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Preface 
a 
This report collects, critically reviews, summarizes, and integrates publicly available information pertaining to understanding 
and managing age-related degradation of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) in nuclear power plants. The two parts 
contain pertinent information useful for understanding aging mechanisms and identifying degradation sites in these systems, 
I structures, and components and managing degradation through effective monitoring and maintenance programs or by 
modifications to operating conditions. Because of its summary nature, the information contained in this report is not intended 
to be sufficiently detailed to satisfy all applications. Extensive references have been provided to guide the reader to more 
comprehensive sources when needed. 
Part 1 of this report reviews information on understanding and managing aging of long-lived, passive, ndnredundant systems 
and components. Other SSCs that have been subjects to NPAR investigations are summarized in Part 2. The SSCs covered in 
Part 2 are active systems used to maintain the desired operational safety margins in nuclear power plants. 
This review should not be considered complete because of the rapidly changing stateof-theart of aging technology and the dif- 
ficulty of identifying, obtaining, and correctly interpreting all existing sources of information. Assessments of aging and its 
mitigation is a complex process subject to differences in interpretation. Perspectives cited in this report should be considered 
preliminary because of the uncertainties generated by the foregoing q ~ a ~ c a t i o n s .  These perspectives do not reflect regulatory 
positions or requirements. 
Abstract 
Aging degradation in safety and support systems of nuclear power plants should be managed to prevent safety margins from 
eroding below the acceptable limits provided in plant design bases. The Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Program, 
conducted under the auspices of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, and 
other related aging management programs are developing technical information on managing aging. The aging management 
process central to these efforts consists of three key elements: 1) selecting structures, systems, and components (SSCs) in 
4 
which aging should be controlled, 2) understanding the mechanisms and rates of degradation in these SSCs, and 3) managing 
degradation through effective inspection, surveillance, condition monitoring, trending, record keeping, maintenance, refurbish- 
ment, replacement, and adjustments in the operating environment and service conditions. This document concisely reviews 
* and integrates information developed under NPAR and other aging management studies and other available information related 
to understanding and managing age-related degradation and provides specific references to more comprehensive information on 
the same subjects. 
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1 Introduction 
For several years the Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Program1 has been developing technical understanding of the 
processes that, through timedependent age-related degradation of systems, structures, and components (SSCs), could reduce 
.C operational safety margins in operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) below acceptable limits. Complementary aging 
management programs are conducted by the Materials Engineering Branch and the Structural and Seismic Engineering Branch 
of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Regulatory Research (RES), Division of Engineering; these 
programs focus on the development of improved nondestructive examination techniques and on understanding and managing 
age-related degradation of NPP pressure vessels, piping steam generators, and civil structures. Parallel programs, focused on 
developing the understanding needed to improve the reliability and prolong the useful life of NPP SSCs, have been instituted 
under the guidance of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). Similar programs are being conducted in other countries, 
and complementary programs are being conducted to improve aging management practices in other industries, such as United 
States commercial and Air Force aviation programs, the U.S. Navy Extended Operating Cycle Program for nuclear 
submarines, and the ~at ional  Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs to develop improved nondestructive 
examination techniques. 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL)' conducted this review to consolidate the information being developed by these programs 
in a form that is "user friendly" for both the NRC staff and NPP licensees. Because of its summary nature, the information 
contained in this report is not intended to be sufficiently detailed to satisfy all applications. Extensive references have been 
provided to guide the reader to more comprehensive sources. 
1.1 Organization 
Part 1 of this report reviews information on understanding and managing aging of long-lived, passive, nonredundant systems 
and components. Other SSCs that have been subjects to NPAR investigations are summarized in Part 2. The SSCs covered in 
Part 2 are active systems used to maintain the desired operational safety margins in NPPs. Degradation of these systems may 
or may not directly affect the operability of the plant, but can impact the overall plant safety. The systems are presented in no 
specific order and not intended to imply any ranking or importance. 
Each section of the report addresses a particular SSC and describes the aging concerns and mechanisms as well as approaches 
to managing the degradation. Further subdivisions are made where significant differences exist between boiling water reactors 
(BWRs) and pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) SSC aging issues. References are provided at the end of each section. 
1.2 Terminology 
Terminology used in this report follows consensus definitions developed by a technical committee composed of members from 
the utility industry and regulatory research (Grant and Miller 1992). 
'Conducted under the auspices of the Division of Engineering, Oftice of Regulatory Research (RES), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 
'PNL is operated by Battelle Memorial Institute for the U.S. Department of Energy. 
1.3 Aging and Research Programs 
The status and accomplishments (through calendar year ICY] 1990) of the NPAR Program are reviewed by Vora (1991); 
Bosnak (1992) gives an updated overview of the program. 
Reports generated in the NPAR Program (through September 1993) are summarized and indexed by Vora (1993); this report 
has been updated annually for 4 years. 
2 
Scott et al. (1992) summarize pertinent insights regarding aging management practices of the United States commercial airline 
industry, the U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber program, the U.S. Navy ballistic submarine fleet, and the Japanese nuclear power 
industry. 
1.4 General Guidance 
Christensen (1992), Dukelow (1992), and Vora and Bums (1989) are good sources for general information regarding the need 
for, and the processes necessary to establish, effective aging management programs. 
Blahnik et al. (1992), Fresco et al. (1993), Gunther and Taylor (1990) and Shah and MacDonald (1993) are good sources for 
summary reviews of insights gained from specific NPAR activities. 
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2 Control Rod Drive Systems 
Reactivity control is achieved in power reactors during startup, shutdown, flux shaping at power, and emergency shutdown 
(scram) by the use of a control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) to position each neutron-absorbing control rod assembly (CRA) 
., within the reactor core. 
2.1 PWR Control Rod Drive Mechanism 
Pressurized-water reactor (PWR) CRDMs are flange mounted on top of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head. A roller 
nut/leadscrew design is used for positioning in Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) plants (Figure 2. I), while a magnetic jack design 
is utilized in Westinghouse and most Combustion Engineering (CE) plants (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). (A rack and pinion 
mechanism is used in two CE plants instead of the magnetic jack type (Figure 2.4).) Externally mounted stator coils are used 
in most models to provide the magnetic field which activates the roller nuts or magnetic latches resulting in control rod 
movement (Grove and Gunther 1993). Loss of AC power results in a rapid gravitydriven insertion of the control rods. 
2.1.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
A wide range of stresses act upon the CRDM and contribute to aging phenomena. ' ~ h e s e  stresses are of diverse nature, 
including mechanical (wear, fatigue, vibration), chemical (corrosion), electrical (arcing, power surges, electrical noise, drift), 
environmental (temperature, radiation, humidity), and miscellaneous (abnormal operating conditions, improper or excessive 
maintenance, testing, and human error) (Grove et al. 1992). 
Table 2.1 summarizes the aging mechanisms that result from these stresses and degrade CRDM components given adequate 
time and proper conditions. Stress corrosion cracking is an aging mechanism that can occur with susceptible materials under 
stress, tensile or compressive, in a corrosive medium. Primary water SCC attacks Alloy 600 components subjected to high 
residual tensile stresses, while transgranular SCC (TGSCC) produces leaks in welds which have been exposed to stagnant con- 
centrations of chlorides and sulfates. Leakage of the primary coolant can cause aging without any stress because of boric acid 
corrosion. Thermal stresses can degrade CRDM components, especially stainless steel castings, by thermal embrittlement or 
low-cycle fatigue. Mechanical wear, in the form of spalling or erosion, deteriorates all mating sub-components. Insulation 
breakdown in the stator or lift coils leads to electrical malfunctions. such as inadvertent rod insertion. 
Failures from 1980 to 1990 were most frequently encountered in the power and logic systems, followed by the CRDM, rod 
position indicator, cables and connectors, and finally in miscellaneous components such as control rods and guide tubes. 
Approximately 40% of these failures were directly attributable to time-dependent aging. Another 30% to 50% may have been 
caused by aging (Grove et al. 1992). 
2.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Table 2.2 summarizes management options for dealing with aging degradation. Performance tests, first among these options, 
are needed to detect aging by trending component degradation. Although common in the nuclear industry, failurelno failure 
tests, such as the meggering of cables, should be replaced by more descriptive inspection techniques. 
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Figure 2.4 Combustion egineering rack and pinion CRDM (Grove and Gunther 1993) 
Electrical components can be analyzed more precisely by an Electronic Characterization and Diagnostics (ECAD) System. 
This system can assess the integrity and operability of various electrical circuits by measuring standard electrical character- 
istics. These data can then be compared against established reference baselines in order to estimate component degradation, 
allowing time for corrective maintenance if necessary (Pentecost et al. 1990). 
Visual inspections help to detect leaks and determine the mechanical condition of the drive shaft, guide tubes, and control rods. 
I During refueling operations, the drive rod, seals, welds, and vent valve can be inspected for physical aging and primary 
coolant leakage. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code requires that at 
least 10% of the welds on periphery housings be examined every 10 years (ASME 1992). Some B&W plants have started a 
gasket inspection program to examine the interior housings as well (Grove and Gunther 1993). 
Table 2.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms in PWR CRDM systems 
Degradation trending is provided by non-invasive, commercially-available advanced monitoring techniques. Motor current 
signature analysis verifies proper CRDM operation by checking for wear, bearing, and seal failures. Infra-red thermography 
inspects electronic components for over-heating. Other advanced monitoring techniques, such as eddy current, ultrasonic, and 
profdometry inspection, help reveal thinning from wear and corrosion. Eddy current monitoring, for example, uses coil 
probes to find defect locations and estimate penetration depth, axial length, circumferential length, and remaining local wall 
thickness (Dobbeni 1990). 
All CRDM components deemed close to failure by the various inspection techniques should be repaired or replaced, depending 
on the component, aging mechanism, and degree of degradation. Corrective maintenance may be facilitated by an operating 
database capable of alerting utility personnel of component failures at other plants (Grove et al. 1992). 
Reference 
Grove, 
Gunther, and 
Sullivan 1992, 
Table 1 
Component 
Spider 
Fuel Assembly 
Guide Tube 
Control Rods 
Split Pin 
Rotor Assembly, 
Latch Assembly 
Leadscrew Drive 
Rod 
Coil Stack 
Vent Valve 
Power and Control 
System 
Rod Position 
lndication Systems 
If aging degradation is not discovered by inspection techniques, aging-related problems may appear during routine reactor 
operation, with the possibility of shutdown. At the Unit 1 Plant on Three Mile Island, an operator noticed an overlap in the 
average positions of two control rod groups. After review, the irregularity was traced to a faulty programmer motor (Licensed 
Event Report 1994). The Palisades Plant was brought from full power to shutdown mode when an abnormal decreasing trend - 
was observed in the level of the volume control tank. Faulty mechanical seals were found to be responsible for this event by 
their leakage of primary coolant (Licensed Event Report 1993). The first incident was handled by the replacement of an entire 
programmer assembly, while the second was corrected by repair of the mechanical seal packages. 
Materials 
Stamless Steel 
Zircaloy-4 
Type 304 Stainless 
Steel Cladding. 
Inconel, Ag-In-Cd, 
B,C Poison 
lnconel 
Stellite, Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Copper Wire, Epoxy, 
Kapton 
Stainless Steel, O-rings 
Semi-conductors, 
Cables, Connectors, 
SCRs 
Reed Switches, 
Stepping Motor, 
Wiring, Cables, 
Connectors, h e a r  
Transformer Detector 
Aging Concerns 
Surface Cracks, Dropped Rod, 
Stuck Rod 
Cracking Wear, Stuck Rod 
Clad Cracking, Poison Wash Out 
Stuck Rod, Loose Parts 
Dropped CRA, Immovable CRA 
Dropped Rod, Immovable CRA, 
Inoperable Locking Mechanism 
Dropped Rod, Electrical Short, 
Voltage Variation, Spurious Rod, 
Control Alarms, Incorrect Rod 
Position 
Inoperable Valve, Primary Coolant 
Leak 
Dropped CRA, Spurious CRA 
Movement, Inoperable Rods, 
Electrical Signal Drifi 
Loss of Position Indication, 
Spurious Position Indication 
Aging Mechanisms 
Stress Corrosion Cracking, 
Wear, Fatigue, Radiation 
Embrittlement 
Wear 
Stress Corrosion Cracking, 
Wear 
Stress Corrosion Cracking 
Wear, Fatigue, Debris Buildup 
Wear, Fatigue, Stress 
Corrosion Cracking 
Corrosion, Wear, Insulation 
Breakdown, Fatigue, Thermal 
Embrittlement 
Corrosion Buildup, Wear, 
Fatigue, Thermal 
Embrittlement 
Corrosion Fatigue, Wear, 
Thermal Degradation, Output 
Draft, Power Surge 
Corrosion, Fatigue, Wear, 
Thermal Degradation, 
Vibration, Electrical Drafi, 
Insulation Breakdown 
Table 2.2 Managing aging in PWR CRDM systems 
2.2 BWR Control Rod Drive Mechanism 
Boiling-water reactor (BWR) CRDMs differ from their PWR counterparts in that they are mechanical-hydraulic devices, rather 
than electrical-mechanical, and that they are mounted on the bottom of the RPV, instead of the top. The bottom mounting 
connects to a flange on the CRDM housing by bolting, while the upper portion joins to the CRA through a coupling assembly. 
A schematic of a BWR control rod drive is provided in Figure 2.5. 
Reference 
Grove, 
Gunther, and 
Sullivan 1992, 
Table 1 
Demineralized water serves as the control rod drive (CRD) system operating fluid and through its movement the.contro1 rod is 
positioned. Each CRDM requires a hydraulic control unit.(HCU) to supply this hydraulic fluid and to regulate its pressure and 
operating flow. An array of valves, pumps,'and headers outside of the HCU, commonly referred to as the balance of the CRD 
system (BOCRDS), provides additional regulation of the operating fluid. 
Management Options 
Conduct NDE performance 
testing and evaluate trends; 
rebuild components that 
approach degradation limits of 
operation; routinely rebuild or 
replace components on a 
10 year frequency; and use 
optimum developed innovative 
tools, equipment, and 
procedures. 
Component 
q 2.2.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Boiling-water reactor stresses are generally the same as those acting upon PWRs (i.e., mechanical, chemical, electrical, and 
environmental). However, these stresses create a unique set of aging concerns because of the diierent reactor operating 
conditions and design. 
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Corrosion Buildup, Wear, 
Fatigue, Thermal 
Ernbrittlement 
Corrosion Fatigue, Wear, 
Thermal Degradation, Output 
Draft, Power Surge 
Corrosion, Fatigue, Wear, 
Thermal Degradation, 
Vibration, Electrical Draft, 
Insulation Breakdown 
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Cladding, Inconel, Ag-In-Cd, 
B,C Poison 
Split Pin Incone! 
Rotor Assembly, Stellite, Stainless Steel 
Latch Assembly 
Lead Screw Drive 
Rod 
Stainless Steel 
Coil Stack Copper Wire, Epoxy, Kapton 
Vent Valve Stainless Steel, O-rings 
Power and Control 
System 
Rod Position . 
Indication Systems 
Semi-conductors, Cables. 
Connectors, SCRs 
Reed Switches, Stepping 
Motor, Wiring, Cables, 
Connectors, lmear 
Transformer Detector 
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Figure 2.5 BWR control rod drive schematic (River Bend Station FSAR) 
Table 2.3 lists the predominant aging concerns along with the responsible mechanisms and affected components. Intergranular 
stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC), most troublesome of the aging mechanisms, attacks metals which have been made susceptible 
during manufacturing by certain heat treatments and welding For instance, the nitriding process weakens the stainless steel collet 
housing by a heat treatment which depletes chromium at the grain boundaries. Transgranular stress corrosion craclung requires a 
hlgh chloride concentration and threshold temperature. Thermal fatigue results from control rod motion, specifically scram and 
rod insertions which produce severe temperature changes in short time periods and thermal gradients across tube walls. 
Corrosion is dangerous not only because of component erosion itself, but also the damage caused by corrosion products. Debris 
can plug areas, like the cooling-water orifice. or become entrapped in filters and under seals. Other aging mechanisms include 
+ thermal embrittlement. mechanical wea1-, rubber degradation. and radiation damage. . 
According to a recent NPAR study, over 59% of system component failures take place in the HCU (valve seals, discs, seats, 
stems, paclung, and diaphragms). Control rod drive mechanism component failures account for about 23% of these failures, 
L 
usually due to wear and aging of the Ciraphitar seals, with the remaining failures in the BOCRDS (Greene 1992). 
Table 2.3 Aging concerns and mechanisms in BWR CRDM systems 
2.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Control rod drive system failures are detected primarily by scheduled testing and routine observation g2%),  occasionally by 
control room observations (24%), and rarely because of a failed service demand (2%) (Greene 1992). Table 2.4 lists several 
testing techniques recommended as management options for assessing component degradation. 
Component 
Index Ttube, Ppiston ?'tube. 
Gguide Ccap, Ccollet 
Aassembl y 
Graphite Seals 
Inner Filter 
Cooling Water Orifice 
Inconel X-750 spud 
CRDM 
Scram Water Accumulator 
Scam Valves and Solenoids 
BOCRDS Valves, Actuator, 
Pumps, Bearings, and Seals 
Maintenance and Replacement 
Activities 
Once system failures are discovered, component servicing (29%) and component replacement (51 %) can restore the CRDM to 
full operation with total CRDM replacement being seldom necessary (19%). Components that should always be replaced when 
rebuilding a CRDM include elastomer seals, Graphitar seals, all locking bands, all o-rings, the cotter pin, safety wiring, spring 
washers and various screws. (Other high-wear components that could be considered for mandatory replacement are the inner 
and outer filters, the check valve ball. strainer, spuds, collet housings, and seal cups IGreene 19921.) 
Aging Concerns 
Leaks. Failure to Operate, 
Cracks 
Leaks 
CRDM Uncoupling 
Restricted Flow 
Uncoupling 
Failure to Operate 
Plugged Orifices 
Failure to Operate 
Leaks, Failure to Operate 
Reliability 
Materials 
Type 304L. Stamless 
Steel 
Graphite 
(not provided) 
(not prov~ded) 
Inconel X-750 
Type 304L Stainless 
Steel 
Cr Plated Type 304L 
Stainless Steel 
(not provided) 
(not provided) 
(not applicable) 
Aging Mechanisms 
Corrosion, Intergranular Stress Corrosion 
Cracking Degraded Nitride Surfaces 
Scarred Surface from Loose Crud, 
Thermal Degradation 
Reassembly Error 
Loose Crude Plugs Orifice 
Deformation 
Deformation and Corrosion During 
Storage 
Separation of Cr Plating 
Wear, Intergranular Stress Corrosion 
Crackmg 
Wear, Adjustment Drift Erosion 
Operator Error, Incorrect Replacement 
Materials 
Reference 
Greene 1992 
p. 27-32 
Table 2.4 Managing aging in BWR CRDM systems 
Component 
Index Tube, Piston 
Tube, Guide Cap, 
Collet Assembly 
Graphite Seals 
Inner Filter 
Cooling Water 
Orifice 
lnconel X-750 
spud 
CRDM 
Scram Water 
Accumulator 
Scam Valves and 
Solenoids 
BOCRDS Valves, 
Actuator, Pumps, 
Bearings, and 
Seals 
Maintenance and 
Replacement 
Activities 
Aging Mechanisms 
Corrosion, Intergranular 
Stress Corrosion 
Cracking, Degraded 
Nitride Surfaces 
Scarred Surface from 
Loose Crud, Thermal 
Degradation 
Reassembly Error 
Loose Crude Plugs 
Orifice 
Deformation 
Deformation and 
Corrosion During 
Storage 
Deparation of Cr Plating 
Wear, Anter Dranular 
Etress corrosion 
cracking 
Wear, Adjustment Drift, 
Erosion 
Operator Error, 
Incorrect Replacement 
Materials 
Materials 
Type 304L. 
Stainless Steel 
Graphite 
(not provided) 
(not provided) 
Inconel X-750 
Type 304L 
Stainless Steel 
Cr-plated Type 
304L Stainless 
Steel 
(not provided) 
(not provided) 
(not provided) 
Management Options 
Trend degradation with 
performance testing; 
Rebuild components 
showing performance 
degradation or replace 
after 10 years service; 
Replace Type 304 SS 
Models A, B, and C collet 
assembly drives with Type 
304L SS Models D, E, and 
F; 
Monitor stall flows; 
Vacuum bottom of reactor 
vessel around guide tubes; 
Replace with new 
improved seal materials 
Test for Proper Installation 
Monitor drive 
temperatures; Retrofit 
cooling water orifices with 
upgrade kit 
Test for disengaged 
CRDM; Replaced 
damaged spud 
Inspect for corrosion and 
deformation; Handle and 
store in approved supports 
and store in 
triethanolamine or 
desiccant 
Test for plugged orifices; 
Replace with Type 304L 
liner 
Inspect for wear and 
corrosion; Rebuild 
degraded components 
Conduct periodic vibration 
signature analyses testing; 
Rebuild degraded 
components 
Use Optimum Innovative 
Tools, Equipment, and 
Procedures 
Reference 
Greene 1992 
p. 27-32 
A guideline of criteria was developed for the urgency of CRDM replacement based upon plant questionnaire responses 
(Greene 1 992) : 
Priority 1 CRDMs - Must be exchanged or rebuilt if the following occur 
1. Excessive scram times 
2. CRDM does not fully insert during a scram 
# 
3. CRDM has a history of uncoupling 
4. CRDM will not fully withdraw 
L 
5. CRDM consistently has a withdrawal stall flow great than 5 gpm 
Priority 2 CRDMs - Should be exchanged or rebuilt 
1. Consistently high temperatures (> 177"C(> 350°F)) throughout length of travel 
2. Unacceptable withdrawal or insertion times (unrelated to HCU) 
3. Repeated episodes of "double-notching" when moving, or CRDMs that continually require increased drive pressures to 
move (unrelated to HCU) 
4. CRDMs with high or abnormal friction traces (not attributable to misalignment with fuel assemblies). 
Boiling-water reactors are subject to the same ASME Code inspection requirements as PWRs. In addition to the ASME visual 
inspections, other testing methods, not mandated by law, have proven effective in assessing system operability and perform- 
ance. The leak-rate and stroke tests check rebuilt drives for component problems prior to insertion in the reactor vessel. 
Leaks are discovered by running hydraulic fluid through the drive while the stroke test determines if the CRDM will protract 
under normal design pressures. Stall flow tests, both insert and withdrawal, estimate the degree of seal degradation by meas- 
uring in-situ flow rates. Measured rates can then be trended and compared against maximum limits (e.g., 19 lpm (5 gpm) for 
withdrawal stall flows) to indicate whether maintenance is necessary. Differential pressure (AP) testing employs electronic test 
equ'ipment to record piston pressures at test ports in the HCU manifold and high point vent valves. The relationship between 
piston-over (PO) and piston-under (PU) AP values can reveal valve defects in the HCU and extreme driveline friction in the 
CRDM (General Electric 1975). 
Database management software is available to aid in the acquisition, display, and storage of operational performance data. 
Historical trends of this data can be analyzed to diagnose operational problems and/or component deterioration. DRIVEX, for 
example, is a computer program that combines the interactive input of symptoms with the comparison of AP traces (actual vs. 
reference) to pinpoint the cause of operational problems (General Electric 1990). 
Crud, or debris, travels through the coolant, collecting under Graphitar seal sets and clogging filters. Not only does crud 
degrade the seals, it also accelerates corrosion by abrading and pitting component surfaces. Crud accumulation can be miti- 
gated by 1) flushing the CRDM (General Electric 1976), 2) vacuuming in and around guide tubes during refueling outages, and 
f 
3) changing the filters in the normal supply water more frequently. 
Better materials and design enhancements should continue to improve CRDM performance. Toshiba, for instance, has devel- 
oped a new carbon seal ring more resistant to cracking and has modified the design of the inner filter base configuration to 
e avoid control rod uncoupling. 
Difficult conditions, such as high temperature, poor visibility, and cramped working areas, frustrate maintenance personnel 
during CRDM change out. Special training and equipment can improve the efficiency and safety (e.g., radiation exposure) of 
under vessel operations. Most special training is practiced on mock-up units, which provide valuable, "hands-on" experience 
for workers (Werres and Thornton 1990). Bubble suits, temporary lighting, portable air conditioners, as low as reasonably 
achievable (ALARA) shields, and advanced handling tools are all examples of special equipment (Greene 1992). 
Other existing technologies that could be considered as management options include 1) an automated inspection system that 
incorporates ultrasonic, eddy current, and visual inspection techniques from the refueling bridge to examine in-core housings 
and stub tube welds (Richardson 1990); 2) industrial pyrometers that detect solenoid coil degradation by monitoring and trend- 
ing surface temperatures; and 3) hydrogen injections that alter water chemistry to minimize IGSCC damage to stub-tube welds. 
4 
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3 Reactor Protection System 
The Reactor Protection System (RPS) is the principal information-gathering and decision-making system to ensure safe 
operation of the reactor. To guarantee the integrity of the reactor and to avoid undue risk to the health and safety of the pub- 
b lic, an elaborate reactor protection structure is needed. The fundamental purpose of the RPS is to prevent the release of radio- 
activity into the environment by protecting the fuel and the pressure boundary. To achieve this, the RPS acts to prevent unsafe 
operation of the reactor, which could lead to accident conditions. The prevention of unsafe operation is accomplished when 
the RPS initiates a reactor trip to shut down the reactor. The RPS measures critical parameters that describe whether the 
reactor is operating within a safe performance envelope, alarms when an unsafe performance condition is being approached, 
and initiates a reactor trip when safe operating limits are exceeded. In the event that an accident does occur, the RPS initiates 
engineered safety features to prevent further development or deterioration of potentially unsafe conditions in mitigating the 
severity and consequences of the accident. 
Because of its important contribution to plant safety, the RPS is designed, constructed, and tested to meet the highest stan- 
dards. The system must be able to supply reactor and component trip signals and initiate engineered safety features to provide 
the required degree of protection for all normal operating and accident conditions. A simplified block diagram of the RPS is 
shown in Figure 3.1: a typical sensor channel is shown in Figure 3.2. The nuclear and process instrument subsystems send 
trip signals to the logic trains. There are two complete and independent sets of logic circuits in the RPS cabinets, as shown in 
Figure 3.3; each set constitutes a logic train. When an unsafe condition is sensed, a signal is sent to the RPS cabinets. If a 
reactor trip is required, the RPS logic sends a signal to open the reactor trip breakers. Tripping these breakers removes power 
from the control rod drive mechanisms for Pressurized-Water Reactors, allowing the rods to drop into the reactor core, thus 
shutting down the reactor. If an engineered safety feature actuation is required, the RPS logic actuates the appropriate safety 
equipment, depending on plant conditions. Permissive signals are also provided by the logic trains to allow automatic or 
rnanualjy initiated interlocks and bypasses. 
There are usually four reactor protection channels with a trip sensor string in each channel. Each of the trip strings also 
has dual isolated components to provide component redundancy. Only one of the many trip sensors has to actuate to trip the 
entire channel. Two channels have to trip to cause the entire RPS to trip. This process is called two-of-four logic, and it p r e  
vents the accidental tripping of the RPS by a spurious signal in only one channel. The resulting high degree of redundancy of 
the RPS prevents total system failure while allowing for individual component failures. 
3.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
A number of reviews have been performed on the various individual components that make up the better portion of the 
Reactor Protection System. Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) studies of the RPS were conducted by Idaho National 
Engineering Laboratory (Meyer 1988; S h a m  1992), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Gehl et al. 1992), and Wyle 
Laboratories (Gleason 1992). These studies provided the technical basis for the RPS standard technical specifications (STS) 
aging evaluation. Additional information was obtained from publications by Edson (1992), Gleason (1991a), Gleason (1991b), 
v Hashemian (1991), Husler and Weir (1991), IEEE Standard 1205-1993, Meyer and Edson (1990), and Shah (1987). Data 
review is presently continuing to update and enhance the available information so that more informed decisions can be made. 
In the work by Meyer (1988), the components within the RPS have been identified based on materials susceptible to aging. In 
general, materials most often cited as weak links in terms of aging are electrical insulation, seals and gaskets, and electronic 
components. In addition, circuit breakers and relays are also susceptible to aging. Below is a brief review of the aging 
concerns and mechanisms of the RPS components. A summary is provided in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Simplified reactor protection system block diagram 
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The associated components are: 
A OVERTEMPERATURE 
(1) Sensors und Transminers - The important subcomponents in th is category are the Pressure Transducers which can be 
classified as strain gauge type and capacitance type. 
- 
(2) Cables, Connectors, and Terminals - The subcomponents in t h i s  category are Instrument and Coaxial Cables for which the 
Insulation, Insulation Jacket, and Sheath are most vulnerable to aging. 
Figure 3.2 Typical reactor protection system sensor channel (pressure) 
(3) Electrical Penetrac1'0ns - The subcomponents in this category that are most vulnerable to aging are 1) Terminal Strip 
Assembly, 2) Shrink Tubing, 3) 0-Ring Seal, 4) Interfacial Seal, and 5) Insulator Plug Skirt. 
(4) Circuit Breakers - The mechanical parts are subject to wear due to testing. The failure rate increases for most types after 
the sixth year of service. Routine maintenance &d refurbishment minimize breaker problems. 
(5) Relays - All types of relays have problems with vibration and wear. Normally, energized relays fail more often than d e  
energized relays because of thermally induced damage to the organic coil and housing components. 
Reichmanis et al. (1993) present the processes and mechanisms of irradiation of polymeric materials. 
3.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
The aging degradation of the components of the Reactor Protection System can be managed by applying the recommended 
ISM methods, i.e., periodic visual inspection, calibration, verifying operational characteristics, and by the normal component 
replacement programs. Too frequent testing is detrimental to the life of many of these components as are stresses caused by 
human errors such as rough handling or testing with values of current, voltage, pressure, etc., above the acceptable or recom- 
C mended limits. However, Meyer (1988) and Beranek et al. (1989 p. 30) suggest that knowledge gained from engineering 
designs, applications, tests, and operating experience be utilized. Also, data from in s i t .  assessments, condition monitoring, 
record keeping, and post-service examination and tests are essential for developing suitable deterministic models and for risk 
assessments , component prioritization, and trending analysis. Such information may allow the detection of sudden component 
failures before they occur. Table 3.2 summarizes the methods of managing aging degradation and provides references. 
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Table 3.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms in reactor protection systems 
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Component 
Sensors/Transmitters 
Printed Circuit Board 
Housing Seals 
Terminal Block 
Housing 0-Rings 
CablesIConnectors 
Insulation 
Insulation Jacket 
Sheath 
Penetrations 
Terminal Strip 
Assembly 
Shrink Tubing 
0-Ring Seal 
Interfacial Seal 
Insulator, Plug Skirt 
Circuit Breakers 
Relays 
Material 
Epoxy Glass 
Laminate 
Ethylene 
Phenolic 
EPDM 
Cross Linked 
Polyethylene 
PVC 
Neoprene 
Glass Filled 
Phenolic 
Polyolefm 
Elastomer 
Dow Corning 
Sylgard 
Polysulphone 
Aging 
Concerns 
Cracking 
Seal Opening, 
Cracking 
Cracking 
Interface 
Pressure Drop 
Leakage 
Currents 
Cracking 
Cracking 
Cracking 
Cracking 
Cracking 
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Cracking 
Cracking 
Loss of 
Operation 
Loss of 
Operation 
Aging Mechanisms 
Radiation 
Embrittlement 
Creep, Hardening 
Radiation 
Embrittlement 
Creep, Hardening 
Radiation Aging 
Radiation 
Embrittlement 
Radiation 
Embrittlement 
Radiation 
Embrittlement 
Radiation 
Embrittlement 
Creep, Hardening 
Creep, Hardening 
Radiation 
Embrittlement 
Wear, Vibration, 
Resistive Heating 
Wear, High-Cycle 
Fatigue 
Table 3.2 Managing aging degradation 
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Materials 
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Cross-Linked 
Polyethylene 
PVC 
Neoprene 
Glass filled 
Phenolic 
Polyolefin 
Elastomer 
Dow Corning 
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Aging 
Mechanisms 
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Radiation Aging 
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Cracking 
Loss of 
Operation 
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Cracking 
Management 
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Trend Testing 
Sampling 
Trend testing 
Trend Testing 
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4 Standby Liquid Control System (BWR) 
The Standby Liquid Control (SLC) system is a backup reactivity control system that is unique to General Electric BWR 
designs. If a BWR experiences an anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) event, where control rods cannot be inserted 
. into the reactor and heat is being added to the suppression pool, the emergency operating procedures will dictate that the SLC 
system be initiated. If action is not taken to control reactor power under these conditions, it is possible that the heat capacity 
limit of the primary containment could be exceeded and the primary containment integrity could be challenged. The SLC 
system will inject sodium pentaborate solution into the reactor vessel as the reactivity control agent. It is injected into the 
bottom of the core where it mixes with the reactor coolant. Sodium pentaborate contains boron-10, which has a high 
absorption cross section for thermal neutrons (Walker et al. 1983). 
The SLC system consists of a stainless steel storage tank, a pair of full capacity positive displacement pumps, two motor- 
operated suction valves, two explosive actuated discharge valves, and the necessary valves and associated piping and instru- 
mentation to inject the sodium pentaborate into the reactor vessel. In addition, the system includes a test tank with the 
necessary valves and piping to adequately test system performance by injecting demineralized water instead of sodium penta- 
borate into the RPV. A simplified one-line diagram of the SLC system is shown in Figure 4.1. Some facility systems have 
accumulators, located on the SLC pump discharge lines, designed to dampen the pressure pulsation from operation of the 
positive displacement pumps. 
Figure 4.1 Typical standby liquid control system 
The sodium pentaborate is stored in the storage tank and is maintained at a specific temperature, tank level, and concentration 
to ensure that the minimum shutdown requirement of 660 ppm boron concentration is available to be injected into the RPV 
within a 50- to 125-minute period. 
4.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
In the study by Buckley et al. (1992) the SLC system relief valves were identified as the most troublesome component that 
appeared to be affected by aging. Most relief valve failures were identified as setpoint drift attributed to mechanical wear. + 
There were a few relief valve failures linked to sodium pentaborate build up and corrosion. Relief valve failure was a concern 
because the relief valve must work properly for the system to be reliable. 
The study noted some other components that were affected by aging: pumps, accumulators, and the system instrumentation. 
The types of aging concerns that were found in these components did not result in sig
nifi
cant system failures. Table 4.1 
summarizes the aging concerns and mechanisms identified by the study. 
Concerns were also raised that stainless steel components that are exposed to borated media could cause SCC in stainless steel 
components exposed to that environment. The cracking is suspected to be linked to the concentration of chlorides and sulfates 
that contaminate the media. The Buckley et al. (1992) study found no evidence that this type of stress corrosion cracking 
existed in the SLC system; however, continued study is recommended. 
4.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Table 4.2 summarizes the recommended methods to manage and mitigate the aging concerns. 
To manage the aging isBues of the system relief valves, the Buckley et al. (1992) study recommends that the surveillance 
interval for testing the valves become more frequent, at least once every refueling outage, so that the setpoint drift problem can 
be closely monitored. 
The pumps, accumulators, and instrumentation are subject to aging primarily due to normal wear. Current surveillance 
intervals and techniques appear to be adequate. 
Table 4.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms in SLC xystems 
Component 
Relief Valves 
Pumps 
Accumulators 
Instrumentation and 
Control 
Material 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
(not applicable) 
Aging Concerns 
Setpoint Drift Leading 
to Reduced Boron 
Injection 
Degradation of Seals, 
Internal Check 
Valves, and Pump 
Packing 
Failure to Maintain 
Nitrogen Gas Pressure 
Due to Failure of 
Nitrogen Gas Bladder 
Setpoint Drift Leading 
to Reduced Boron 
Injection 
Aging Mechanisms 
Wear, Corrosion 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
References 
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Buckley et al. (1992) 
Buckley et al. (1 992) 
Buckley et al. (1992) 
Table 4.2 Managing aging degradation of SLC systems 
Even though the threat of SCC in the SLC system appears to be minimal, preventive measures are still recommended. Stress 
corrosion cracking can be managed by monitoring the sodium pentaborate solution for sulfide and chloride contaminants. This 
type of surveillance should take place upon receipt of the Borax and boric acid ingredients of the sodium pentaborate, and also, 
periodically, a sample from the solution in the storage tank should be analyzed. Further study should be conducted to deter- 
mine what levels of sulfides and chlorides would constitute a threat to the SLC system. 
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Relief Valves 
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Aging Mechanisms 
Wear, Corrosion 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
Management 
Options 
Increase Surveillance 
Interval and Monitor 
for Setpoint Drift 
Maintain Normal 
Maintenance and 
Durveillance Practice 
Maintain Normal 
Maintenance and 
Surveillance Practice 
Maintain Normal 
Maintenance and 
Surveillance Practice 
References 
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5 Engineered Safety Systems 
+ 
The Engineered Safety Systems include the residual heat removal, the high pressure injection, the high pressure coolant 
injection and the high pressure core spray systems. These systems provide heat removal and/or coolant inventory control in 
the primary coolant system. 
* 
5.1 Residual Heat Removal System 
The primary function of the residual heat removal (RHR) system is to transfer heat from the core and reactor coolant system 
(RCS) during plant shutdown and refueling operations. The system is also employed with the safety injection system for emer- 
gency core cooling system (ECCS) under LOCA conditions. The system is designed to perform the following functions: 
to provide core cooling in the unlikely event of a LOCA (this cooling is intended to prevent excessive core heat up, 
si@icant cladding-water reactions, fuel melting, or significant alteration of core geometry) 
to limit suppression pool water temperature (in BWRs) 
to remove decay heat and sensible heat from the RCS while the plant is shut down for refueling and servicing 
to condense reactor steam so that decay and residual heat may be removed if the main condenser is not available at hot 
standby (in BWRs) 
to supplement the fuel and containment pools cooling and cleanup system capacity when necessary to provide additional 
cooling capability. 
The RHR system in PWRs receives water from the RCS hot legs, cools it, and pumps it back to the cold legs or core flooding 
tank nozzles. The low-pressure RHR system is isolated from the RCS when the reactor coolant pressure is higher than the 
RHR system design pressure by valves in the RHR pump suction and discharge lines. The heat removed in the heat exchang- 
ers is transported by the component cooling water or service water system. The RHR system is also used to fill, drain, and 
remove heat from the refueling canal during refueling operations, to circulate coolant through the core during plant startup 
prior to RCS pump operations, and in some cases to provide an auxiliary pressurizer spray. 
The RHR system in BWRs typically consists of pumps, valves, heat exchangers, piping, pipe supports and constraints, electri- 
cal instrumentation, and controls. The RHR system for a typical BWR plant is shown in Figure 5.1. In the shutdown cooling 
mode, the BWR RHR system can also be used to supplement spent fuel pool cooling. The low-pressure RHR piping is pro- 
tected from high RCS pressure by isolation valves. The steam condensing mode of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) 
operation in BWRs (when included in the plant design) provides an alternative to the main condenser or nonnal RCIC mode of 
operation during the initial cooldown. Steam from the reactor is transferred to the RHR heat exchangers where it is con- 
* 
densed. The condensate is piped to the suction side of the RCIC pump. The RCIC pump returns the condensate to the reactor 
vessel. The heat removed in the heat exchangers is transported to the ultimate heat sink by the service water system. An 
aging assessment of the RCIC system has been performed by Lee (1994). 
Figure 5.1 RHR system for a typical BWR plant 
5.1.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
A large percentage of RHR failures in BWRs is aging related (Lofaro et al. 1989). Many of these failures resulted in degraded 
operation of the RHR system. The system with a failed component could still perform its functions; however, the failed com- 
ponents eventually required repair or replacement. The dominant failure mechanisms in a BWR RHR system were found to be 
wear and calibration drift (Lofaro et al. 1989). 
The predominant failure mode was leakage in pumps and valves followed by loss of function and erroneous signals in instru- 
mentation and controls. Detailed results on research on valves have been performed by Greenstreet et al. (1985) and Haynes * 
(1989). Key RHR system aging degradation concerns and mechanisms are presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for RHR systems 
Heat Exchanger Tubes Corrosion, Debris, 
5.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
An effective approach to managing aging degradation must include a preventive maintenance program that periodically tests, 
monitors, and inspects RHR components to detect degradation and provide criteria for repairs and replacement prior to failure. 
Programs that develop data from testing for trending analyses should be implemented (Lofaro et al. 1989). These should 
include periodic valve stroke time as well as pump bearing temperature and vibration. Pump and valve control circuits must 
be tested periodically to demonstrate functionability. Leaks are detected by visual inspections. Some management options for 
mitigating aging degradation of RHR systems through inservice inspections are listed in Table 5.2. 
5.2 High Pressure Injection System (PWR) 
The high pressure injection system (HPIS) in a PWR is part of the ECCS and is shown in Figure 5.2. It provides high 
pressure injection of borated water from the borated water storage tank (BWST) to prevent uncovering the core for small 
LOCAs and to delay uncovering the core for intermediate sized LOCAs. 
High-head centrifugal motor-driven pumps inject borated water into the cold-leg piping. The HPIS can also be used to cool the 
core following a reactor shutdown when heat cannot be removed by the steam generator. The charging flow passes through 
the shell side of the regenerative heat exchanger for recovery of heat from the letdown flow before returning to the RCS cold 
leg via the charging nozzles. Some plants use the HPIS system for normal primary coolant system charging and seal injection 
water for the reactor coolant pumps. Motor operated valves and check valves regulate the flow. 
The low pressure injection system (LPIS) is part of the overall ECCS and also pumps borated water from the BWST for long- 
8 
term core cooling following accident conditions. During the high pressure recirculation mode of operation, the HPIS pumps 
water from the LPIS output. 
a The charging inlet nozzles have thermal sleeves that protect the nozzle from thermal shocks. 
Table 5.2 Managing aging degradation in RHR systems 
5.2.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
The HPIS system consists of pumps, valves, instrumentation and controls, and high-pressure piping capable of delivering 
borated water to the reactor core. The most frequent agerelated failures are electrical and mechanical control malfunctions for 
pumps and valves. Boron crystallization from leaking packing and seals or faulty heat tracing has caused valves and pumps to 
malfunction. Borated water leaking on to carbon steel parts of HPIS components and on to adjacent systems has caused corro- 
sion. The potential for fatigue failure of the stainless steel pipe and nozzles resulting from loose thermal sleeves or valve seat 
leakage is of special concern. 
References 
Lofaro et al. 1989, 
p. 4.3 
Lofaro et al. 1989, 
p. 4.5 
Lofaro et al. 1989, 
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Aging degradation is a significant concern in HPIS systems, because failure of certain components would make the systems 
unavailable. The most common general failure modes are leakage and failure to operate as designed. Key HPIS system aging 
degradation concerns and mechanisms are listed in Table 5.3. The most commonly failed components are nozzles and thermal 
sleeves, valves, valve operators, instrumentation and control components, pumps, pipe supports, and pipes. The mechanisms 
causing these failures include wear aggravated by improper lubrication, corrosion, erosion, fatigue caused by vibration and 
operation cycles, thermal and radiation embrittlement, water hammer, setpoint drift, and out-of-calibration instrumentation 
(Meyer 1989). The degradation mechanisms associated with the charging nozzles and safety injection nozzles have been 
indicate$ by Shah and MacDonald (1 993). 
Management Options 
Volumetric Inspection 
Trend Bearing 
Temperature, Lubricant 
Pressure 
Trend Differential 
Pressure, Pump Power 
Volumetric Inspection 
Monitor Leakage 
Visual Inspection 
Monitor Bolt Torque 
Minimize Water Hammer 
Visual Inspection 
Visual Inspection 
Trend Flow, Flow 
Resistance 
Recalibrate 
Operability of the LPIS is essential to provide borated water to the HPIS during the high pressure recirculation mode of opera- 
tion. Because the LPIS also consists of pumps, valves, and piping, its aging degradation mechanisms are similar to those .# 
affecting the HPIS. Debris, paint flakes, or loose material due to aging could potentially damage both the LPIS and HPIS dur- 
ing the high pressure recirculation mode of operation. 
Aging 
Mechanisms 
Erosion, Corrosion 
Wear, Fatigue 
Creep, Hardening 
Wear 
Wear 
Corrosion 
Wear 
Erosion, Corrosion 
Corrosion, Erosion 
Corrosion, Erosion 
Corrosion, Debris, 
Erosion, Wear 
-- 
Component 
Pump Impeller 
Pump Bearing 
Pump Seals 
Pump Casing 
Valve Seal (Packing) 
Valve Body 
Valve Seat 
Valve Internals 
Heat Exchanger Tubesheet 
Heat Exchanger Channel Head 
Heat Exchanger Tubes 
Instrumentation and Control 
Materials 
Stainless Steel 
Carbon Steel 
Polymeric 
Carbon Steel 
Asbestos 
Stainless Steel 
EPDM 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Carbon Steel 
304L Stainless 
Steel or CuNi 
(not 
Applicable) 
Figure 5.2 High-pressure injection system for a typical PWR plant 
Table 5.3 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for HPI systems 
Component 
Nozzles 
Thermal Sleeves 
Valve Seal 
Valve Body 
Valve Seat 
Valve Internals 
Instrumentation 
and Control 
Pump Impellers 
Pump Bearings 
Pump Seals 
References 
Meyer 1989, p. 36; Shah 
and MacDonald 1993, 
p. 241 
Meyer 1989, p. 36 
Meyer 1989, p. 36 
Meyer 1989, p. 36 
Materials 
Low Alloy Steel 
Stainless Steel, 
Ni-Cr Alloy 
Asbestos 
Stainless Steel 
Polymeric 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Carbon Steel 
Polymeric 
Aging Concerns 
Through-wall 
Cracking, 
Leakage 
Loose, Broken 
Thennal Sleeves 
Leakage 
Thinning 
Leakage 
Distortion 
Calibration Drift 
Distortion 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal Fatigue 
Thermal Fatigue, 
Vibration 
Wear 
Wear 
Corrosion 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear, Vibrations, 
Fatigue 
Wear, Fatigue 
5.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
An effective approach to managing aging degradation must include a preventive maintenance program that periodically tests, 
monitors, and inspects HPIS components to detect degradation and provide criteria for repairs and replacement prior to failure. 
Pump and valve control circuits must be tested periodically to demonstrate functionability. Leaks are detected by visual 
inspections; prompt repair prevents aggravation of problems from boron crystal build-up in pumps and valves and boric acid 
corrosion of carbon steel parts. Operating practices that reduce thermal cycling will reduce cracking of pipes and nozzles from 
thermal fatigue; thermal sleeve integrity and valve leakage must also be monitored. Detection of cracking in welds and high 
stressed areas of base metal requires enhanced ultrasonic testing. Some management options for mitigating aging degradation - ' 
of HPIS systems through inservice inspections are listed in Table 5.4. These have been indicated by Meyer (1989). The 
in-service inspection methods for charging and safety injection nozzles are outlined in Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
5.3 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (BWR) 
The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system is part of the ECCS in a BWR and is an engineered safety feature (ESF). 
The HPCI system is found in the BWR-3 (except Millstone 1) and BWR-4 designs (Conley et al. 1994). The purpose of the 
HPCI system is to 1) maintain adequate reactor vessel, water inventory for core cooling on small break LOCAs, 2) depressur- 
ize the reactor vessel to allow the low pressure ECCS system to inject on intermediate break LOCAs, and 3) back up the 
RCIC system or isolation condenser. 
The HPCI system is an independent ECCS requiring no AC power, plant service and instrument air, or external cooling water 
systems to perform its purposes. The HPCI system is normally aligned to remove water from the condensate storage tank and 
pump the water at high pressure to the reactor vessel via the feedwater piping. HPCI consists of a steam turbine, turbine 
pump, valves, high pressure piping, two water sources, and instrumentation. 
5.3.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Aging degradation is a significant concern in the ECCS systems, because failure of certain components would make the system 
unavailable. The most common general failure modes are leakage and failure to operate as designed. Key HPCI system aging 
degradation concerns and mechanisms for HPCI systems are listed in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.4 Managing aging degradation in HPI system 
Component 
Nozzles 
Thermal Sleeves 
Valve Seal 
Valve Body 
Valve Seat 
Valve Internals 
Instrumentation 
and Control 
Pump Impellers 
Pump Bearings 
Pump Seals 
Materials 
Low Alloy 
Steel 
Stainless Steel, 
Ni-Cr Alloy 
Asbestos 
Stainless Steel 
Polymeric 
Stainless Steel 
- 
Stainless Steel 
Carbon Steel 
Polymeric 
Aging 
Mechanisms 
Thennal Fatigue 
Thermal Fatigue, 
Vibration 
Wear 
Wear 
Corrosion 
Wear 
- 
Wear 
Wear, Vibrations, 
Fatigue 
Wear, Fatigue 
Management Options 
Surface and Volumetric 
inspections 
Volumetric Examination of 
Welds, Loose Parts 
Monitoring 
Operational Tests 
Visual Inspection 
Operational Tests 
Visual Inspection 
Test, Recalibrate 
Visual Inspection 
Testing 
Testing 
References 
Meyer 1989, p. 36; Shah 
and MacDonald 1993, 
P 
Meyer 1989, p. 36 
Meyer 1989, p. 36 
Meyer 1989, p. 36 
Table 5.5 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for HPCI systems 
Tables 2 and 37 
The most commonly failed components are valves, valve operators, instrumentation and control components, pumps, turbines, 
piping, and pipe supports. The mechanisms causing these failures include wear aggravated by improper lubrication, corrosion, 
erosion, fatigue caused by vibration and operation cycles, thermal and radiation embrittlement, water hammer, setpoint drift, 
and out-of-calibration instrumentation (Conley et al. 1994). 
The emergency core cooling system standby safety systems are frequently tested to ensure operability; however, testing and 
maintenance often cause many of the same stressors as normal operation. These tests may contribute to premature failures, 
wear, and aging degradation in some components. Other aging stressors also active during system standby conditions may act 
synergistically to degrade components. A single failure of the pump assembly, the turbine, the flow controller, or any one of 
several valves will render the system inoperable. Any aging degradation occurring in these components should be monitored 
and mitigated wherever possible to prevent system inoperabiity to an automatic- or manual-initiation signal. 
5.3.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Some management options for mitigating aging degradation of HPCI systems through in-service inspections are listed in 
Table 5.6. Most of the ECCS is covered by the ASME Section XI (ASME 1992) code rules for Class 2 systems (i.e., Subsec- 
tion WC), although the piping up to the first isolation valve is covered by the rules for Class 1 components (i.e., Subsection 
IWB), and some RCIC system components may also be covered by the ASME code rules for Class 3 systems (i.e., Subsection 
IWD). Pressure retaining welds in ECCS vessels must be examined volumetrically at each inspection interval, and nozzles in 
vessels greater than 'h inch (1.27 cm) nominal thickness must be examined by either surface, volumetric, or both methods 
(depending on the specific weld configuration) during each inspection interval. During normal plant operation, much of the 
RCIC system contains static water, and portions of the RHR system may contain static water. Hence, the potential for corro- 
sion is such that spot checks of the accessible internal surface areas should be conducted during the later service years to verify 
the absence of corrosion products and other evidence of deterioration. 
Most failures were detected during testing and operations. Maintenance accounts for nearly 14% of the detected failures in 
HPCI systems. The high percentage of failures detected during surveillance testing and operation is an indication that only a 
a very small number of failures are identified during preventive maintenance before they cause a system malfunction (Conley 
et al. 1994). Additional information on trending degradation in pumps is provided by Guy (1992). Hoyle (1992) discusses the 
comprehensive test and other considerations for pump testing. Stockton (1992) examines problems associated with in-service 
testing of pumps. Haynes (1992) discusses several diagnostic techniques developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) 
for monitoring pumps and valves. 
Table 5.6 Managing aging degradation in HPCI systems 
Tables 2 and 37 
The following recommendations are based on the studies by Conley et al. (1994): 
High failure rates and failures found during testing could be reduced by updated preventive maintenance programs that 
include most recent methods for detecting, monitoring, and controlling aging degradation. Further improvement could be 
made by upgrading codes and standards to include aging degradation considerations. 
The incidence of water hammer events could be reduced by design and procedure modifications for opening isolation 
valves and by implementing drain pot, keepfull, void detection, and venting system improvements. 
The wear and aging degradation caused by fast starts could be reduced if the HPCI response time were relaxed to 
60 seconds. 
The HPCI system would be running and available for immediate return to full service without a challenging startup if the 
systems were switched to recirculation to the coolant storage tank after water level recovery has been verified. 
Damage to the pump from deadhead operation could be prevented by modifying the minimum flow valve operating logic to 
ensure that the valve is open when the pump starts and closes when the pump is not running. 
The service life of motor-operated valve (MOV) power cables could be extended by using cables capable of conducting the 
locked rotor current, which is much higher than the nameplate full load current. 
Overstressing of valve stem and valve seats could be reduced by not electrically backseating the valves. 
Stress corrosion cracking could be reduced by replacing materials in valves that are susceptible to SCC, such as Type 410 
stainless steel bolting and 174PH swing arms with high residual stresses. .I 
HPCI failures could be reduced by as much as 40% by incorporating wear monitoring, improved inspection, systematic 
troubleshooting, repairing and trending degradation. 
Wear, corrosion, and aging degradation could be reduced if vendor specified lubricants were systematically used. 
5.4 High Pressure Core Spray System (BWR) 
'The high pressure core spray (HPCS) system is part of the ECCS in a BWR and is an ESF. The HPCS system is found in 
BWR-5 and BWR-6 (Conley et al. 1994). The purpose of the HPCS system is to 1) maintain reactor inventory after small 
break LOCAs that do not depressurize the RPV, 2) provide spray cooling heat transfer during breaks in which the core is cal- 
culated to become uncovered, and 3) act as a backup to the RCIC system that maintains vessel water inventory in the event of 
a reactor vessel isolation. The flow diagram of a typical HPCS system is shown in Figure 5.3. 
The HPCS system employs a keepfull approach for void-prone systems and motordriven, rather than turbinedriven pumps. 
It has been reljable, but the failure rate may increase with age. It has, however, experienced a higher number of instrument 
failures and related instrument failure causes such as setpoint drift and being out of calibration. 
I 
5.4.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Aging degradation is a significant concern in the ECCS systems, because failure of certain components would make the system 
unavailable. The most common general failure modes are leakage and failure to operate as designed. Key HPCS system aging 
degradation concerns and mechanisms are listed in Table 5.7. The most commonly failed components are valves, valve 
operators, instrumentation and control components, pumps, turbines, piping, and pipe supports. The mechanism causing these 
failures include wear aggravated by improper lubrication, corrosion, erosion, fatigue, thermal and radiation embrittlement, 
water hammer, setpoint drift, and out-of-calibration instrumentation (Conley et al. 1994). 
Emergency core cooling system standby safety systems are frequently tested to ensure operability; however, testing and 
maintenance often cause many of the same stressors as normal operation. These tests may contribute to premature failures, 
wear, and, aging degradation in some components. Other aging stressors also active during system standby conditions may act 
synergistically to degrade components. A single failure of the pump assembly, the turbine, the flow controller, or any one of 
several valves will render the system inoperable. Any aging degradation occurring in these components should be monitored 
and mitigated wherever possible to prevent system inoperability to an automatic- or manual-initiation signal. 
5.4.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Some management options for mitigating aging degradation in HPCS systems through inservice inspections are listed in 
Table 5.8. Most of the ECCS systems are covered by the ASME Section XI code rules for Class 2 systems (i.e., Subsection 
IWC), although the piping up to the first isolation valve is covered by the rules for Class I components (i.e., Subsection WB), 
and some RCIC system components may also be covered by the ASME code rules for Class 3 systems (i.e., Subsection IWD). 
Pressure retaining welds in ECCS vessels must be examined volumetrically at each inspection interval, and nozzles in vessels 
greater than % inch (1.27 cm) nominal thickness must be examined by either surface, volumetric, or both methods (depending 
on the specific weld configuration) during each inspection interval. 
During normal plant operation, much of the ECCS system contains static water, and portions of the RHR system may contain 
static water. Hence, the potential for corrosion is such that spot checks of the accessible internal surface areas should be 
conducted during the later service years to verify the absence of corrosion products and other evidence of deterioration. 
Most failures were detected during testing and operations. Maintenance accounts for nearly 14% of the detected failures in 
HPCSs. The high percentage of failures detected during surveillance testing and operation is an indication that only a very 
small number of failures are identified during preventive maintenance before they cause a system malfunction (Conley et al. 
* 1994). 
The following recommendations are based on the studies by Conley et al. (1994). 
* 
High failure rates and failures found during testing could be reduced by updated preventive maintenance programs that 
include most recent methods for detecting, monitoring, and controlling aging degradation. Further improvement could be 
made by upgrading codes and standards to include aging degradation considerations. 
n Containment 
Figure 5.3 Flow diagram of a typical HPCS 
' The incidence of water hammer events could be reduced by design and procedure modifications for'opening isolation 
valves and by implementing drain pot, keepfull, void detection, and venting system improvements. 
The wear and aging degradation caused by fast starts could be reduced if the HPCS response time were relaxed to 
60 seconds. 
The HPCS would be running and available for immediate return to fuu service without a challenging startup if the systems 
were switched to recirculation to the coolant storage tank after water level recovery has been verified. 
Table 5.7 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for HPCS systems 
1994, Tables 2 and 
Table 5.8 Managing aging degradation in HPCS systems 
Damage to the pump from deadhead operation could be prevented by modifying the minimum flow valve operating logic to 
ensure that the valve is open when the pump starts and closes when the pump is not running. 
The service life of MOV power cables could be extended by using cables capable of conducting the locked rotor current, 
which is much higher than the nameplate full load current. 
Overstressing of valve stem and valve seats could be reduced by not electrically backseating the valves. 
Stress corrosion cracking could be reduced by replacing materials in valves that are susceptible to stress corrosion 
cracking, such as Type 410 stainless steel bolting and 174PH swing arms with high residual stresses. 
u 
HPCS failures could be reduced by as much as 40% by incorporating wear monitoring, improved inspection, systematic 
troubleshooting, repairing and trending degradation. 
Wear, corrosion, and aging degradation could be reduced if vendor specified lubricants were systematically used. 
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6 Auxiliary Feedwater System (PWR) 
.I 
The auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) normally supplies high pressure feedwater to the steam generators (SGs) during 
startup, hot standby, and shutdown. It also functions as an emergency system for the removal of heat from the primary system 
when the main feedwater system is not available for emergency conditions, including small-break LOCA cases. Under certain 
v accident scenarios (involving reactor coolant system-to-secondary coolant system leakage), the AFWS is also supposed to 
provide a liquid bamer to the offgas from the RCS. A schematic drawing of the AFWS is shown in Figure 6.1. 
The AFWS operates long enough either to hold the plant at hot standby for several hours or to cool down the primary system, 
at a rate not to exceed limits specified in technical specifications, to temperature and pressure levels at which the low-pressure 
decay heat removal system can operate. The AFWS must perform these functions whether or not offsite electrical power is 
available. Consequently, the system contains, in addition to electrical motordriven pumps, a steam turbinedriven pump, the 
steam supply for which are the steam generators themselves. 
Condensate 
Storage Tank 
Steam 
Generator 
I\ v 
Blowdown 
Service Water 
(Backup Supply) 
Main 
Steam 
Figure 6.1 Schematic of the AFWS 
The water flow boundaries of the AFWS extend from the condensate storage tank (normal operation), to the connections with 
the steam generators, which are made either through a connection to the main feedwater piping or through separate auxiliary 
feedwater piping and auxiliary feedwater nozzle connected directly to the steam generators. The AFWS also interfaces with 
the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System and with the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) and the electrical power 
systems. All pumps, valves, piping, inter-connections, and cross-connections are included in the AFWS, together with all 
sensors, manually and automatically actuated control equipment, and the automated feedbacWcontrol system for the turbine. 
Since July of 1981, the license applicants have included in their license docket the generic short- and long-term recommends- 
tions identified in NUREG-061 1(NRC 1980a) and NUREG-0635 (NRC 1980b) ; an acceptable method for meeting these s 
recommendations is to show, by performing a reliability analysis in accordance with item II.E.l.1 of NUREG-0737 (NRC 
1980c), that the AFWS has an unreliability of not greater than per demand. 
6.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
The major aging concerns for the AFWS identified in Casada (1990, 1992) are listed in Table 6.1. The AFWS is essentially a 
backup system, designed to provide feedwater to the SGs under various accident conditions. The system components are 
rarely or never tested under the complete set of conditions and demands associated with the accident scenarios. To do so 
would in some cases be deleterious to other plant systems, under most AFWSIother equipment configurations. Thus, the 
ovemding aging concern for the AFWS is that wear or degradation might go undetected for components that are rarely tested, 
or not tested in design demand condition; and that this undetected degradation could cause system failure or functional 
degradation if the AFWS were called on for its (safety-related) design functions. 
The time-related degradation of auxiliary feedwater pumps of PWRs has been addressed in some detail (Adams and Makay 
1986; Kitch et al. 1988; Adams 1992) and methods for detecting and monitoring degradation have been reviewed (Kitch et al. 
1 988). 
Table 6.1 Understanding aging of the auxiliary feedwater system 
Instrumentation an Corrosion, Debris 
Adams and Makay 1986, 
6.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
The aging degradation and concerns for specific AFWS components were summarized in the previous section. In this section, 
the options for better managing the aging for this system are discussed. Options for detecting and/or mitigating aging-related 
degradation are summarized in Table 6.2. 
With regard to flow path maintenance, the most prevalent degradation will be the malfunction of valves in full-flowlflow 
1 control demand situations. Nondestructive testing (NDT) methods have now been developed to remotely assess the function 
and condition of such valves; these methods should be used where practical during routine testing or operation to ensure that 
the crucial valves are fully operable. 
w Another aspect of flow path maintenance is piping corrosion and foulinglplugging, especially in little-used piping runs, such as 
those proceeding tolfrom the service water system. Modem methods of NDT on such piping runs, combined with modem 
methods of corrosion and biota control, should be applied to ensure the continued reliability of piping and fittings. This must 
be supplemented with periodic pressure testing of all critical piping and fittings at the demand pressures. 
The fraction of AFWS degradation that has historically been found during demand events, as well as the number and types of 
failure and degradation sources that were found to not be detectable by the monitoring methods in place at the Reference Plant, 
indicate the need for improvements in certain aspects of the current monitoring practices. While there are no guidelines to 
establish what is an acceptable level of failures detected during demand, the rate indicated by the failure data review (about 
18% of all system degradation was detected during demand conditions) appears excessive. 
The Reference Plant review also revealed that the ability of some components to function as required under design basis or off- 
normal conditions is not verified periodically. This was found to be the case particularly where multiple component interaction 
is involved. 
Table 6.2. Managing Aging Degradation of the AFWS 
Component Material Aging Mechanisms 
Valve Body Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
Corrosion, Debris 
Buildup 
Fatigue, Wear 
Corrosion 
Wear 
Wear, Fatigue 
Fatigue, Corrosion 
Fatigue, Corrosion 
Carbon Steel 
Management Options References 
Advanced NDT Methods 
Wear Tracking 
Wear Tracking 
Wear Tracking 
Improved Testing 
Methods 
Established Testing and 
Maintenance Procedures 
- 
- 
- 
- 
On-line Fatigue 
Monitoring, Acoustic 
Emission Monitoring 
Valve Seat 
Kueck 1993 
Kitch et al. 1988, p. 71, 
Table 5.1 
Shah and MacDonald 1993, 
p. 552 
Elastomer 
Valve lntemals Stainless Steel 
Valve Packing P m ,  
Graphite 
Instrumentation and 
Control 
Components: 
-- 
Pump Impeller 
Pump Diffuser 
Pump Casing 
Pump Bearings 
Piping and Piping 
Connections 
Auxiliary Feedwater 
Nozzle 
Alloy Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Cast Carbon 
Steel, Cast 
Stainless Steel 
Tin-Based 
Babbitt 
Carbon Steel, 
Low-Alloy 
Steel 
Low-Alloy 
Steel 
Mitigation of these problems involves more comprehensive and better planned periodic testing. Tests must be structured that 
activate the critical relays and electronics via realistic pseudo signals and, further, verify that the component responses result in 
appropriate physical changes to the system configuration and permit required operator interactions (e.g., that the crossover and 
valves respond as advertised). 
Kueck (1993) provides recommendations for alternate methods of performing testing that would greatly reduce equipment 
degradation caused by testing and would improve verification of system operability. The primary areas where alternate test 
methods are discussed are AFWS pump testing, I&C functional verification, and check valve testing. 
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7 Containment Heat Removal System 
The containment heat removal systems perform their intended function by controlling pressure and temperature inside the 
containment. In PWRs, they also assist in fission product cleanup by removing radioactive iodine from the containment 
. atmosphere following an accident in which radiation leakage occurs. 
Ln all PWRs except one (Yankee Rowe), containment cooling is provided by a containment spray system which operates by 
pumping water through spray nozzles located at the top of the containment structure to cool the containment atmosphere (see 
Figure 7.1). In most PWRs, containment fan coolers are also provided as a backup to the containment spray system. These 
fan coolers blow the containment air across cooling coils to remove heat (see Figure 7.2). 
With the exception of one plant (Big Rock Point), which uses a dry containment, all BWRs in the United States use a pressure 
suppression containment. This design includes a large pool of water inside the containment structure, called the suppression 
pool, and a drywell structure in which the reactor is housed. In pressure suppression containments for BWRs, cooling is pro- 
vided by a containment spray system (similar to that used in PWRs) to both the drywell and the suppression pool sections 
along with a suppression pool cooling system (see Figures 7.3 and 7.4). The suppression pool cooling system, is actually an 
operating mode of the RHR system, the aging issues of which have been discussed in Section 5.1 of this report. 
For this study, the definition of containment system used herein limits the systems addressed to those that are required to func- 
tion to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The containment heat removal systems that operate only during normal plant 
operation have not been addressed. 
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Meale and Satterwhite (1988) analyzed nuclear plant operational data contained in the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System 
(NPRDS) and found that aging was the primary factor in the failure of several fan cooling system components, including cir- 
cuit breakers, blowers, motors, pumps, and electromechanical controllers. Recently b f a ro  et al. (1994) analyzed containment 
spray systems and fan cooler systems for aging-related failures in both PWRs and BWRs. They showed that environmental 
stressors (corrosion, erosion, vibration, fatigue, wear, dirtldust, etc.) contribute significantly to component failure in contain- 
ment heat removal systems. Table 7.1 summarizes the aging mechanisms and degradations resulting from these stressors for 
the major components. 
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7.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
The components of a successful program to manage aging degradation are broadly twofold: 1) inservice inspection, surveil- 
lance, and monitoring methods (incorporating non-destructive evaluation [NDE] and residual life assessments, where appropri- 
ate, as well as parameter trending and record-keeping) to assess the magnitude and rate of aging degradation; and 2) control 
+ 
measures to mitigate the adverse impacts of component aging on plant safety and capacity factors. These methods for manag- 
ing aging degradation are discussed below and summarized in Table 7.2 for the containment heat removal system. 
1 Lofaro et al. (1994) examined plant-specific data on currently used inservice inspection, surveillance, and monitoring (ISM) 
methods for containment spray and fan cooler systems. Specifically these include pumps and valves for containment spray 
systems and valves/dampers and cooling coils for fan cooler systems. The ISM practices are indicated in Table 7.2 for the 
indicated components. It is to be noted that several of these methods were found to be effective in detecting and mitigating 
some but not all the aging mechanisms in these systems and improved methods are required (Lofaro et al. 1994, Table 5.4). 
Table 7.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms for containment heat removal systems 
Lofaro et al. (1994) recommend a detailed study on determining most effective monitoring and maintenance practices to detect 
and mitigate aging degradation on containment heat removal system components. Such a study should address the most 
common types of aging problems exhibited industry wide, and problems specific to certain plant operating conditions. 
7.3 References 
Component 
Containment Spray Valve 
Internals 
i i t e  
Containment Spray Valve Seat 
Containment Spray Heat 
Exchanger Tubes 
Containment Spray 
Instrumentation and Control 
Containment Spray Circuit 
Breakers 
Containment Spray Pump Bearing 
Containment Spray Pump Seal 
Fan Cooler Dampers and Valves 
Fan Cooler lnstrumehtation and 
Control 
Fan Cooler Circuit Breakers 
Fan Cooler Cooling Coils 
Lofaro, R., M. Subudhi, R. Travis, A. DiBiasio, A. Azarm, and J. Davis. 1994. m e  Eflects of Age on Nuclear Power Planr 
Containment Cooling Systems. NUREGICR-5939, Prepared by Brookhaven National Laboratory for the U.S. Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Aging Concerns 
Distortion 
Material 
Stainless Steel 
Elastomer 
Copper Nickel AUoy 
(not applicable) 
Weld Metal 
Cast lron 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
(not applicable) 
(not applicable) 
Copper Nickel AUoy 
Meale, B. M., and D. Sattenvhite. 1988. An Aging Failure Survey of Light Water Reactor Safety System and Componenrs. 
NUREGICR-4747, Vol. 2 ,  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Erosion, Corrosion 
References 
Lofaro et al. 1994, 
Table 3.1 
Leakage 
Plugging, Leakage, 
Fouhg 
Incorrect Signal 
Contact Loss 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Incorrect Reading 
Loss of Contact 
Leakage Plugging, 
Fouling 
Wear 
Debris, Corrosion, 
Wear 
Calibration Drift 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
Calibration Drift 
Fatigue 
Debris, Corrosion, 
Wear 
Lofaro et al. 1994, 
Table 3.1 
Lofaro et al. 1994, 
Table 3.1. 
Lofaro et al. 1994, 
Table 3.1 
Lofaro et al. 1994, 
Table 3.1 
Lofaro, et al. 1994, 
Table 3.1 
Lofaro et al. 1994, 
Figures 4.37, 4.38. 
Lofaro, et al. 1994, 
p. 4-26, and Figure 
4.37 
Lofaro et al. 1994, 
Figures 4.34 and 4:35 
Lofaro et al. 1994, 
Figure 4.40 
Table 7.2 Managing aging degradation of containment heat removal systems 
References 
Lofaro et al. 
1994, Table 5.1 
. -- 
-- 
-- 
- 
-- 
Lofaro et al. 
1994, Table 5.1 
Lofaro et al. 
1994, Table 5.1 
Lofaro et al. 
1994, Table 5.2 
Lofaro et al. 
1994; Table 5.2 
Component 
Containment Spray Valve 
Internals 
Containment Spray Valve 
Packing 
Containment Spray Valve Seat 
Containment Spray Heat 
Exchanger Tubes 
Containment Spray 
Instrumentation and Control 
Containment Spray Circuit 
Breakers 
Containment Spray Pump 
bearing 
Containment Spray Pump Seal 
Fan Cooler Dampers and Valves 
Fan Cooler Instrumentation and 
Control 
Fan Cooler Circuit Breakers 
Fan Cooler Cooling Coils 
Management Options 
Venfy correct position (3 1 days) 
Verify stroke time (quarterly/cold 
shutdown) 
Verify full stroke (cold shutdown1 
refueling) 
Verify relief valve set pressure 
(5 years) 
Venfy automatic valves actuate 
on hi-hi containment pressure 
signal (18 mos) 
Repair or Rreplacement 
Recalibrate, Replace Worn Parts 
Readjust, Replace Worn Parts 
Verify pump head within limits 
(quarterly) 
Verify pump flow within limits 
(quarterly) 
Verify pump vibration within 
limits (quarterly) 
Venfy adequate discharge 
pressure in recirculation mode 
(31 days) 
Verify pump starts in hi-hi 
containment pressure signal 
(18 mos) 
Verify automatic operation for 
operated components (1 8 mos) 
Recalibrate, Replace Worn Parts 
Verify Cooling Water Limits 
(1 8 mo) 
Venfy Pump Head Within Limits 
(quarterly) 
Readjust, Replace Worn Parts 
Verify No External System Leakage 
(3 Y-) 
Hydro Test (10 years) 
Material 
Stainless steel 
PFTE, 
Graphite 
Elastomer 
Copper Nickel 
AUoy 
Weld Metal 
Cast Iron 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Copper Nickel 
UOY 
Aging Mechanisms 
Erosion, corrosion 
Wear 
Wear 
Debris, Corrosion, 
Wear 
Calibration Drift 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
Calibration Drift 
Fatigue 
Debris, Corrosion, 
Wear 
8 Instrument and Control Power Systems 
This chapter covers the NPAR activities concerning Batteries, Battery Chargers and Inverters. The first section covers the 
batteries and the second deals with the chargers and inverters. 
. 
8.1 Batteries 
Batteries are used in NPPs to provide an emergency power source to vital safety-related functions in the event of AC power 
loss. The power is delivered directly to critical DC loads or, via DC-to-AC inverters, to critical AC loads such as emergency 
diesel generator (EDG) starter motors, circuit breakers. control relays, annunciators, and safety-related instrumentation (Berg, 
Shao, et al. et al. 1994). If there is a station blackout (all offsite power is lost and the EDGs do not start), safe shutdown is 
possible by battery-supplied power to equipment which monitors and controls plant parameters. These batteries consist of 
many individual Pb-acid storage cells connected together by flat plates with Pb-Ca grids. Other types of cells, such as Pb-Sb 
or Ni-Cd, are used in only a few nuclear plants and are not considered in this subsection. During normal operation, the 
batteries are kept fully charged by the battery charger, which also supplies power to the DC subsystem. 
8.1.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Batteries .are subjected to a variety of electrical, mechanical, thermal, chemical, electrochemical and environmental stressors 
that contribute to battery degradation. Table 8.1 tabulates these stressors along with the affected components, aging concerns, 
and aging mechanisms. 
According to Berg, Shao, et al. (1994), the predominant aging mechanisms are 1) material chemical changes, 2) corrosion, 
3) fatigue, 4) wear, 5) thermal aging, 6) gassing and electrolyte evaporation, and 7) fouling. Material chemical changes, often 
due to the presence of contaminants, are caused by chemical reactions with susceptible components. Corrosion of 
subcomponents, both metallic and organic, results from long-term exposure in oxidizing environments. Cyclic loading and 
temperature fluctuations can both initiate and propagate cracks in materials by fatigue cracking. Gradual material loss occurs 
in valve-regulated batteries by the wear of contacting parts, particularly pressure relief valves. Thermal aging embrittles non- 
metallic~ and weakens the dielectric strength of insulating materials. Electrolytic water can be lost by evaporation or an 
overcharge induced decomposition. The latter phenomenon, called gassing, generates oxygen which can loosen the active 
materials in the plates and diminish battery capacity. Fouling refers to the accumulation of dust or dirt on electrical equipment , 
that may resist, short circuit, or ground the flow of current. 
An example of corrosive degradation is the thermally induced oxidation of grids and top conductors. This oxidation stresses 
the container by plate swelling, producing electrolyte leakage through newly formed cracks and an increased susceptibility to 
vibration, as in a seismic event (Edson and Hardin 1987). 
8.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Table 8.2 contains aging management guidelines for all of the components. The recommended aging management programs 
and techniques were derived from a survey of 6 utilities covering 17 plants (Berg, Shao, et al. 1994). From this survey the 
a programs were evaluated for effectiveness and divided into two groups. Only the first group, commonly used aging 
management techniques, will be described in this section. Requirements for maintenance, testing, and replacement of batteries 
are provided in IEEE Std 450-1987 (IEEE 1987) and Regulatory Guide 1 .I29 (NRC 1978a). Batteries maintained according to 
the practices recommended in these two documents should provide reliable service for their qualif~ed life (Edson 1990). 
Table 8.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms for batteries' 
Preventive maintenance programs assess a battery's condition through routine inspections and operability checks. The fre- 
quency of inspections is dictated by plant Technical Specifications and IEEE Std 450-1987 (EEE 1987). Surveillance 
procedures use similar methods but yield more conclusive information about the state of battery degradation. For example, 
surveillance programs precisely evaluate battery performance by capacity tests. 
Component 
Plates, Grid, 
Active Material 
Electrolyte 
Separator 
Container 
TOP 
Conductor1 
Straps 
Terminal Posts 
Racks 
Terminal Post 
Seals 
Intercell 
Connectors and 
Associated 
Hardware 
'Berg et al. 1994; 
"Good housekeeping" programs verify equipment operability by the routine logging of parameters, such as ambient tempera- 
ture, float voltage, and charging current, during operator walkdowns. Online monitoring warns control room personnel of 1 
abnormal or fault conditions so that annunciator response procedures can be initiated. Corrective maintenance programs, like 
annunciator response procedures, can be applied in response to observed abnormalities, but can also mitigate future aging. 
For example, the damage caused by sulfation and hydration can be minimized by the coriective procedure of equalizing 
charge. 
Material 
LeadILead- 
Calcium/ 
Lead-antimony1 ' 
Lead Diox~de 
Sulfuric Acid 
RubberIGlass Mat 
or Microporous 
Polyethylene 
Polycarbonate, 
Styrene 
Acrylenitrite, 
Butadiene Styrene 
Lead Alloy 
(sometimes with 
copper) 
Lead Alloy 
(sometimes with 
copper inserts) 
Steel, Fiberglass 
Rubber, Plastic 
Lead-Plated Copper 
p.  3-3 to 3-5 and 4-16 to 
Applicable Stressors 
Normal Charging, Overcharging, 
Undercharging, Impurities, 
ChargeID~scharge Cycles. 
Seismic Events 
Undercharging, Overcharging, 
Impurities, Elevated Temperature 
Overdischarging, Overcharg~ng, 
Excessive ac Ripple. Elevated 
Temperature 
Improper Cleaning Solvents, 
Plate Growth. Handling, 
Elevated Temperature 
Normal Charging, Overcharging, 
Elevated Temperature, 
ChargelDischarge Cycles, 
Seismic Events 
Humidity, Dust and Dirt, 
Electrolyte LeaksISpills, 
Improper Handling 
Electrolyte LeaksISpills, 
Humidity, Seismic Events 
Plate Growth, Terminal Post 
Corrosion, Elevated Temperature 
Humidity, Dust and Din, 
Electrolyte LeaksISpills, 
Improper Handling 
4-24. 
Aging Concerns 
Loss of Active Material, 
Reduced Capacity, 
Battery Failure 
Reduced Capacity 
Internal Short Circuits, 
Reduced Capacity, 
Battery Failure 
Cracked Container, 
Electrolyte Leakage, 
Reduced Capacity 
Reduced Capacity, 
Banery Failure 
High Connection 
Resistance, Short 
Circuits, Reduced 
Output, Banery Failure 
Rack Failure, Loss of 
Battery 
Loss of Electrolyte, 
Reduced Capacity, 
Battery Failure 
High Connection 
Resistance, Reduced 
Output 
Aging Mechanism 
Material Chemical 
Changes, Corrosion, 
Fatigue, Gassing 
Material Chemical 
Changes, Gassing, 
Electrolyte Evaporation 
Material Chemical 
Changes, Thermal 
Aging 
Material Chemical 
Changes, Fatigue, 
Thermal Aging 
Corrosion, Fatigue 
Corrosion, Fatigue, 
Fouling 
Corrosion, Fatigue 
Fatigue, Thermal 
Aging 
Corrosion, Fatigue, 
Fouling 
Table 8.2 Managing aging degradation for batteries 
According to IEEE Std 535-1986 (IEEE 1986), battery seismic testing is required and must be performed at end-of-life 
conditions. This standard, endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.158 (NRC 1989), explains that naturally aged batteries are 
preferred for testing, but also includes acceptable methods of accelerated aging. 
+ Operational experience reviews compile and analyze recurring problems at many plants, including the host facility, in order to 
abate these problems through corrective measures. Performance trending, a part of this program, observes changes in battery 
parameters, like cell specific gravity and voltage, so that effective surveillance, maintenance, and/or replacement can be 
scheduled. 
Aging Management 
Follow practices recommended in RG 1.129' and IEEE 
Std 450- 1980' 
Apply commonly used programs and techniques, as 
appropriate:' 
Preventive maintenance 
Surveillance program 
"Good housekeeping" practices 
On-line monitoring and annunciator response 
procedures 
Corrective maintenance procedures 
Class 1E battery seismic qualification 
Operational experience reviews and trending 
Apply less commonly used programs and techniques, as 
appropriate:' 
Continuous environmental monitoring and 
environment mitigation 
Sample cell analysis 
Battery charger output waveform monitoring 
Battery impedance testing 
Battery conductance testing 
Infrared thennographic inspection 
Periodic battery replacement 
Potential surveillance tests for detecting seismic 
vulnerability 
Component 
Plates, Grid, 
Active Material 
Electrolyte 
Separator 
Container 
Top Conductor1 
Straps 
Terminal Posts 
Racks 
Terminal Post 
Seals 
Intercell 
Connectors and 
, Associated 
Hardware 
' Regulatory Guide 
IEEE Std 450-1987 (IEEE 1987) 
' Ber, Shao, et a1 1994; pp 1-4 to 1-10 
Material 
LeadlLead-Calcium1 
Lead-AntimonyILead 
Dioxide 
Sulfuric Acid 
RubberlGlass Mat or 
Microporous Polyethylene 
Polycarbonate, Styrene 
Acrylenitrite, Butadiene 
Styrene 
Lead Alloy 
(sometimes with copper) 
Lead Alloy 
(sometimes with copper 
inserts) 
Steel, Fiberglass 
Rubber, Plastic 
Lead-Plated Copper 
1.129, Rev. 1 (NRC 1978a) 
Aging Mechanism 
Material Chemical 
Changes, Corrosion, 
Fatigue, Gassing 
Material Chemical 
Changes, Gassing, 
Electrolyte Evaporation 
Material Chemical 
Changes, Thermal Aging 
Material Chemical 
Changes, Fatigue, 
Thermal Aging 
Corrosion, Fatigue 
Corrosion, Fatigue, 
Fouling 
Corrosion, Fatigue 
~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ,  ~ h ~ ~ l  ~~i~~ 
Corrosion, Fatigue, 
Fouling 
8.2 Battery Chargers and Inverters 
Nuclear power plants use battery chargers and inverters to supply power to safety-related equipment, instrumentation, and 
controls. Battery chargers convert plant auxiliary AC power to regulated DC power for plant requirements, primarily the 
charging and floating of standby batteries, as well as for input into inverters. Inverters convert DC input power from a battery 
or battery charger to AC power for supplying critical ac loads, typically instrumentation and controls equipment necessary for 
safe plant operation and shutdown (Berg, Stroinski, et al. 1994). Battery chargers and inverters are considered together in this 
subsection because of their similarities in design, construction, parts, and materials. Both components experience similar 
environments and operational stressors and have the same subcomponents, such as diodes, relays, capacitors, integrated 
circuits, etc. 
Three types of battery charger designs are used at nuclear facilities: the silicon controlled rectifier (SCR) solid state type, the - 
controlled ferroresonant type, and the magnetic amplifier type. The SCR, or thyristor solid state charger, is most commonly 
used, making up nearly 75% of the population, and is the only charger type that is qualified to IEEE Std 323 (IEEE 1983) data 
and IEEE Std 650-1990 (IEEE 1990). Four basic inverter designs are currently in use: the ferroresonant transformer, the 
pulse-width modulated. the quasi-square wave, and the step wave. The first two types are used most often, with the last two 
types making up less than 20% of the inverter population. 
8.2.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Battery chargers and inverters are exposed to generally the same stressors that act upon batteries (see Section 8.1.1). 
Table 8.3 shows the aging concerns and mechanisms which result from these stressors to degrade battery charger and inverter 
components. 
Corrosion, fatigue, wear, thermal aging, and fouling are all aging mechanisms which damage battery charger and inverter 
components and have been previously described in Section 8.1.1. Aging mechanisms unique to charges and inverters are elec- 
tronic drift, setpoint drift, and material set. Electronic drift degrades circuitry by time-dependent changes in electronic mate 
rials, resulting in the loss of calibration accuracy. Setpoint drift is the result of thermal aging, corrosion, wear, and fatigue 
working independently or synergistically over time (Berg, Stroinski, et al. 1994). Material set requires the hardening, gelling, 
or adherence of an organic component to adjacent materials, causing binding or misoperation of relays and circuit breakers. 
8.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Table 8.4 summarizes effective programs for the management of aging caused by the mechanisms previously described. As 
with Table 8.2, commonly used programs are listed here along with less commonly used ones. IEEE Std 650-1990 (IEEE 
1990) provides quaMcation requirements for battery chargers and inverters and helps identify any scheduled surveillance1 
maintenance, periodic testing, and component replacement necessary to maintain qualification. Regulatory Guide 1.1 18 (NRC 
1978b) focuses on general criteria for periodic testing. 
Aging management programs for battery chargers and inverters are largely similar to the battery aging management programs 
described in Section 8.1.2. Programs that can be considered identical are 1) "good housekeeping" practices - operator rounds, 
logs, and checklists; 2) online monitoring and annunciator response procedures; and 3) operational experience reviews and 
trending. Unique to battery chargers and inverters, however, are the equipment qualification and infrared thermographic 
inspection programs. The equipment qualification program uses performance testing and parameter analysis to assess compo- 
nent reliability. The infrared thermographic inspection program uses infrared technology to detect "hot spots" for thermal 
aging and fatigue. 
The rest of the techniques are similar in approach to the battery programs but different in detail. Preventive maintenance 
activities include the cleaning of dirt and debris, visual inspections for leaks and discolorations, tactile inspections, and calibra- rn 
tions. Surveillance programs verify acceptable component performance through periodic testing and observation beyond that 
required by Technical Specifications. Corrective maintenance, such as component replacement and cleaning, is performed in 
response to abnormalities or failures. Future aging can also be mitigated with certain procedures applied during corrective 
maintenance (Gunther et al. 1988). 
Table 8.3 Aging concerns and mechanisms for battery chargers and inverters' 
Aging Concerns 
Transformer Failure 
Inductor Failure 
Coil Failure 
Contact Failure 
BindinglMisoperation 
Setpoint Drift (Timing and Sensing Relays) 
Chatter 
Capacitor Failure 
SCR Failure 
Diode Failure 
Surge Suppressor Malfunction 
Surge Suppressor Failure 
Circuit Board Output Changes 
Circuit Board Failure 
Signal Degradation 
Contact Degradation 
RestrikeIShorting 
BindinglMisoperation 
Contact Degradation/Failure 
BindinglMisoperation/Feilure 
Contact Degradation 
Potentiometer Failure 
Wire and Cable Failure 
Degraded PerfomncelFailure 
Degraded PerformancelFailure 
Loss of Structural Integrity 
Components 
Transformers 
Inductors 
Relays 
Capacitors 
Silicon Controlled 
Rectifiers 
Diodes 
Surge Suppressor 
Circuit Boards Resistors1 
Transistors 
Circuit Breakers 
Switches 
Potentiometers 
Wires and Cables 
Cooling Fans 
Cooling Fan Motors 
Cabinet 
'Berg, Stroinski, et el. 1994; 
- 
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal Aglng, Thermal Stress 
Thermal Fatigue, Corrosion, Fatigue 
Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal Fatigue, 
Corrosion, Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal Stress, 
Corrosion, Wear, Electronic Drift, 
Fatigue, Material Set, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal Stress. 
Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging. Thermal Stress, 
Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal Stress, 
Thermal Fatigue, Electronic Drift, 
Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal Stress, 
Thermal Fatigue, Electronic Drift, 
Corrosion, Fatigue, Fouling 
Corrosion, Fouling, Thermal Aging, 
Wear, Fatigue, Material Set 
Corrosion, Thermal Aging, Fouling, 
Wear, Fatigue 
Corrosion, Wear, Electronic Drift, 
Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Corrosion, Fatigue, 
Fouling 
Corrosion, Wear 
Thermal Aging, Corrosion, Wear, 
Fouling, Fatigue 
Corrosion 
p. 4-13 to 4-16. 
Table 8.4 Managing aging degradation for battery chargers and inverters 
Aging Management 
Follow practices recommended in RG 1.1 18' and IEEE Std 650- 
1990' 
Apply commonly used programs and techniques, as 
appropriate:' 
Preventive Maintenance Program 
Technical Specification Surveillance Program 
"Good Housekeeping" Practices - Operation Logs and 
Checklists 
On-line Monitoring and Annunciator Response Procedures 
lnfrared Thennographic Inspection Program 
Corrective Maintenance 
Operational Experience Reviews and Trending 
Apply less commonly used programs and techniques, as 
appropriate:' 
Environment Mitigation 
Waveform Monitoring 
Insulation Resistance Testing 
Transformer Turns Ratio Testing 
Sample Removal and Analysis 
Equipment Replacement/Refurbiahment 
Environmental Monitoring 
Transient Monitoring and Recording 
Vibration Diagnosis 
Components 
Transformers 
Inductors 
Relays 
Capacitors 
Silicon Controlled 
Rectifiers 
Diodes 
Surge Suppressor 
Circuit Boards Resistors1 
Transistors 
Circuit Breakers 
Switches 
Potentiometers 
Wires and Cables 
Cooling Fans 
Cooling Fan Motors 
Cabinet 
' Regulatory Guide 1.1 18, 
IEEE Std 650-1990 @EE 
' Berg, Stroinski, et al. 1994; pp. 5-14 to 5-17. 
Berg, Stroinski, et al. 1994; pp. 5-27 to 5-32. 
- 
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal Aging, Thermal 
Stress, Thermal Fatigue, 
Corrosion, Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal 
Fatigue, Corrosion, Fatigue. 
Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal 
Stress, Corrosion, Wear, 
Electronic Drift, Fatigue, 
Material Set, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal 
Stress, Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal 
Stress, Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Fatigue, 
Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal 
Stress, Thermal Fatigue, 
Electronic, Drift, Fatigue, 
Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Thermal 
Stress, Thermal Fatigue, 
Electronic Drift, Corrosion, 
Fatigue, Fouling 
Corrosion, Fouling, Thermal 
Aging, Wear, Fatigue, Material 
Set 
Corrosion, Thermal Aging, 
Fouling, Wear, Fatigue 
Corrosion, Wear, Electronic 
Drift, Fatigue, Fouling 
Thermal Aging, Corrosion, 
Fatigue, Fouling 
Corrosion, Wear 
Thermal Aging, Corrosion, 
Wear, Fouling, Fatigue 
Corrosion 
Rev. 2 (NRC 1978b). 
1990). 
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9 Emergency Diesel Generator 
* 
The EDG system provides electrical power to the Class 1C bus in the event of a loss of offsite AC power. All EDG system 
components are located in the mild environment outside of containment and there is no basic difference in the PWR and the 
BWR applications. Each EDG unit is a complete, independent electric power generating system, consisting of a diesel engine, 
.. generator, electrical controls, auxiliary subsystems, and the engine support subsystems for 1) fuel oil storage and transfer, 
2) cooling water, 3) engine starting, 4) engine lubrication, and 5) combustion air intake and exhaust. Each of these subsystems 
is described below. 
The EDG fuel oil storage and transfer subsystem includes all-tanks, pumps, and piping up to the connection to the engine 
interface as defined by the engine manufacturer or unit specifications. 
The EDG cooling water subsystem includes the heat exchangers and all valves, pumps, and piping up to the engine 
interface. 
The EDG starting subsystem includes instrumentation and control subsystems; air compressors, dryers coolers, and 
receivers; devices to crank the diesel engine; filters; valves; and necessary piping up to the engine interface. 
The EDG lubrication subsystem includes the piping, pumps, filters, and associated auxiliary equipment and components 
required to provide essential heated and conditioned lubrication oil to the engine up to the engine interface. 
The EDG combustion air intake and exhaust subsystem supplies combustion air of reliable quality to the engine interface, 
and exhausts the products of combustion from the engine interface to the atmosphere. It consists of filters, silencers, s u p  
port structures, screens and louvers, and ducts to and from the engine interface at the turbocharger(s). 
A typical nuclear power plant has two or more independent EDG units (Kirkwood and Meyer 1989). The diesel engines are of 
the general size used for ship propulsion and stationary power applications, rated at 3000 to 10,000 horsepower each. Diesel 
engines are generally quite reliable and may operate for 20,000 or more hours between major overhauls in ship and stationary 
power service. Due to emergency loading tests and standby service, EDG engines generally age and wear at a faster rate and 
need overhauls more often. 
9.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Most of the EDG components were designed for continuous use, not for standby and intermittent service. However, except 
for the periodic testing requirements imposed under Regulatory Guide 1 .I08 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency 1977) (now 
withdrawn), stressors affecting the aging of EDG units at nuclear power plants are quite similar to those imposed on EDG 
systems supplying hospitals, military facilities, and other critical installations. Figure 9.1 is a diagram of the major 
components and subsystems of an EDG system that includes data from an aging study showing the relative failure rates of the 
EDG components at NPPs (Hoopingarner et al. 1987). In this context, a "failure" is registered each time the EDG system 
4 
cannot complete a fast-start and/or accept load within the allotted time,' or continue to run for the demand period. 
'To successfully complete a fast-start, the cold EDG must automatically start within 10 to 13 seconds and attain the design-related load within 30 to 
45 seconds (the allotted time varies within these limits for the various nuclear power plants). 
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Figure 9.1 Diagram of the mqior components and subsystems of an EDG system 
An important finding of these studies was that the EDG fast-starting and fast-loading testing program, undertaken in response 
to the old Regulatory Guide 1 .I08 ( U . S .  Nuclear Regulatory Agency 1977, was itself a major contributor to premature aging 
of the EDG units. The current applicable Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3 has greatly reduced this source of aging stressors. 
Other than the stresses induced by fast loading and short run times, Hoopingarner et al. (1987) found that the primary causes 
of EDG component failures were as follows (see Table 9.1): 
(1) Vibration-induced loosening and vibration-induced deterioration of the governor and other components of the instrument 
and control subsystem. Vibration-induced fatigue failures and loosening of fittings and fasteners was also a major aging 
contributor for the fuel and cooling subsystems. 
(2) Corrosion due to water in the starting and fuel subsystems. 
(3) Corrosion of components of the cooling subsystem, sometimes compounded by deposition or microbiological 
attack. 
(4) Fouling due to bacterial growth in water and fuel subsystems. 
(5) Other causes include defects in design, manufacturing, and construction, and poor maintenance practices. 
9.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Hoopingarner and ~aloudek (1989) have provided guidance on maintenance, surveillance, monitoring techniques, and practical 
engine management techniques for improving the reliability of EDG units. Additional detailed guidance has been provided by 
Lofgren et al. (1 988) and Shah and MacDonald (1 993). The recommended EDG aging management program incorporates 
more appropriately the roles of maintenance, operations, modified-testing, inspections, monitoring, and trending. Less empha- 
sis on the statistics of engine reliability was found to be helpful in reducing aging effects. 
Table 9.1 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for emergency diesel generators 
References1 
pp. 884-885, 897-898, 
919 
pp. 886, 900, 919 
pp. 886, 900, 919 
Aging Concern 
Wear, Oil Deterioration, Failure to Meet 
Performance Demands 
Loss of Electrical Contact, Arcing, Vibration 
Loosening, Overheating, Drift and 
Maladjustment 
Vibration Loosening, Wear Drift, Corrosion, 
and Maladjustment 
SystemlComponent I Aging Mechanism 
I&C System 
Governor 
Vibration, Heat, Oil Contamination 
and Dust Poor Maintenance and 
Maladjustment, Fast Starts 
Shutdowns 
pp. 885, 898, 915 
I I 
Control Air 
Fuel Oil 
Piping on Engine, Filters 
Fuel Oil Injection Pumps pp. 882, 899, 915 
I&C System 
Sensors and Relays 
Vibration. Heat, Dust, Humidity, and 
Chemical Attack 
Vibration, Particulates and Biofouling 
in Oil 
Vibration and Adverse Internal 
I&C System 
Fatigue of Fuel Oil Lines, Loosening, Filter 
Plugging 
Binding, Scoring, and Poor Operation 
Fuel Oil 
Injector Nozzles 
Fuel Oil 
Fuel Oil Supply Components 
and Pumps 
I&C System 
Gages, Alarms and 
Vibration, Moisture, Corrosion Plugging, Fatigue of Lines, Maladjustment 
Starting System 
Air Valve 
Starting System 
Actuators and Controls 
Cooling System 1 Vibration, Poor Chemistry, Metal-to- ( Wear, Vibration Loosening, Corrosion ( pp. 884, 900, 916 
Vibration, Humidity, 
pp. 886, 900, 919 
Conditions 
Chemical Change, Biofouling, and 
Particles in Oil 
Chemical Change, Water in Oil, Bio- 
fouling, Metal-To-Metal Contact, and 
Loose Electrical Contacts 
Starting System 
Starting Air Motors 
Water and Particulates 
Moisture in Air, Vibration 
Piping I Exterior Attack by Fuel Oil ( and Flex Joints, Fatigue Failures I 
I I 
Binding, Plugging, Poor Spray Patterns 
Wear, Loss of Pressure 
Water, Particulates, and Vibration 
Pumps ( Metal Contact 
pp. 882, 899. 915 
pp. 915 
Plugging, Binding, Failure to Close, 
Exposure to Exhaust Gases in Piping 
Corrosion, Plugging, Binding, Loose 
Electrical Terminations 
I 
pp. 881, 899, 915 
pp. 881, 899, 915 
Plugging, Binding, Failure to Operate, 
Vibration Loosening 
Cooling System 
Heat Exchangers and 
Radiators 
pp. 881, 899, 916 
Cooling System 
Lubrication Oil System 
Pumps 
Particulates, Poor Water Chemistry 
Lubrication Oil System 
Heat Exchangers 
Lubrication Oil System 
Vibration, Poor Water Chemistry, Leakage and Deterioration of Gaskets, Hoses 
Vibration, Metal and Particulates in 
the Oil, High Pressure and Pressure 
Pulses 
Filters I 
pp. 884, 900, 916 
Plugging, Corrosion, Internal Leakage in 
Heat Exchangers and External Leakage with 
Radiators 
Corrosion, Particulates in Oil and 
Water 
Particulates in Oil, Biofouling 
Lubrication Oil System 
Piping 
Lubrication Oil System 
Oil 
pp. 884, 900, 916 
Vibration Loosening, Wear 
Intake and Exhaust System 
Turbocharger 
pp.883,917 
Plugging, Tube Thinning and Cracking 
Plugging, Loss of Oil Flow 
Vibration, Pulsations 
Particulates and Water in Oil, Bio- 
fouling, Standby Heaters Accelerate 
pp. 883-884, 917 
pp. 883-884, 918 
Oil Brenkdown 
Vibration, Fast Loading Induced 
Surges and Poor Lube Oil Conditions, 
Deposit Induced Unbalance, 
Corrosion, Heat, Abrasion 
Fatigue, Fitting Failures, Oil Leaks 
Sludge and Foam, Chemical Deterioration 
pp. 883-884, 917 
pp. 883-884, 917 
Bearing Failure, Fatigue Fracture, IGSCC 
Fracture, Erosion 
pp. 880, 898, 917 
Table 9.1 (Continued) 
Changes in operation, maintenance, and regulation were projected to have important influences in the reduction of aging in the 
EDG system. 
System/Component 
Intake and Exhaust System 
Aftercooler 
Intake and Exhaust System 
Filters and Duct Components 
Generator 
Voltage Regulator 
Generator 
Coils 
Generator 
Exciter 
Switchgear 
Relays and Circuit Breakers 
These components are rather 
out of scope for EDG 
Engine Structure 
Crankcase and Frame 
Engine Structure 
Cylinder Liners and Seals 
Engine Structure 
Main Bearings 
Engine Structure 
Cylinder Heads 
Engine Structure 
Bolting 
Drive Train 
Pistons and Rings 
Drive Train 
Connecting Rods 
Drive Train 
Crankshaft 
' Unless other wise noted, the 
Regulation was found to have an important aging reduction role chiefly in Standard Technical Specifications and in Regulatory 
Guides (Hoopingarner 1991). Many technical specification and guide requirements are neutral in aging effects, however, eight 
beneficial improvements have been identified. Of these eight improvements, the three most important were reductions in tes- 
ting load application rates, testing loads to less than the continuous rating, and the average number of tests. The NRC has 
acted to greatly reduce this source of aging. 
Aping Mechanism 
Vibration, Corrosion, Particulates 
Vibrat~on, Corrosion, Particulates 
Heat, Vibration 
Torsional Vibrations, Dust, Coil 
Stress, Insulation Breakdown 
Dust, Humidity, Vibration 
Dust, Arcing, Humidity 
Vibration, Thermal Stress. 
Fast Loading Adds to Stress 
Fast Loading, Thermal Expansion 
Caused Metal Contact with Pistons, 
Poor Lubrication at Startup, Chemical 
Attack on Seals 
Fast Loading, Poor Lubrication at 
Startup, Contaminants in Oil, 
Cavitation, Excess Heat 
Thermal Stress, Hot Spots, Thermal 
Cycles 
Vibration, Overstress, Heat, 
Corrosion 
Fast Loading, Thermal Stress, 
Dynamic Stress, 
Dynamic Stress, Overstress 
Dynamic Stress, Torsional Vibration, 
Poor Supply or Contaminated Lube 
Oil 
references are to pages of Shah and 
Aging Concern 
Leakage, Plugging 
Vibration Induced Loosening, Filter 
Plugging, Corrosion Failures 
Loss of Function, Failed Contacts 
Coil Shifting and Fretting, Electrical 
Grounding, Cooling Passage Blockage 
Wear, Arcing, Loss of Function 
Loss of Contact, Loss of Function 
Distortion, Cracking. These are early failure 
problems 
Scuffing and Wear 
Scoring and Wear, Loss of Bearing Surface 
Material, Fatigue 
Cracking, Distortion, Water Leaks 
Vibration Loosening, Fatigue Loosening Fol- 
lowed by Bending and Sheering Failures, 
Corrosion Induced Damage and IGSCC 
Wear and Scuffing, Thermal Expansion 
Induced Metal-to-Metal Contact, Fatigue, 
Overstress 
Fatigue. Often associated with bolting and 
oil hole areas and with early failures due to 
manufacturing defects. 
Fatigue, Scoring. Fatigue is a very early 
failure cause in this component. 
MacDonald (1993). 
Reference' 
pp. 880, 898, 917 
pp. 880, 898, 917 
pp. 885, 919 
pp. 885, 919 
pp. 885, 919 
pp. 885, 919 
pp. 879, 900, 916 
pp. 879, 900, 916 
pp. 879, 900, 917 
pp. 897, 917 
pp. 897, 917 
pp. 891-892, 896, 901, 
918 
pp. 879, 890, 896, 918 
pp. 879, 890, 896, 918 
The nuclear power industry has made some EDG design changes affecting engine standby conditions. These include keeping 
the lubrication oil moving to some of the bearings and components, heating the oil and coolant to keep the engine warm, and 
removing moisture by drying the starting-air during standby to reduce corrosion in the starting system. Another highly recom- 
mended modification is to isolate, where it is practical, the engine and generator instruments and controls from engine 
vibrations. 
To manage aging degradation in EDG systems, the NPAR study results indicate that for each significant aging mechanism 
various management options are available. These are discussed here. Some aging mechanisms are very pervasive and affect 
A all or almost all systems. Other aging mechanisms affect only one or two systems. Table 9.2 briefly shows these system and 
aging mechanism relationships. The following text amplifies the table information. 
- 
Table 9.2 Managing aging degradation in EDG systems 
Essentially All EDG 
ended monitoring and trending 
Aging Mechanism - Vibration Induced Fatigue and Loosening 
Affects essentially all EDG systems 
- Management options do not include replacement of components that fail by fatigue with identical components cannot be 
recommended, even though that is an industry standard practice. Options in order of successful mitigation are 1) modify 
components and systems as needed to reduce fatigue stressor or material stress, 2) ensure that good torque management 
practices are in the diesel maintenance program, and 3) establish a monitoring and trending program for the diesel units. 
'I 
- Handled as a special case, vibration induced wear and problems on skid-mounted instrumentation and sensors are prob- 
ably best managed on a time-managed replacement basis with identical components. 
Aging Mechanism - Water, Biofouling, Particulates, and Chemical Changes 
Affects fuel, starting, lubrication, and cooling systems 
- Management options in order of successful mitigation are 1) ensure that water is removed by design changes and routine 
maintenance actions, 2) ensure that chemical analysis and control programs are effective, and 3) elements of a good 
monitoring and trending program will detect any adverse effects of most of these aging mechanisms. 
Aging Mechanism - Dust, Humidity, and Chemical Attack 
Affects the instrument and control and generator systems 
- Management options in order of successful mitigation are 1) good maintenance and design modification practices, 
2) careful inspections are important, and 3) the recommended monitoring and trending program will detect the effects of 
these aging mechanisms. 
Aging Mechanism - Poor Lube-Oil Conditions, Deposits, Corrosion, and Filter Plugging 
Affects the intake and exhaust system 
- Management options in order of successful mitigation are 1) the recommended monitoring and trending program will 
detect the effects of these aging mechanisms, and 2) inspections for the affect of these mechanisms adds to diesel 
reliability. 
Aging Mechanism - All Those Affecting the Engine Structure and Drive Train 
- Management options in order of successful mitigation are 1) the recommended monitoring and trending program will 
detect most of the effects of these aging mechanisms, and 2) inspections for the presence of these mechanisms is 
important. 
A new standard that incorporates EDG aging data and information has been released by IEEE. IEEE Std 1205-1993, "Guide 
for Assessing, Monitoring, and Mitigating Aging Effects on Class 1E Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations," 
was approved by IEEE on March 18, 1993. Appendix C.2 of this standard shows how it should be applied to the diesel gen- 
erator. Also, standard IEEE Std 387-1984, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Diesel-Generator Units Applied as Standby Power 
P 
Supplies for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," has been changed extensively in response to changed regulatory guides and 
the NPAR aging information. IEEE Std 387 has been balloted, received IEEE approval, and a 1995 publication date is 
projected. 
Different engine manufacturers and suppliers furnished diesel-generator sets to the industry. There were both common and 
different aging problems for these different EDG sets. To better manage aging and to improve availability, owners groups 
have been created by the users of these different engines. These groups have used the NPAR aging information along with 
operations data and manufacturer's recommendations to greatly increase the average engine reliability in the nuclear industry. 
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10 Component Cooling Water Systems 
The component cooling water systems (CCWSs) of concern are those that are required for safe shutdown during normal, 
operational transient, and accident conditions, and for mitigating the consequences of an accident or preventing the occurrence 
of an accident. These include closed-loop auxiliary cooling water systems for reactor system components, reactor shutdown 
- equipment, ventilation equipment, and components of the ECCS. 
In PWRs, the CCWS is a common system used to remove heat from various plant components and transfer it to an open loop 
cooling system such as service water. The CCWS is a non-radioactive, closed-loop cooling water system, which serves as a 
bamer between radioactive components and the open-loop cooling systems. The basic CCWS generally consists of several 
pumps, heat exchangers, a surge tank, and piping supplying the loads in a variety of header arrangements. Two typical 
designs for CCWSs used in operating PWR plants are shown in Figures 10.1 and 10.2. The CCWS for Plant A consists of 
two redundant safety-related loops and various loops for cooling non-safety-related components (Figure 10.1). The cooling 
loops are supplied by 3 CCWS pumps and three CCWS heat exchangers, each of which can supply either or both of the safety- 
related cooling loops. The CCWS is cooled by the service water system. The Plant B CCWS design includes three pumps, 
two heat exchangers, and one surge tank (Figure 10.2). The heat exchangers are cooled by service water from a nearby river 
on the tube side. 
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The loads cooled or supplied by the CCWS vary from plant to plant. Typical safety-related loads by reactor vendor are 
Westinghouse - RHR heat exchangers (HX), RHR pump seals, safety injection (SI) pumps, containment spray pumps, 
containment coolers. 
Combustion Engineering - shutdown HXs, low-pressure SI pumps, high-pressure SI pumps, containment spray pumps, 
chillers, containment air coolers. 
Babcock & Wilcox - decay heat removal (DHR) HXs, DHR pumps, high-pressure injection (HPI) pumps, reactor building 
fan coolers. 
10.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Higgins et al. (1988) have shown that environmental stressors (high temperature, high pressure, vibration, humidity, dust, etc.) 
contribute signscantly to component failure in CCWSs. Table 10.1 summarizes the aging mechanisms and degradations 
resulting from these stressors for the major components. 
10.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
The components of a successful program to manage aging degradation are broadly twofold: 1) inservice inspection, surveil- 
lance, and monitoring methods (incorporating NDE and residual life assessments, where appropriate, as well as parameter 
trending and record-keeping) to assess the magnitude and rate of aging degradation; and 2) control measures to mitigate the 
adverse impacts of component aging on plant safety and capacity factors. Lofaro et al. (1992) determined that certain types of 
Table 10.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms for component cooling water systems 
degradation of CCWS components can be detected and mitigated. They recommended certain inspections and tests that 
included ASME Section XI (ASME 1992) requirements as well as other practices already used by some plants. These methods 
for managing aging degradation are summarized in Table 10.2. 
- 
Lofaro et al. (1992) suggested that the methods determined to be effective in detecting aging in CCWS components were also 
capable of mitigating that aging. That is, detection of aging degradation would identify the need for an appropriate main- 
tenance action; this action would then be performed to mitigate the observed degradation. 
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Component Aging Concerns Material Aging Mechanisms 
Valves 
Wear 
Corrosion 
Wear 
ErosionlCorrosion 
Seal (packing) 
Body 
Seat 
lnternal Parts 
PTFE, Graphite 
Carbon Steel, Stainless Steel 
Elastomer 
Stainless Steel 
Pumps 
Leakage 
Wall Thinning 
Leakage 
Distortion 
Erosion/Corrosion 
Wear, Fatigue 
Corrosion, Erosion, 
Wear 
Creep, Hardening 
Wear 
Impeller 
Bearings 
Primary Seals 
Secondary Seals 
Casing 
Bronze Alloy, Cast Iron, 
Stainless Steel 
Cast Iron Class 30B 
Stainless Steels, Lead Bronze, 
Tungsten Carbide, Ceramics 
Rubber, Elastomer, PTFE 
Cast Iron, Carbon Steel 
Heat Exchangers 
Distortion 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Tubes 
Tubesheets 
Channel Heads 
Corrosion, Debris, 
Erosion, Wear 
Corrosion, Erosion 
Corrosion, Erosion 
Copper-Nickel, Brass/ 
BronzelAdmiralty, Stainless 
Steel, Carbon Steel 
Copper-Nickel, Brass1 
BronzeIAdmiralty, Stainless 
Steel, Carbon Steel 
Copper-Nickel, Brass1 
BronzelAdmiralty, Stainless 
Steel, Carbon Steel 
Fouling, Blockage, 
Leakage 
Thinning 
Thinning 
Table 10.2 Managing aging degradation i n  component cooling water  systems 
- - - - - - 
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Valves 
Seal (packing) 
Body 
Seat 
Internal Parts 
Management Options References 
PFTE, Graphite 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel 
Elastomer 
Stainless Dteel 
Pumps 
Wear 
Corros~on 
Wear 
ErosionlCorrosion 
Check for excessive 
leakagelcorrosion (daily to weekly) 
Check for body wall thinning (5 to 
1 0 years) 
Stroke valve (3-1 8 mo) 
Lubricate moving parts (6 to 18 mo) 
Inspect for cracks, warping 
(12-60 mo), check for unusual noise 
(daily to weekly) 
Lubricate bearingslcouplings (6- 
18 mo); monitor vibration (1-3 mo) 
Check oil level (daily to weekly), 
analyze lube oil (1-6 mo) 
Check for excessive leakage (daily to 
weekly) 
Check for wall case thinning (5 to 
10 years) 
Impeller 
Bearings 
Primary Deals 
Secondary Seals 
Casing 
Bronze Alloy, Cast Iron. 
Stainless Steel 
Cast lron Class 30B 
Stainless Dteels, Lead 
Bronze, Tungsten Carbide, 
Ceramics 
Rubber, Elastomer, PTFE 
Cast Iron, Carbon Steel 
Heat Exchangers 
ErosionICorrosion 
Wear, Fatigue 
Corrosion, 
Erosion, Wear 
Creep, Hardening 
Wear 
Tubes 
Tubesheets 
Channel Heads 
Copper-Nickel, Brass1 
BronzeIAdmiralty, Stainless 
Steel, Carbon Steel 
Copper-Nickel, Brass1 
BronzelAdmiralty, Stainless 
Steel, Carbon Steel 
Copper-Nickel, Brass/ 
BronzeIAdrniralty, Stainless 
Steel, Carbon Steel 
Corrosion, 
Debris, Erosion, 
Wear 
Corrosion, 
Erosion 
Erosion/Corrosion 
Clean tubes: Check for excessive 
leakage/corrosion (daily or weekly) 
Check thinning 
Check thinning 
11 Service Water System 
a 
The service water system (SWS) transfers heat from plant systems and components to the ultimate heat sink (UHS). The three 
safety-related heat sources served by the SWS in transferring heat loads from various sources in the plant to the UHS are core 
decay heat, decay heat removal components, and emergency power sources. In most designs, there is one SWS, but it is 
- broken into essential and nonessential subsystems. Essential portions of the SWS, including the isolation valves separating the 
essential and nonessential portions, are classified Quality Group C and seismic Category 1. Because of the wide variation in 
each plant's UHS and the application of multiple system design approaches, the SWS is defined from a functional standpoint. 
The functional service water system boundary is defined in Figure 11.1. 
Jarrell et al. (1989) assembled a database that contains a listing of the configurations, characteristics, and water sources for the 
SWSs in all commercial nuclear power plants in the United States. In the Phase 11 study, Jarrell et al. (1992) divided the 
systems into three general classifications by type of cycle: 1) open-cycle oncethrough systems, 2) open-cycle recirculating 
systems, and 3) closed systems. These types of systems are discussed briefly below. 
The open-cycle once-through SWS, also referred to as a "straight through" system, is often used when a large volume of water 
is available for the UHS. A simplified diagram of a typical open SWS is shown in Figure 11.2. 
INDICATWN AND 
CONTROL SIGNALS ' 
ELECTRIC .. 
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Figure 11.1 Service water system functional boundary 
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Figure 11.2 Open-cycle once-through service water system 
Open-cycle recirculating systems use a self-contained UHS, such as a spray cooling pond or a dedicated cooling tower as 
shown in Figure 1 1.3. 
The third general type of SWS is the closed-loop system; it resembles the open-cycle recirculating configuration, but adds an 
intermediate heat exchanger to prevent exposure of associated component load heat exchangers to a raw cooling water 
environment (see Figure 11.4). 
More extensive and detailed descriptions of SWS configurations, characteristics, and water sources are presented by Jarrell 
et al. (1992) and Lam and Leeds (1988). Cramond et al. (1992) describe the SWS systems at eleven specific NPPs. 
11.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Of the wetted systems in NPPs, the SWS seems to have the most aggressive combination of corrosive factors, even though the 
temperature range is relatively low (-0 to 50'C (32 to 12VF1). SWS components (pumps, valves, piping, heat exchangers, 
etc.) are subject to deposition, corrosion, and biofouling, the extent of which depends on the system type. Lam and Leeds 
(1988) reviewed operational experience with SWS, and performed a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for four NPPs. The 
results of the PRA show that degradation of the SWS can have a significant adverse impact on safe operation of a NPP. In a 
more comprehensive study, Cramond et al. (1992) performed PRAs for eleven additional NPPs. Their results verified the 
concern regarding reliability of the SWS and its importance to plant safety. 
A root cause analysis of age related failures common to SWSs was performed by Jarrell et al. (1992). Based on this analysis, 
it was determined that the principal aging mechanisms leading to SWS degradation and failure are corrosion, biologic and 
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Figure 11.3 Open-cycle recirculating system 
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Shk 
Figure 11.4 Closed-loop senice water system 
inorganic accumulation, and wear. Valve failures were primarily due to corrosion, whereas pumps were more likely to fail 
due to wear. Also, based on this examination, it appears that the recirculating SWS has the lowest failure rate of the three 
types of system cycles. 
Table 11.1 provides the aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for the SWS. 
Table 11.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms for service water systems 
11 -2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Johnson and Jarrell (1991) have summarized the corrosion mechanisms and the water chemistry control measures and counter- 
measures that should be incorporated in programs to manage corrosion-related degradation of SWSs. Stewart and Smith 
(1 992) provide generic guidance for risk-based inspection programs that include concerns for vulnerabilities that are not age 
related; however, their guidance reflects the risk ~ i g ~ c a n c e  of age-related degradation to the reliability of SWSs. 
Component 
Pump Impeller 
Pump Casing 
Pump Bearings 
Pump Seals and 
Gaskets 
Valve Body 
Valve Seat 
Valve hternals 
Valve Seals, 
Gaskets 
Heat Exchanger 
Tubes 
Heat Exchanger 
Tubesheets 
Table 11 -2 indicates the management options to mitigate aging. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Erosion, Corrosion 
Corrosion, Erosion, 
Wear 
Wear, Abrasion 
Creep, Hardening 
Corrosion, Erosion 
Wear 
Erosion, Corrosion 
Wear 
Corrosion, Debris, 
Erosion, Wear 
Corrosion, Erosion 
References 
Orton and Allen 
1995; Jarrell et al. 
1992 
Material 
Brass 
Cast Iron, Carbon 
Steel 
Cast Iron 
Rubber, Elastomer 
Carbon Steel, 
Stainless Steel 
Elastomer 
Stainless Steel 
FTFE, Graphite 
Cu-NilBrasslBronzel 
Admiralty, Stainless 
Steel, Carbon Steel 
Stainless Steel, 
Carbon Steel 
Aging Concerns 
Distortion 
Wall Thinning, 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Wall Thinning 
Leakage 
Distortion 
Leakage 
Fouling, Blockage, 
Leakage 
Thinning 
Table 11.2 Managing aging in service water systems 
11.3 References 
Cramond, W. R., D. B. Mitchell, J. L. Yakle, and S. P. Miller. 1992. Loss ofEssentiu1 Service Water in LWRs (GI-153). 
NUREG/CR-5910, Prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
D.C. 
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Management Options 
Visual Inspection, Acoustic 
Emission, Thermography 
Internal Visual Analysis for 
Thinning 
Acoustical Monitoring 1 
Visual Inspection 
Visual Inspection, MOV 
Diagnostic System 
(MOV-DS) 
Visual Inspection, MOV-DS 
Visual Inspection, MOV-DS 
Visual Inspection, MOV-DS 
UT, ET, Hydrostatic Testing 
Internal Visual Inspection, 
UT 
Component 
Pump Impeller 
Pump Casing 
Pump Bearings 
I 
Pump Seals and 
Gaskets 
Valve Body 
Valve Seat 
Valve Internals 
Valve Seals, 
Gaskets 
Heat Exchanger 
Tubes 
Heat Exchanger 
Tubesheets 
Jarrell, D. B., L. L. Larson, R. C. Stratton, S. J. Bohn, and M. L. Gore. 1992. Nuclear Plant Service Water System Aging 
Degradation Assessment - Phase II. NUREGICR-5379, Vol. 2, Prepared by Pacific Northwest Laboratory for the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Johnson, A. B., Jr., and D. B. Jarrell. 1991. "Corrosion and Corrosion Control in Nuclear Service Water Systems. " In 
1 International Conference on Nuclear Power Plant Operarions - Ready for 2000, pp. 3845. American Nuclear Society, 
La Grange Park, Illinois. 
Material 
Brass 
Cast Iron, Carbon 
Steel 
Cast Iron 
Rubber, Elastomer 
Carbon Steel, 
Stainless Steel 
Elastomer 
Stainless Steel 
PTFE, Graphite 
Cu-Ni/Brass/Bronze/ 
Admiralty, Stainless 
Steel, Carbon Steel 
Stainless Steel, 
Carbon Steel 
Lam, P. S., and E. J. L d s .  1988. Operating Experience Feedback Report: Service Water System Failures and Degrada- 
tions. NUREG-1275, Vol. 3, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Erosion, Corrosion 
Corrosion, Erosion, 
Wear 
Wear, Abrasion 
Creep, Hardening 
Corrosion, Erosion 
Wear 
Erosion, Corrosion 
Wear 
Corrosion, Debris, 
Erosion, Wear 
Corrosion, Erosion 
Orton, R. D., and R. P. Allen. 1995. Recommendations for the Treatment of Aging in Standard Technical Specijications. 
Draft NUREG, Prepared by Pacific Northwest Laboratory for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Stewart, M.  A. ,  and C. L. Smith. 1992. Generic Service Water System Risk-Based Inspection Guide. NUREGICR-5865, 
Prepared by Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, EG&G Idaho, Inc. for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
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12 Engineered Safety Systems 
a 
Nuclear plant compressed air systems consist of 1) the non-interruptible safety-related instrument air system (IAS), sometimes 
called the control air system; and 2) the non safety-related service air system (SAS), also called the station air system or the 
plant air system. The IAS provides the highest quality compressed air for pneumatic controls, air operated valve controllers 
w and positioners, and pneumatic instrumentation in the nuclear power station. It is also the source of compressed air delivered 
to and stored in safety-related accumulators via safety-related check valves. The IAS is, therefore, vital for maintaining stable 
plant operation. Because of the fail-safe design and local safety-related air storage, the overall IAS is generally classified as 
non-safety. Its loss may result in a reactor trip or, on occasion, the actuation of ESF systems. The less quality-restrictive SAS 
provides compressed air for non safety-related systems, but may serve as a backup to the safety-related IAS. A risk-based 
review of IASs at nuclear power plants indicates that they contribute less to total risk than many other safety-related systems 
@eMoss et al. 1990). 
The IAS consists of air compressors, air dryers and filters, valves, instrumentation, and piping. The service air compressors, 
along with diesel start air compressors, are common to all plants and account for most of the compressor-related reportable 
events and maintenance calls. Aging of nuclear plant diesel start air compressors was evaluated by Hoopingarner et al. (1987). 
Aging of other components of the IAS was evaluated by Villaran et al. (1990) and Moyers (1990). 
12.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Key compressed air system aging degradation concerns a& mechanisms are presented in Table 12.1. Contaminants in the air 
have been identified as the dominant cause for most IAS component and air equipment deterioration. Moisture in the air leads 
to corrosion of internal parts of pneumatic devices; particulates can block the air flow through tubing, orifices, and ports of 
air-operated equipment; and hydrocarbons create gummy substances in the component internals leading to sluggish operation of 
moving parts. Other mechanisms affecting the IAS operation are bearing wear in the compressors, corrosion of cooling tubes 
and air equipment internals, and leakage of air through degraded seals and gaskets. Many of these problems can be attributed 
to the lack of proper maintenance and testing of IAS components. Wide ranges in the percentage of total failures exhibited by 
compressors, air dryers, and filters at different plants with different preventive maintenance practices for any given component 
indicate a direct effect of maintenance practices on the number of failures experienced. 
Within the compressed air systems, compressors and air system valves dominate most component failures, followed by dryers 
and filters. A large fraction (60 to 89% depending on plant age; Villaran et al. 1990, pp. 4.2 and 4.4) of failures has been 
attributed to aging of these components. Wear from normal service caused compressors to fail to load/unload properly and to 
leak water or oil. Oil leaks in oil-less type compressors not only can generate hydrocarbon deposits and gummy-like residues 
in the valve internals causing sluggish or inoperable pneumatic valves, but they can also cause valve seals to become brittle 
and to stick to mating surfaces, thereby preventing proper valve motion. Blocking and clogging in p r e  and after-filters have 
resulted in low air flow. Rust particles inside piping and comected equipment, due to moisture or water in the air supply, 
sometimes get dislodged during severe vibrations (e.g., flow-induced water hammers), and could adversely affect air-operated 
devices. Wear and corrosion accounted for more than half of the failures in which air system valves failed to open or close 
1 
manual and power operated valves. The next most common failure mode was valve seat leakage (Villaran et al. 1990, 
pp. 4.16 and 4.20). 
Design deficiencies that have affected aging and failures include inadequate capacity of accumulators, improper component 
a 
sizing, valves failing to perform their intended functions under slow depressurizations of an IAS, faulty components, and 
incorrect selection of valve fail-safe positions. 
Table 12.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms for compressed air systems 
Aging hlechanisms 
Wear, fatigue, corrosion erosion, 
contaminants 
blocking, clogging. corrosion, 
deterioration, contamination 
Corrosion, saturation, blocking, 
clogging 
Wear, corrosion, contamination, 
blockage 
Calibration, setpoint drift, con- 
tamination, overheating 
Erosion, corrosion, blocking, 
clogging, vibration, overstress 
Aging Concerns 
Leakage, failure to load or 
unload properly 
Delivery of moist air; loss of 
desiccant into air system 
Low air flow 
Inability to open or close, seat 
leakage 
Incorrect signal, loss of func- 
tion, loss of signal, erroneous 
indications, erroneous alarms, 
erroneous automatic actions 
Plugging, cracking leaking 
joints 
Component 
Compressors and 
Intercooler 
Air Dryers 
Filters 
Valves 
Instrumentation 
Piping 
References 
Villaran, Fnllwood, and Subudhi 1990, 
pp. 3 .3  and 4.17-4.21; Moyers 1990, 
p .  13 
Villaran, Fullwood, and S u b ~ ~ d h i  1990, 
pp. 3.1-3.4 and 4.19; Moyers 1990. 
p.17 
Villaran, Fullwood, and Subudhi 1990, 
pp. 3.1-3.4 and 4.21 
Villaran, Fullwood, and Suhudhi 1990, 
pp. 3.1-3.4. 4.16 and 4.20 
Villaran, Fullwood, and Subudhi 1990, 
pp. 4.17 and 4.21 
Villaran, Fullwood, and Subudhi 1990, 
pp. 3.1-3.4, 4.17 and 4.20 
Materials 
Cast iron main frame; forged steel or nodular 
iron crank shaft and connecting rod; alumi- 
num or steel main bearings; aluminum or 
steel-backed copper-lead crank bearings; 
aluminum, tin-faced cast iron, or cast iron 
crosshead; hardened steel piston rod; alumi- 
num or Ni-plated cast iron pistons; cast iron 
cylinders; stainless steel valve elements and 
seats; carbon or tetrafluoroethylene (TFE) rod 
packing, compression, and rider rings; 
admiralty brass heat exchanger tubes; 
neoprene coated steel heat exchanger shell 
Tower dryers - alumina or silica gel desic- 
cant; carbon steel vessel; stainless steel 
screens; carbon steel main air piping; steel 
valve hodies with stainless steel internals; 
copper valve control air piping 
Refrigerated dryers - carbon steel chiller and 
heat exchanger shells; admiralty brass or cop- 
per heat exchanger tubing 
[None specified] 
Stainless steel bodies; flexitallic or asbestos 
gaskets; EPDM, Viton, Buna "N," Nylon 
seats 
Polyethylene, copper 
Steel 
12.1.1 Managing Aging Degradation 
A summary of management options for reducing compressed air system aging degradation through inservice inspections, 
surveillance, and monitoring is provided in Table 12.2. In addition to starting problems, leakage of oil from oil reservoirs or 
bearings, water from the coolers, air from seals, and excessive vibration dominate the failures in the loadinglunloading valves 
of the compressor/receiver subsystem. Most of those are attributed to instrumentation/control problems (i.e., setpoint drift, 
calibration), wear of non-metallic components (e.g., seals, gaskets), and drainage-of-condensate problems. High pressure 
differential (AP) across the intake air filter indicates clogging with dust, water, and other atmospheric contaminants. Problems 
I 
associated with loadinglunloading valves, aftercooler or moisture separator corrosionlwater leak problems, and drainage of 
condensate are not addressed in the suggested maintenance programs. 
. An effective approach to managing aging degradation must include a preventive maintenance program that periodically tests, 
monitors and inspects IAS components to detect degradation and provide criteria for repairs and replacement prior to failure. 
Plants with highest priority placed on compressor maintenance had the lowest frequency of compressor failures (Villaran et al. 
1990, pp. 4.8 and 4.9). Programs that develop data from testing, operating parameters, and maintenance records for trending 
analyses should be implemented. Inspections and testing should include 1) verification of supply and delivered air W t y  
(cleanliness, dew point, contamination, and hydrocarbon levels), and 2) monitoring coolant water, oil, and gas flow, 
temperatures, and pressures to detect degradation of performance in compressor, dryer, and heat exchanger systems. 
The importance of training in preventive maintenance procedures is emphasized by the observation that human errors are the 
second most important cause of dual-tower desiccant-type air dryer failures resulting from normal service. Recommended 
testing and maintenance practices for compressed air systems are described in Section 6 of Villaran et al. (1990). Trending of 
all data acquired during testing, operating parameter data, and maintenance records is recommended for assessing component 
degradations. 
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Table 12.2 Managing aging degradation of compressed air systems 
Component 
Compressor and 
IntercooIer 
Air Dryer 
Filters 
Valves 
Instrumentation 
Piping 
Materials 
Cast iron, forged steel, 
nodular iron, aluminum, steel, 
steel-backed copper-lead, tin- 
faced cast iron, babbitt-lined 
steel, babbitted cast iron, 
hardened steel, Ni-plated cast 
iron, TFE, admiralty brass or 
neoprene coated steel 
Alumina, silica gel desiccant, 
carbon steel, stainless steel, 
carbon steel, copper, 
admiralty brass or copper 
[None specified] 
Stainless steel, flexitallic, 
asbestos, EPDM, Viton, Buna 
"N" or Nylon 
Polyethylene or copper 
Steel 
Aging Mechanisms 
Wear, fatigue, corrosion, 
erosion, contaminants 
Blocking, clogging, cor- 
rosion, deterioration, 
contamination 
Corrosion, saturation, 
blocking, clogging 
Wear, corrosion, 
contamination 
Calibration, setpoint drift, 
contamination, 
overheating 
Erosion, corrosion, 
blocking, clogging, vibra- 
tion, over stress, dirt and 
sludge accumulation 
Management Options 
Conduct recommended 
preventive maintenance, lubri- 
cation, inspect for visible signs 
of degradation, corrosion, 
erosion, and loss of integrity; 
monitor vibration; document 
operating parameters of pressure 
drop, pressure, temperatures, 
flow rates, dew points, air 
quality, etc.; test performance of 
components and systems; per- 
form trending analyses of oper- 
ating data, test results and pre- 
ventive maintenance records for 
early indications of degradation. 
References 
Villaran et al. 1990, pp. 3.4, 
4.4, 4.5, and 6.1 to 6.8. 
13 High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) Filters and Adsorbers 
D 
Air treatment systems are among the Essential Auxiliary Supporting (EAS) Systems required for operation of ESF Systems. 
During normal plant operations, air treatment systems provide a safe andlor controlled environment for equipment and 
personnel, including removal of heat from rooms housing ESF equipment and ensuring habitability of the control room. 
. Following an accident, air treatment systems operate to ensure the safe shutdown of the plant, allow equipment to be serviced, 
and provide the ultimate bamer to release of radioactivity to the public. 
Air treatment systems are required to capture airborne particles and volatile species that may be suspended in, or exist as gas 
phase constituents of, recirculating aerosols, gaseous effluents, or accidental releases. Air treatment systems consist of some 
or all the following components: demisters, heaters, prefilters, high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, activated carbon 
gas adsorption units (adsorbers), postfilters, fans or blowers, ductwork, dampers, valves, and instrumentation and equipment 
to sample and monitor system performance. A typical configuration of an air treatment system is shown in Figure 13.1. 
Of these, the components most fundamental to providing plant and public safety are those designed to capture the particulate 
con taminants and the radioactive gaseous (volatile) contaminants, namely the HEPA filters and adsorbers, respectively. One 
or both of these components are installed in nuclear air treatment systems. The particulate matter could be radioactive chemi- 
cal compounds or otherwise inert airborne material that has been contaminated by the adsorption of radioactive species, includ- 
ing cesium iodide (CsI). To capture these contaminants, the HEPA filters use a filter media made from a mixture of glass 
fibers that is formed into pleated "paper" to separate suspended particles from an essentially atmospheric pressure gas stream. 
A typical HEPA filter is shown in Figure 13.2 where the glass fiber filter paper is in the form of a continuous sheet pleated 
vertically over the separators. In addition to the filter paper medium, components of the HEPA filter include the frames, 
gaskets, face guards, and the corrugated separators that are used to separate adjacent sheets of the filter paper. 
El- 
Figure 13.1 Typical air-treatment system 
Figure 13.2 Typical HEPA filter construction 
The radioactive volatiles of primary interest are the elemental and organic forms of iodine, the former being a major contri- 
butor to potential radiation doses to the plant personnel and public. To capture these contaminants, the adsorber shell directs 
the gasses through tightly packed beds of activated carbon granules, which are usually also impregnated with other chemicals 
to enhance the removal of organic species (e.g., methyl iodide). Type 304 or Type 304L series stainless steels are specified 
for the adsorber shell materials contacting the adsorbent. 
13.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Winegardner (1993, 1995) reviewed data on the aging of HEPA filters and adsorbets including aging stressors, aging mecha- 
nisms, and their effects. He found that aging (e.g., the degradation of component performance over time) was not only caused 
by the direct retention of radionuclides, but also by heat, humidity, airborne contaminants and pollutants. A detailed discus- 
sion is given below. A summary of the aging concerns is provided in Table 13.1. 
13.1.1 HEPA Filters 
Increasing pressure drop (resistance to air flow) is an obvious result of HEPA filter use over time. Dust pickup of approxi- 
mately 1 kg11000m3/h of design filtration capacity is sufficient to increase the filter% flow resistance to twice the design 
resistance of a new filter (0.25 kPa) (First 1991). Dust loading, along with heat and radiation, also has the potential for reduc- 
ing the effectiveness of the organic materials used to strengthen the filter medium and provide water repellence. 
High moisture content in the airflow can increase the pressure drop, or AP, across the filter medium as well as reduce its 
tensile strength. This results principally from the presence of liquid water in the filter medium's fiber structure, where it is 
incorporated by sorption, condensation, or droplet filtration (Ricketts et al. 1987). The increase in AP in the filter medium, 
together with the decrease in tensile strength of the medium, leads to structural failure of the filter at unacceptably low values 
of AP, even at design flow rates. f 
Johnson et al. (1989) experimentally confirmed the effects of aging on HEPA filters. Aged sheet media samples, from dis- 
mantled filters having 13 to 14 years of service, were tested under conditions prescribed in Department of Defense Military 
specifications. 
Table 13.1 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for HEPA filters and absorbers 
Forty-one percent of these aged samples failed the tensile strength test, 71 % failed the pressure drop test and, when tested for 
water repellence, all failed when the top (dirty side) was tested while 57% failed when the bottom (clean side) was tested. Six 
filters in service 15 to 19 years and two filters in service 14 years were exposed in a wind tunnel to pressure pulses associated 
with the standard NRC Region I design basis tornado and to additive shock wave overpressures. Small incremental pressure 
increases were used on the two aged filters. The average breaking pressure was decreased 52% for the six aged filters and 
decreased 28% for the two incrementally stressed, aged filters. Recently Gilbert et al. (1995) have shown that filter media 
tensile strength decreases with age, but their data were not sufficient to establish a shelf life. 
Ln addition to the filter medium itself, aging processes can adversely affect other filter components (Winegardner 1993, 1995). 
Corrosion of metal frames and corrugated separators can occur. Physicochemical reactions generated by heat and radiation 
can degrade the face gaskets as well as the adhesives and sealants that are used to splice the medium, fasten the gaskets to the 
filter face, and seal the filter pack to the frame. 
13.1.2 Adsorbers 
Aging Concerns 
Aging 
Mechanisms Component 
Continuous degradation of gas adsorbers over time (e.g., "weathering") is an inherent result of exposure to air containing 
moisture, contaminants, or pollutants (Winegardner 1993, 1995). This is because the adsorber material, impregnated granular 
carbon, has been "activated" to dramatically increase its surface area and provide countless reaction sites. Many airborne 
constituents can readily react with or be adsorbed by the activated carbon beds, thus reducing the number of active sites that 
would otherwise be available for the adsorption of radioiodine. During normal operation, airborne constituents may include 
moisture, volatile organic solvents, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and carbon monoxide. Oxidation, as well as competitive 
loading, can impair bed performance, including decreasing the efficiency of the impregnant. Because the amount of airborne 
1 constituents is not constant with time nor from plant to plant, it is essentially impossible to provide criteria concerning the 
useful life of impregnated activated carbon. 
References Material 
The greatest degradation in adsorber performance is in the retention of methyl iodide as opposed to elemental iodine for which 
'. the loss in retention capacity is much slower (Burchsted et al. 1976). Moisture, when relative humidity is 70% and greater, is 
a significant factor in the degradation of impregnated charcoal retention of methyl iodide (CH,I) (Diet2 1978). Moisture 
degrades KI-impregnate charcoals more than Triethylenediamine (TEDA)-impregnated charcoals due to oxidation of the carbon 
surface, which occurs less rapidly in amines (as TEDA) (Billinge and Broadbent 1989). Other contaminants can also degrade 
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I 
Corrosion 
Embrittlement 
Corrosion 
Oxidation 
Galvanic corrosion 
impregnated charcoals, with NO, and SOZ having the largest effects, methyl-ethyl ketone (MEK) producing a mild effect, and 
NH, having a negligible effect (Wren and Moore 1991a,b). Moisture increases the adsorption rate and capacity of TEDA 
charcoal for NO,, but not for SO, (Wren and Moore 1991a). 
Relatively rapid deterioration of the stainless steel components of the adsorber due to galvanic corrosion can result from 
contact with wet carbon. Guidance in this area is to be indicated in the revision to Regulatory Guide 1.52 (NRC 1978). 
13.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Inspection, surveillance, and monitoring methods (ISMM) are used to establish the condition of HEPA filters and adsorbers 
once they have been put into operation. Requirements for ISMM are given in ASME N510-1989 (ASME 1989b), which is 
referenced in Regulatory Guide 1.52 (NRC 1978). When unacceptable aging degradation of performance is evident, 
replacement of the component is the primary method used for mitigating the degradation. A detailed discussion is given 
below. A summary is provided in Table 13.2. 
13.2.1 HEPA Filters 
Instrumentation requirements, including alarms, and surveillance test requirements for HEPA filters are presented in ASME 
N510-1989 (ASME 1989b). Differential pressure (due to pressure drop across the filter), uniformity of the mixing of the air 
stream approaching the HEPA filter bank, and filter leaks are continuously monitored or are the subject of periodic tests. 
High differential pressure alarms are required at both local and remote manned control panel locations for HEPA filters in ESF 
air-cleaning systems. Pressure drop indication is required for the local station. For non-ESF systems, high AP alarms and AP 
indicators are recommended only for the local station. Filters are usually replaced prior to failure, primarily as a result of an 
indication of high AP. 
Testing to verify uniformity of the mixing in the air stream approaching the HEPA filter bank is a prerequisite for conducting 
surveillance leak testing of the installed filter bank. This test is based upon the introduction of dioctylphthalate P O P )  aerosol 
into the air stream and taking concentration readings across a plane parallel to, and a short distance upstream of, the HEPA 
filter bank. The recommended frequency of the "air-aerosol mixing uniformity test" includes testing upon completion of initial 
construction and after each major modification or repair (acceptance tests). 
Table 13.2 Managing aging degradation of HEPA fdters and absorbers 
Component 
HEPA Filter Media 
HEPA Filter Frame 
HEPA Filter Gaskets 
HEPA Filter 
Corrugated 
Separators 
Adsorber 
Adsorber Trays 
Material 
Glass Fibers 
Wood products 
Al-alloy , cold-rolled 
steel, chrome steel, 
stain-less steel 
Neoprene sponge 
rubber, cork 
Al-alloy , epoxy coated 
aluminum 
Impregnated granular 
carbon 
Stainless steel 
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Because gradual deterioration and leaks could develop under standby as well as service conditions, surveillance leak testing of 
installed HEPA filters is required. This test is also based on the introduction of DOP aerosol upstream of the filters. Concen- 
trations are then measured upstream and downstream of the filters. Recommended frequency includes upon completion of 
initial construction and after each major modification or repair (acceptance tests), after each filter replacement, at least once 
each operating cycle, and after painting, fire, or chemical release if communication with the system occurred in such a manner 
that the filters could be adversely affected by the fumes, chemicals, or foreign objects (NRC 1978; Bellamy 1991). Visual 
inspection is required before each series of surveillance tests. 
13.2.2 Adsorbers 
Aerosol mixing tests, surveillance leak tests, and visual inspections, previously noted for installed HEPA filters, are also 
required for installed adsorbers (ASME 1989b). In addition, laboratory tests are required to determine the efficiency of used 
adsorbent material (ASME 1989a). 
As with HEPA filters, verification of the uniformity of air-aerosol mixing in the approaching air stream is through DOP aero- 
sol injection and subsequent concentration measurements upstream of the adsorber banks. The recommended frequency of this 
test includes upon completion of initial construction and after each major modification or repair (acceptance tests). 
Surveillance leak testing of installed adsorbers uses a halide gas (a fluorocarbon). The halide is injected upstream of the 
adsorber bank, and concentration is measured upstream and downstream of the bank. The recommended frequency of leak 
testing includes 1) acceptance tests; 2) at least once each operating cycle; 3) after painting, fire, or chemical release in any 
ventilation zone communicating with the system; 4) following any evidence of water or other foreign material in an ESF atmos- 
phere cleanup system; 5) following each partial or complete replacement of the carbon adsorber in an adsorber section or 
bank; and 6) following removal of an adsorber sample for laboratory testing if the integrity of the adsorber is affected (NRC 
1978, 1979; Bellamy 1991). Visual inspection is required before each series of surveillance tests. 
The leak test is supplemented by laboratory tests of used carbon samples to determine system efficiency and remaining capac- 
ity for methyl iodide. These samples are obtained from extra canisters of adsorbent installed in the air stream to determine the 
adsorbent's response to the service environment over its predicted life (ASME 1989a). Recommended frequency for the lab- 
oratory adsorbent tests includes 1) acceptance tests, 2) before each adsorber replacement, 3) at least once each operating cycle 
but not exceeding 720 hours of system operation (unless modified by laboratory test history), and 4) immediately following 
inadvertent exposure of the system to solvents, paints, or other organic fumes or vapors that could degrade the adsorber"~ 
performance (ASME 1989b). 
Nondestructive evaluation of performance degradation and assessment of residual life for installed HEPA filters and adsorbers 
are accessible from the required monitoring methods and surveillance tests. These include monitoring of AP to determine the 
agedependent degradation of HEPA filters, surveillance leak testing of installed HEPA filters and adsorbers, and laboratory 
tests of used carbon adsorber samples to determine the remaining capacity for methyl iodide. 
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14 Mechanical Structures and Components 
i 
This section is devoted to aging concerns and associated mitigation strategies for valves, pumps and support structures for 
PWR and BWR plants. The valves that have been considered in this assessment are 1) power-operated relief valves (PORVs), 
2) MOVs, and 3) solenoid-operated valves (SOVs) and check valves (CVs). The pumps that have been considered are the 
ones for 1) the auxiliary feedwater system for the PWR and 2) the RCIC system for the BWR. Reactor pressure vessel 
supports and snubbers are the equipment and component support structures that have been considered in this section. 
14.1 Valves 
Valves are used to operate and control safety-related systems and components such as BWR control rod drives and the RCIC 
system. Valve degradation has occasionally resulted in marginal or nonfunctional performance. Valve disassembly-inspection 
testing, maintenance, and repair operations affect reactor outage schedules and are one of the primary sources of radiation 
exposure to maintenance staff. Considerable progress has been made to replace the disassembly-inspection tests and eliminate 
risk of improper reassembly with nonintrusive methods of valve diagnostics for PORVs, MOVs, SOVs, and CVs (Haynes 
1992). The functions of the four types of valves are listed below: 
Power-operated relief valves require an external power supply for actuation, normally air or electricity, and are typically 
controlled by an electrical signal resulting from high system pressure or manual actuation from the control room. 
Although PORVs and associated block valves (BVs) were not designed as safety-related components, they are relied upon 
to mitigate certain design-basis accidents. 
Motor-operated valves are used in safety-related systems in nuclear power plant fluid systems. The most commonly used 
valve types are gate, globe, and butterfly valves. Significant maintenance efforts have resulted from failures with occa- 
sional compromise of the operational readiness of critical safety-related systems. The nonintrusive measurement of motor 
current signature analysis provides detailed information related to the condition of the motor, motor operator, and valve 
mechanical disorders across a wide range of levels from mean values and gross variations during a valve operation which 
characterizes transients and periodic occurrences. Numerous MOV monitoring systems are commercially available 
(Haynes and Fanner 1992, p. 3). 
Solenoid-operated valves are found throughout nuclear power plant safety-related systems, often a subcomponent of larger, 
more complex systems. These consist of electromechanical systems with numerous components subject to degradation 
from environmental exposure and repeated use. Conventional testing has included leakage, speed of operation, power 
consumption, and temperature. Newer methods of nonintrusive monitoring of performance parameters can detect and 
trend degradation with minimal cost and impact on plant operation (Kryter and Farmer 1992). 
Check valves are used to prevent flow in the wrong direction in nuclear plant safety systems. Many check valve failures 
have been attributed to severe degradation of internal parts (e.g., hinge pins, hinge arms, discs, and disc nut pins) 
resulting from instability (flutter) of these parts under normal plant operating conditions. Check valve instability may be a 
result of misapplication (e.g., using oversized valves) and may be exacerbated by low flow conditions andlor upstream 
flow disturbances. Combinations of acousticlultrasonic or acousticlmagnetic techniques can be used to diagnose check 
valve degradation. Check valve monitoring systems are commercially available (Haynes 1992, p. 24). 
14.1.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Aging degradation in valves is a significant concern because failure of certain components can make systems important to 
safety unavailable. A summary of key aging degradation concerns and mechanisms is presented in Table 14.1. The most 
common general failure modes are leakage and failure to operate as designed. Quarterly tests to ensure operability are 
required by Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME 1992) or valves affecting safety systems; 
however, testing and maintenance often cause many of the same stressors as nonnal operation. These tests may contribute to 
premature failures, wear, and aging degradation. Other aging stressors also active during system standby conditions may act 
synergistically to degrade components. A single failure of any one of several valves could render a system inoperable. Aging 1 
degradation should be monitored and mitigated wherever possible to prevent system inoperability to an automatic-initiation 
signal. Codes and standards need to be upgraded to take advantage of nonintmsive diagnostics, now commercially available. 
Table 14.1 Valve aging degradation concerns and mechanisms 
The failure mechanisms of valves is dependent on the environment and operating requirements for each valve type. Some 
common failure mechanisms are: 
Power operated relief valve failures have consisted of valve leakage, regulator leakage, limit switch malfunction or adjust- 
ment problems, air regulator leak, and failure to reset. Most leaks have been due to steadwater cutting the seatlplug 
interface. Degradation of the air or electrical actuation controls may prevent operation of the PORV (Murphy and 
Cletcher 1987). 
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The most common MOV failure modes are internal and external leakage due to erosion and corrosion. These conditions 
may be caused and accelerated by lodging of solid particles between the obturator and the valve seat or by corrosion 
products at the valve stem-packing interface. Degradation in MOVs includes wear, corrosion, and aging degradation, 
some of which could be reduced if vendor-specified lubricants were systematically used. Degradation of MOV power 
cables has resulted from cables unable to conduct the locked rotor current, which is much higher than the nameplate full 
load current. Electrically backseating valves using oversized motors has overstressed valve stems and valve seats. 
Damage to the stem-packing interface can also be caused by loose bolts or nuts holding the MOV assembly. Stress 
corrosion cracking has occurred in alloys such as Type 410 stainless steel with high residual stresses. Valve components 
have been degraded by wear, fatigue, embrittlement, degraded insulation, testing damage, poor adjustment, and erosion 
(Greenstreet et al. 1985). 
Aging Mechanisms 
Fatigue, Wear, Corrosion, 
and Erosion of Seats 
Galling, Stress Corrosion 
Cracking 
Corrosion, Erosion, 
Embrittlement 
Corrosion, Erosion, 
Embrittlement 
Components 
Body and Cap 
Assemblies 
Stud Bolts 
Gaskets 
Seating Materials 
Common SOV seating materials include ethylene propylene diene monomer (EPDM), Viton, Buna "N," and nylon. 
Temperatures up to 80 to 100°C (176 to 2120F) caused by a continuously energized coil and'heating from process lines or 
a high-temperature environment cause rapid deterioration of these elastomeric parts. Seats and O-rings may harden, 
crack, or assume a compressive set that can result in leakage past the seat of a closed valve or through the spaces between 
valve body parts. Interaction between the varnish coating and the Class H insulation at high temperatures has also led to 
dielectric breakdown and turn-to-turn shorts in coils. Inductive surge following current interruption in DC energized coils 
can lead to arcing through the coil insulation during cyclic operation (Bacanskas et al. 1987, pp. 24-26). 
Materials 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Flexitallic or Asbestos 
EPDM, Viton, Buna 
"N," Nylon 
Aging Concerns 
Cracking Leading to 
Leakage 
Stress Relaxation, 
Fracture 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Erosion and wear from fluid flow, contaminants, low dose-rate radiation, and high temperature can result in cracking or 
pitting of the seat. ,Wear of surface interfaces from vibration, turbulence and water hammer can cause the core assembly 
to move off center and bind or stick. 
Other materials of construction for SOVs such as stainless steel subassemblies and core spring, electrical housing and 
disc-holder spring, and a brass or stainless steel valve body appear to have few problems. 
The CV body and cap are primarily stainless steel. Type 304 or Type 316 stainless steel is generally used for the cap stud 
bolts. These require lubrication to prevent galling. Check valve seats are generally machined into the forging on less than 
3-inch [7.6 cm] valves and in larger valves are generally replaceable hardened Stellite or Hastelloy. The valve body alloy 
is normally used for CV obturators to accommodate thermal expansion. Stellite or another hard alloy may be used for 
Ball CV obturators to resist wear and scratching. The hanger pin, hanger, and fastener are generally stainless steel. 
Hanger pin bearings are usually made of a hardened alloy such as Stellite. Check valves with pressure-seal construction 
use a steel sealing ring and bolt configuration, whereas machined surfaces require asbestos-type gaskets. Flexitallic-type 
gaskets of stainless steel and asbestos are deformed by tightening and should be used only once. A few CV designs use 
graphite-asbestos packing for the hanger pin (Greenstreet et al. 1985, p. 9). 
14.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Valves are among the most commonly failed components. Some options for management of aging are presented in Table 14.2. 
The mechanisms causing these failures include wear aggravated by improper cable size, motor size, valve size, lubrication, 
water hammer, setpoint drift, and out-of-calibration instrumentation. 
Table 14.2 Managing valve aging degradation 
Most failures were detected during testing and operations. The high percentage of failures detected during surveillance testing 
and operation is an indication that only a very small number of failures are identified during preventive maintenance before 
+b they could cause a system malfunction. Suggested practices to reduce or mitigate valve failures are listed below. 
Components 
Body and Cap 
Assemblies 
Stud Bolts 
Gaskets 
1 Seating 
Materials 
The greatest improvement in reliability of PORVs would result from using newer, more reliable PORV designs and 
improving testing, diagnostics, and maintenance applied to PORVs and BVs, particularly the BV motor operator (Murphy 
and Cletcher 1987). Because of the relief function of PORVs, the greatest safety benefit can be achieved by using designs 
that are resistant to sticking open. 
Materials 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Flexitallic or 
Asbestos 
EPDM, 
Viton, Buna 
"N", Nylon 
Aging Mechanisms 
Fatigue, Wear, 
Corrosion, and Erosion 
of Seats 
Galling, Stress Corrosion 
cracking 
Corrosion, Erosion, 
Embrittlement 
Corrosion, Erosion, 
Embrittlement 
Management Options 
Minimize water hammer, contaminants, 
particulates, vibration, and temperature 
gradients; avoid electrically backseating; 
use proper motor size; avoid excessive 
cyclic operation. 
Avoid using bolts with high residual 
stresses; use alloys with low potential 
for stress corrosion cracking; apply 
proper torque; use recommended 
lubricants. 
Avoid high temperature and high 
radiation fields, use specified lubricant; 
do not reuse deformable gaskets. 
Minimize contaminants and particulates 
in fluid; use proper valve design and 
size; use specified lubricants; avoid 
electrically backseating. 
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Improvement in several practices would improve the service of MOVs. Wear, corrosion, and aging degradation could be 
reduced by adhering to vendor specified lubricants. The service life of MOV power cables could be extended by using 
cables capable of conducting the locked rotor current, which is much higher than the nameplate full load current. Over- 
stressing of valve stem and valve seats could be reduced by not electrically backseating the valves. Stress corrosion 
cracking could be reduced by replacing materials that are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking, such as Type 410 
stainless steel bolting. Advanced non-intrusive diagnostics and trending as a measurement of aging should be used to 
replace disassembly and intrusive testing. 
Solenoid-operated valve stressors that should be controlled or eliminated are high dose-rate radiation, high transient line a 
voltages, elevated DC voltage during station battery float charging, frequent cycling in valve operation, corrosion products 
and other contaminants in the process fluid, and pressure transients (Bacanskas et al. 1987, p.24). 
Check valve stressors that cause aging degradation are vibration, flow-induced forces, flow transients, hydraulic forces, 
water hammer, foreign objects lodged between the seat and obturator, and thermal cycling. Thermal- and radiation- 
induced degradation of valve gaskets is a significant aging-related effect. Check valve materials tend to be resistant to 
corrosion, except for some effects from borated water (Greenstreet et al. 1985, p. 14). 
Improvements in the operation of the HPCI system could reduce the stressors on valves (Conley 1990). The incidence of 
water hammer events could be reduced by design and procedure modifications for opening isolation valves and by 
implementing drain pot, keepfull, void detection, and venting system improvements. The wear and aging degradation caused 
by fast starts could be reduced if the HPCI response time were relaxed to 60 seconds. The HPCI system could be running and 
available for immediate return to full service without a challenging startup if the systems were switched to recirculation to the 
condensate storage tank after recovery of the water level has been verified. 
Considerable progress has been made in the development and application of advanced and nonintrusive diagnostic methods to 
trend degradation in mechanical, electrical, instrumentation, power cables, instrumentation cables, connectors, and control 
components. These need to be applied for nondestructive evaluation and residual life assessment to replace disassembly- 
inspection tests and eliminate risks from improper reassembly. Nonintrusive methods of valve diagnostics are commercially 
available for PORVs, MOVs, SOVs, and CVs (Haynes 1992). 
14.2 Pumps 
Pumps are among the most commonly failed nuclear reactor plant components. This section describes concerns and mechan- 
isms of pump aging and indicates how industry is managing aging pumps. Coolant pumps provide the flow of water that 
transfers heat generated by the nuclear fission out of the reactor core. The primary coolant pumps provide for the removal of 
heat during normal steady-state operation. In a PWR, auxiliary feedwater pumps deliver water from a condensate storage tank 
or from the emergency service water system to the steam generators. Auxiliary feedwater pumps are multistage (5 to 9 stages) 
high-head centrifugal pumps driven by motors or turbines. The pumps are automatically started in response to several 
emergency conditions, such as low steam generator level, a safety injection signal, or emergency bus undervoltage. Auxiliary 
feedwater pumps are also used to support normal shutdown and startup sequences. Auxiliary feedwater pumps usually operate . 
at low-flow conditions. 
The BWR RCIC system is an ESF system that incorporates a pump to supply high-pressure cooling water to the reactor vessel 
and provides a limited decay heat removal capability whenever the main feedwater system is isolated from the reactor vessel. 
The HPCI pump assembly includes a main pump driven directly by the HPCI steam turbine and a booster pump driven from 
the main pump shaft. The HPCS pump is an electricallydriven centrifugal pump. Abnormal events which could cause such a * 
situation to arise include an inadvertent isolation of all main steam lines, loss of condenser vacuum, pressure regulator failures, 
loss of feedwater, and the loss of offsite poser. For each of these events, the high pressure part of the ECCS provides a 
backup function to the RCIC system. 
14.2.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
The aging mechanisms that have affected components of reactor coolant and recirculation pumps are 1) casings (thermal 
embrittlement, thermal and mechanical fatigue, stress-corrosion cracking, high residual stress as a result of no post-weld heat 
treatment, erosion and erosion/corrosion, and crevice corrosion), 2) closure studs (corrosion and stress corrosion cracking), 
and 3) shafts (mechanical and thermal fatigue and corrosion). These aging concerns and mechanisms are summarized in 
Table 14.3. Cavitatioderosion has not been a concern for reactor coolant and recirculation pumps. However, the low-flow 
operating and testing condition for auxiliary feedwater pumps accelerates the wear from hydraulically unstable conditions. The 
wear can result in impeller or diffuser breakage, thrust bearing and/or balance device failure due to excessive loading, 
cavitation damage on suction stage impellers, increased seal leakage, seal injection piping failure, shaft or coupling breakage, 
and rotating element seizure (Haynes 1992). 
Table 14.3 Pump aging degradation concerns and mechanisms 
Thermal embrittlement results from prolonged exposure of cast stainless steel pump casings with duplex austeniticlfemtic 
microstructures to typical operating temperatures on the order of 288OC (550°F). Operating temperature transients and vibra- 
tions subject pump casings to thermal and mechanical fatigue. High residual stresses in pump welds made using the electro- 
slag techniques enhance fatigue damage at the weldments. 
Closure studs are subject to corrosion and stress-corrosion cracking. Shafts are subject to mechanical and thermal fatigue and 
corrosion. Cavitatioderosion is a concern for many pumps, although it has not been identified as a concern for reactor coolant 
or recirculation pumps. 
References 
Conley 1990, 
pp. 16, 17, 27, 
44,46 
Component 
Casing 
Bearing Housing 
Impeller 
Shaft 
Nuts and Bolts 
Cables 
Two concentric Type 304 stainless steel-graphiteasbestos gaskets seal between the PWR coolant pump cover and casing. A 
leakoff line permits detection of reactor coolant leakage through the inner gasket and must be maintained free from plugging. 
Reactor coolant may corrode the low alloy steel (SA193 Grade B7 or SA540 Grade B23) closure studs. A single gasket is 
used in BWR coolant pumps. 
Alternating mechanical bending stresses and rapidly varying thermal stresses' cause high-cycle mechanical and thermal fatigue 
in pump shafts. The bending stresses are caused by asymmetric distributions of pressure. These stresses, when superimposed 
upon stress risers and high residual stresses at welds on the shaft surface can initiate circumferential cracks and propagate 
them in a plane perpendicular to the shaft axis. These cracks usually occur in grooves on the shaft surface and propagate in a 
transgranular manner. 
Materials 
Carbon Steel, Low 
Alloy Steel 
Cast Iron 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Low Alloy Steel 
Polyethylene, Copper 
. Aging degradation of pumps is a significant concern in RCIC systems, because a single failure of the pump assembly or the 
turbine would make the system unavailable. Reactor core isolation cooling standby safety systems are frequently tested to 
ensure operability; however, testing and maintenance often cause many of the same stressors as normal operation. These 
tests may contribute to premature failures, wear, and aging degradation in pumps and other components. Other aging stressors 
J 
'Thermal barriers or heat exchangers limit reactor coolant heat reaching the mechanical seal cavity, but induce thermal stress cycling in the pump shaft. 
Aging Concerns 
Cracking Leading 
to Leakage 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Cracking 
Stress Relaxation, 
Cracking 
Calibration Drift 
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal embrittlement, 
fatigue, wear, erosion, stress- 
corrosion cracking 
Fatigue 
Fatigue 
Fatigue, corrosion 
Galling, wear, fatigue, stress- 
corrosion cracking 
Corrosion, embrittlement 
also active during system standby conditions may act synergistically to degrade components. Stressors for the HPCI pump 
assembly include pressure; lubrication problems; testing and maintenance leading to fatigue, wear, and leakage; vibration; and 
cavitation. 
14.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
A summary of viable options for managing aging degradation is provided in Table 14.4. All pumps that perform safety related 
functions are required to meet the inservice testing (IST) requirements of the applicable ASME Code. Non-intrusive trending 
of pump pressure and flow (Stockton 1992), vibration (Guy 1992), and bearing temperature, lubricant pressure, and pump a 
power (Hoyle 1992) is preferred, where possible, to disassembly-inspection tests; it supports ALARA and eliminates risk from 
improper reassembly. If required, disassemble pumps for inspection and maintenance at specified intervals. Examine welds 
by surface and volumetric (radiography or advanced ultrasonic methods, if appropriate) examinations. The inservice inspec- 
tion requirements of Section XI of the ASME Code (ASME 1992), which are currently limited to volumetric examinations, 
should be supplemented to include visual inspections. Pump shaft inspections during shutdown should include surface and 
volumetric examinations. Radiography is generally used for volumetric examination because ultrasonic waves are severely 
attenuated by the coarse grains in the steel. Radiographic triangulation is required to evaluate the location and size of a flaw. 
Advanced ultrasonic inspection, when developed, could provide improved inspection capability (Egan et al. 1987; Jeong and 
Amrnirato 1988). 
Improvements in the mitigation, detection and trending of pump aging problems can be achieved by incorporating the following 
practices : 
Conduct volumetric (radiography or advanced ultrasonic methods, if appropriate) and visual examinations of all bolts, 
studs, nuts, and bushings during each inspection interval. Remove insulation and paint if required for visual access. 
Examine pump cover and casing flange surfaces. 
Monitor radial pump motor frame vibrations for pump shaft damage, and monitor pump shaft proximity for circumferen- 
tial cracks from mechanical and thermal fatigue. Conduct surface and volumetric (radiography or advanced ultrasonic 
methods, if appropriate) examinations of the pump shaft. 
Tighter specification of certain materials of construction and fabrication methods could potentially provide marked 
improvements in auxiliary feedwater pumps' durability and reliability. The application of state-of-the-art monitoring tech- 
niques should be studied in regard to its value in assessing wear and aging factors. 
Table 14.4 Managing pump aging degradation through inservice inspections, surveillance, and monitoring 
Components 
Casing 
Bearing 
Housing 
Impeller 
Shaft 
Nuts and Bolts 
Cables 
Materials 
Carbon Steel, 
Low Alloy 
Steel 
Cast Iron 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel 
Low Alloy 
Steel 
Polyethylene, 
Copper 
References 
Conley 1990, 
p. 27 
Conley 1990, 
p. 27 
Conley 1990, 
p. 27 
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal embrittlement, fatigue, 
stress, wear, erosion, corrosion, 
stress corrosion cracking 
Fatigue 
Fatigue 
Fatigue 
Galling, Wear, Fatigue 
Corrosion, Radiation Damage, 
Embrittlement 
Management Options 
Trend motor frame and shaft 
proximity vibrations, flow, 
differential pressure; examine 
visually, use specified lubricant 
Surface and volumetric inspection 
Use specified lubricant, inspect 
for wear and corrosion 
Apply advanced nonintrusive 
methods to trend degradation 
The following recommendations are based on the studies by Conley (1990): 
High failure rates and failures found during testing could be reduced by updated preventive maintenance programs that 
include the most recent methods for detecting, monitoring. and controlling aging degradation. Further improvement could 
be made by upgrading codes and standards to include aging degradation considerations. 
The wear and aging degradation caused by fast starts could be reduced if the HPCI response time were relaxed to 60 
seconds. 
The HPCI system would be running and available for immediate return to full service without a challenging startup if the 
systems were switched to recirculation to the coolant storage tank after water level recovery has been verified. 
Damage to the pump from deadhead operation could be prevented by modifying the minimum flow valve operating logic to 
ensure that the valve is open when the pump starts and closes when the pump is not running. 
14.3 Equipment and Component Supports 
Aging is of potential concern for support structures that are inside the containment and perform safety-related functions. These 
structures must be capable of resisting loads and load combinations to which they may be subjected, and this failure should not 
initiate a LOCA. If a LOCA occurs inside the containment, support structures mitigate the consequences of the accident by 
protecting the containment and other ESFs from effects of the accident (e.g., jet forces and whipping pipes). Support 
structures that are specifically considered in this subsection are RPV Supports and Snubbers. 
14.3.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
In this subsection, the aging concerns and mechanisms are addressed for the two different types of equipment and component 
supports, namely 1) RPV Supports and 2) Snubbers. Because of the signif~cant differences in the operating characteristics of 
the two components, these will be treated separately and reported in Table 14.5 and Table 14.6. 
Table 14.5 Aging concerns and mechanisms for RPV supports 
Component 
Neutron Shield Tank at the Core 
Horizontal Midplane Elevation 
Column Support at the Core Horizontal 
Midplane Elevation 
Cantilever Support in the Active Height 
of the Core 
Threaded Parts in Sliding Foot 
Assembly 
Skirt Support 
Material 
A516 GR 60 
Steel 
A36 Carbon 
Steel or 
A5331-B1 
Steel 
A-36-69 and 
A193-GR B7 
Steel 
Maraging 
Steels 
Carbon Steel 
Aging Concerns 
Cracking Leading 
to Leakage 
Cracking Leading 
to Loss of Support 
Cracking Leading 
to Loss of Support 
Cracking 
Ductile Rupture 
Aging Mechanisms 
Neutron 
Embrittlement 
Corrosion 
Neutron 
Embrittlement 
Neutron 
Embrittlement 
Corrosion 
Fatigue 
References - 
Hopkins 1987, 
Shah and 
Macdonald 
1993 
Table 14.6 Aging concerns and mechanisms for snubbers 
RPV Supports 
Components 
Mechanical Snubbers 
Hydraulic Snubbers 
Of the four major types of RPV supports used in PWRs, the neutron shield tank supports and column supports are directly 
exposed to neutron flux from the reactor core beltline region over some portion of their suppqrting length. For these two types 
of support structures, the primary aging concern is neutron radiation-induced embrittlement. Radiation embrittlement of RPV 
steels, welds, and heat-affected zones adjacent to welds is discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of Volume 1 of this report. Normal 
operating temperatures in the supports are lower than those in the RPV; thus, the amount of embrittlement produced by a given 
neutron fluence would exceed that produced in the RPV. 
Data from the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) vessel surveillance program indicate a substantial radiation embrittlement 
rate effect at low temperatures (-50°C [122"F]) for ,4212-B, A350-LF3, and AlO5-11, and corresponding welds (Cheverton et 
al. 1991). On the other hand, characterization of material from the Shippingport neutron shield tank (NST) indicated that the 
amount of embrittlement damage of A212 Grade B steel in a low-temperature, low-flux environment is not as large as that 
experienced by the HFlR surveillance capsules (Chopra and Shack 1990). Because the radiation spectrum experienced by 
vessel supports and the Shippingport NST are similar, the vessel supports are likely to experience embrittlement damage 
similar to that experienced by Shippingport NST. However, there are several unresolved issues regarding the embrittlement 
damage in a low-flux, low-temperature environment, some of which are currently being addressed. 
Materials 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel, Bronze 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel, Bronze, Thermo- 
plastics, and Elastomers 
A major type of PWR vessel support (the bracket type) and the skirt-type supports used for BWR (and a few PWR) vessels are 
not likely to receive a significant neutron fluence, even during an extended operating lifetime. The cantilever-type PWR vessel 
supports may or may not sustain a significant neutron fluence (Cheverton et al. 1989) depending on the specific design of the 
support structure and its location relative to the core region. An analysis of the potential impact of the apparent increase in 
low-temperature embrittlement, observed in the vessel surveillance program noted above indicates that a "short column" s u p  
port that rests on steel cantilever beams may present the greatest potential for fracturerelated failure of the vessel supports 
(Cheverton et al. 1991). The potential for synergistic effects, where radiation embrittlement is of concern, has not been 
subjected to detailed examinations. Other factors that need to be considered include (Hopkins 1987) 
Corrosion - One of the factors present in all LWR containments is a greater-than-average humidity at elevated tem- 
perature, coupled with the presence of a radiation environment. The effect of the gamma radiation can be important in 
causing increased corrosion rates synergistically with the high humidity and temperatures. The long-term effects of such 
an environment on the integrity of the RPV supports should be examined because the total gamma dose alone on the 
supports will be over 5000 Mrads in the first 40 years of life. Reactor pressure vessels support corrosion during the 
original license period is not expected to be a problem; only minor local pitting has been observed to date. 
Aging Concerns 
Lnternal Degradation, 
Spring Microcracking, 
and Locking. 
Degradation of Seals, 
Wear, Deformation of 
Metal Parts 
Radiation damage to nonferritic parts of the RPV support system - Some support systems depend on a dry lubricant 
that is located between the support and the RPV nozzle. Typically, such material has a radiation threshold dose on the 
order of 2 x lo3 Mrads. Therefore, an evaluation should be made of the actual radiation levels the lubricant will receive 
and to determine if supplementation or replacement of the lubricant is needed. 
Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of threaded parts in the sliding foot assembly - The threads are coated with Heresite. 
The threshold stress for initiation of SCC is 150 psi, while the applied tensile stresses' are calculated to be about 20 psi; 
therefore, SCC of the sliding foot assemblies is not expected. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Vibration, Fatigue, 
Corrosion 
High Temperatures, 
Moisture, Vibration, 
Wear 
References 
Hopkins 1987, 
Brown et al. 
1992 
Fatigue - The skirt type supports for BWR RPVs are subject to fatigue because of the expansion and contraction cycles 
associated with the temperature- and pressure-induced expansion and contraction of the vessels during the plant startup1 
shutdown cycles. However, the fatigue usage factor during the first 40 years of operation is expected to be well below 1. 
Table 14.5 summarizes the aging concerns and mechanisms for RPV supports. 
Snubbers 
Snubbers are mechanical or hydraulic devices that limit the dynamic displacements of pipes or other components. The major- 
ity of piping snubbers are mechanical devices with load ratings 59,000 kg (130,000 lbs) or less, whereas equipment snubbers 
are almost exclusively hydraulic and are manufactured with load ratings up to 907,000 kg (2,000,000 lbs). Although snubbers 
can provide a valuable service, they have often been added, in response to an overly conservative stress analysis, at places 
where current design criteria would indicate that they are unnecessary. 
An extensive review of the status of snubbers was made by Bush et al. (1986). They concluded that both hydraulic and 
mechanical snubbers are susceptible to failure from a variety of mechanisms, including those related to aging; however, the 
most important failure mechanism for a given snubber is highly dependent on the specific stressors applied to it, including the 
local environment and nature and frequency of the dynamic loads that are applied to it. This report included the following 
observations and recommendations in regard to specific tests: 
Breakaway force is sensitive to both vibration and extended periods of inactivity; inactivity may increase breakaway force 
levels substantially. Both conditions may exist and should be considered. 
The usual tendency is to minimize the dead band level to minimize impact loads in the snubbers and attached components. 
This tendency needs to be counter balanced against the increased tolerance to higher vibration levels at higher dead band 
levels. 
The spring rate or load displacement is an indication of the stiffness in the snubber; however, stiffness is controlled by the 
associated hardware attached to the structure, the snubber, and the component. Therefore, the spring rate of the snubber 
is only a part of the picture, and evaluations based on the cited values may not be valid. 
The various measured parameters are quite sensitive to the type of test and the test procedures. An acceptable snubber 
may be rejected or an unacceptable snubber may be accepted due to variability in test equipment and test procedures. This 
factor is not recognized in the various codes and standards. A definitive set of criteria should be developed to control this 
variable. 
A preliminary NPAR evaluation of snubber aging (Brown et al. 1990) concluded, in part, that manufacturers' recommenda- 
tions for maintenance of hydraulic snubbers are generally conservative while those for mechanical snubbers are not. The latest 
results from NPAR in-plant research (Brown et al. 1992) indicate that 
The performance of mechanical snubbers can be degraded by all the environmental influences, including elevated tempera- 
ture, vibration, and moisture, by increasing drag and breakaway forces and by changing activation acceleration thresholds. 
The seal performance of hydraulic snubbers can be rapidly degraded by high temperatures in isolated areas. Radiation 
probably contributes less than originally hypothesized. 
* Fluid leakage in hydraulic snubbers is commonly associated with leaking hydraulic fittings, though the amount of this 
fitting leakage that could be ascribed to the service environment could not be determined. However, a significant number 
of seal leaks were directly attributable to elevated temperatures rather than long-term exposure to normal environmental 
conditions. 
Recently, the ASME standard on Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, OM-Part 4 (ASME 1990), has been 
proposed as a substitute for existing Technical Specification requirements for snubber ISI. The substitution of the OM-4 stan- 
dard is currently under consideration by the NRC. If the substitution is approved by the NRC, a Generic Letter will be issued 
to allow nuclear power plants this regulatory option. The Phase I NPAR snubber research (Bush et al. 1986; Brown et al. 
1990) has played an important role in the development of the snubber surveillance methods; and NPAR staff and sub- 
contractors have maintained a direct interface. over the last 3 years, with the O M 4  committee. An equally important impact 
is expected from the latest results of the NPAR in-plant research (Brown et al. 1992) which provides important information for 
understanding and managing snubber aging and recommendations for service life monitoring (Table 14.7) 
Table 14.6 sunlmarizes the aging concerns and mechanisms for snubbers. 
14.3.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
In this subsection, potential approaches for managing aging concerns and mechanisms are addressed for the two different types 
of equipment and component supports, namely 1) RPV Supports and 2) Snubbers. 
Pressure Vessel Supports 
Table 14.7 summarizes aging management practices for RPV supports. 
As a result of his review of aging concerns for pressure vessel supports, Hopkins (1987) recommended that further studies be 
made to 
develop fracture toughness and strength assessment data for the RPV support steels irradiated at temperatures less than 
232°C (450°F); develop a correlation of fracture toughness versus Charpy V-notch properties at temperatures less than 
232°C (450°F) and as a function of displacements per atom and neutron fluence (E > 1 MeV) 
determine the range of radiation conditions (neutron spectra and flux levels) in and around shield tanks, and cantilever and 
column-type support structures 
investigate the effects of the expected radiation levels due to extended operation on the lubricants between the RPV 
nozzles and supports. 
Snubbers 
Brown et al. (1990, 1992) concluded that, historically, manufacturers' recommendations for hydraulic snubber seal and fluid 
replacement intervals are generally conservative and often result in unnecessary snubber overhauls or replacements. In con- 
trast to this, the recommended 40-year maintenancefree service life of mechanical snubbers, originally recommended by 
snubber manufacturers, does not appear to be conservative enough. 
Table 14.7 Managing aging degradation in RPV supports 
Component 
Neutron Shield Tank at the 
Core Horizontal Midplane 
Elevation 
Column Support at the Core 
Horizontal Midplane Elevation 
Cantilever Support in the 
Active Height of the Core 
Threaded Parts in Sliding Foot 
Assembly 
Skirt Support 
Materials 
A5 16 GR 60 Steel 
A36 Carbon Steel 
or A5331-B1 Steel 
A-36-69 and A193- 
GR B7 Steel 
Maraging Steels 
Carbon Steel 
Aging Mechanisms 
Neutron 
Ernbrittlement , 
Corrosion 
Neutron 
Embrittlement 
Neutron 
Embrittlement 
Stress Corrosion 
Cracking 
Fatigue 
Management Options 
Monitoring 
Monitoring and 
Sampling 
Monitoring and 
Sampling 
Monitoring 
Monitoring 
References 
Hopkins 1987 
Failures resulting from long-term degradation may be minimized by scheduled maintenance (e.g., seal replacement or replace- 
ment of snubbers). However, because the probability of failure might actually increase due to handling or assembly errors, 
unnecessary maintenance or snubber replacement should be minimized. Practical methods are needed, therefore, for 
monitoring long-term degradation in both hydraulic and mechanical snubbers. 
A limited number of snubbers fail from applications that are beyond their design capacity. These include high amplitude 
vibration, abnormally high temperatures, and transient loads. Short-term failures generally occur within one or two operating 
cycles. They can be reduced by modification of the environment, augmented surveillance, frequent maintenance, frequent 
I replacement of snubbers, or retrofitting with more durable snubbers for a specific application. 
Table 14.8 summarizes aging management practices for snubbers. 
c 
Snubber operability in the active (dynamic) mode is normally verified by measurement of activation level andlor release rate. 
The operability of a snubber in the passive mode (i.e., the ability of the snubber to allow free thermal motion) is usually 
determined during inservice tests by direct measurement of either breakaway force (the force required to initiate motion of the 
snubber) or by drag force (the force exerted by the snubber when stroked at a given velocity). 
Pertinent discussions of Nondestructive Evaluation and Residual Life Assessment methods were provided in the recornmenda- 
tions by Brown et al. (1992) for service-life monitoring of snubbers. These recommendations included 
determination of snubber degradation or failure causes 
determination and documentation of operating environment 
augmented surveillance 
testing 
trending. 
The service data for both hydraulic and mechanical snubbers are often incomplete in terms of documentation of environmental 
parameters and failure causes (Brown et al. 1990). In addition, inconsistencies exist in parameter measurement, inspection, 
testing, and documentation methods so that data from some plants cannot be readily combined or compared with data from 
others. Brown et al. (1992) noted several important considerations for trending: 1) test machines used for trending should 
provide a time trace of load and velocity, 2) establishing baseline data is essential for identifying trends, and 3) the parameters 
trended should be those that directly relate to the anticipated aging failure mode. 
Table 14.8 Managing aging degradation in snubbers 
Component 
Mechanical 
Snubbers 
Hydraulic 
Snubbers 
Material 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel, Bronze 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel, Bronze, Thermo- 
Plastics, Elastomers 
Aging Mechanisms 
Vibration, Fatigue, 
Corrosion 
High Temperature, 
Moisture, Vibration, 
Wear 
Management Option 
Monitor, Test and Change 
Design and Operating 
Procedure 
Monitor and Trend 
Performance Testing, Design 
Changes 
References 
Brown et al. 
1992 
Brown et al. 
1992 
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15 Electrical Components 
The electrical components considered in this section include relays and circuit breakers. Cables connectors and splices are 
covered in Part 1 Section 6. Other related sections in this Part include Sections: 3- Reactor Protection System; 8- Instruments 
and Control Power Systems; 16.1-Resistance Temperature Detectors; 20-Bistables and Switches and; 21-Motors and Motor 
control Centers. 
15.1 Relays 
Relays are solid state devices used in protective and control applications in NPPs. There are five categories of relays: protec- 
tive, auxiliary, control, time delay or timing, and electronic. 
Protective relays detect power overloads or degraded conditions in the plant power system and initiate the opening of circuit 
breakers to isolate the affected portion from the electrical distribution system and, thereby, prevent damage to protected equip 
ment (motors, buses, and transformers). The contacts of most protective relays are limited to currents between 0.3 and 
3.0 amps and are not, therefore, capable of handling the electrical load associated with completion of the protective action. 
There are many different types of protective relays, but the most commonly used are undervoltage, instantaneous overcurrent, 
time overcurrent, and differential protective relays. 
Auxiliary relays, which can have contacts rated to 35 amps, supplement protective relays in transmission and distribution sys- 
tems to carry the heavier electrical loads required to operate circuit breaker trip coils. Auxiliary relays are normally actuated 
by the contacts of protective relays. 
Control relays are used in the logic and protective action initiation systems. Control relays are two-position relays that transfer 
position when their coils are energized. They may be constructed with solenoids or armatures, however, solenoid types are 
more common. 
Time delay relays usually consist of a control relay with a timing device attached that, when energized or deenergized, delays 
the change in position of the relay contacts for a specified period, as when used to delay a trip function to avoid spurious trips. 
In many plants, time delay relays are also used in the emergency power system to sequence loads connected to the diesel 
generator. 
Electronic relays are solid state devices that are used for protective or control relay applications. This type of relay is rela- 
tively new in nuclear applications and is not widely used. There has been use in some limited applications, such as motor con- 
trol relays and in applications where high cycling causes mechanical relays to fail frequently. 
* 
15.1.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Toman et al. (1987) did an extensive review of data on the designs, functions, and aging of relays. They concluded that relay 
components are aged by numerous stressors that, with time, will cause relay materials to degrade. Discussed below are the 
materials used in relay components and their aging degradation mechanisms. 
While relays are usually located in sealed cabinets and, therefore, in relatively mild environments, they are subjected to a 
variety of mechanical, electrical, thermal, and environmental stressors. The symptoms of such degradation may include 
changes in response time (slowing of control relays or variations in the time delay for time delay relays), in coil characteristic 
(inrush and holding currents,  and insulation resistance), o r  in contact characteristics (resistance across  closed contacts). The 
various types o f  relays a r e  generally constructed of the  s ame  materials, though the  induction d isc  relays and time delay relays 
use some different materials. 
Relays are subjected to a variety o f  mechanical, electrical, thermal, and environmental stressors that contribute to degradation. 
After this degradation,  relays may fail when energized at  normal design voltages. Aging concerns and mechanisms for relays 
are listed in Table 15.1 . 
Table 15.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms for relays 
Component 
Relay Case 
Coil wire 
Coil Spool 
Coil Coating 
Contact Carriers 
Contacts 
Coil lead Wires 
Cams 
Timing Circuits 
Timing Diaphragms 
Plunger or Armature 
'Trademark of E. I. Du 
Aging Mechanisms 
Embrittlement, Chemical Reac- 
tions, Vibration, Thermal Damage 
None Significant 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal 
Damage, Inductive Surges 
Corrosion, Thermal Cycling, 
Leakage 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal 
Damage, Inductive Surges 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal, 
Inductive Surges, Humidity 
Thermal Damage 
Oxidation, Contamination (e.g., 
dirt), Arcing and High Cycle Rate 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal 
Damage, Inductive Surges 
Vibration, Thermal Cycling 
Corrosion, Contamination 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal 
Damage, Power Surges 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal 
Damage, Contamination 
Contamination, High Cycle 
Fatigue, Wear 
References 
Toman et al. 
1987 
Materials 
Phenolic, Lexan' 
Aluminum, Steel 
Polyamide-imide Insulated 
Wire 
Copper Wire 
Zytel,' Nylon, Lexan' 
Polyester Tape, Fiberglass 
Tape, Varnish 
Phenolic, Zytel,' Nylon, 
Delrin' 
Silver 
Teflon' Silicon Rubber, 
TeGel' 
Copper Wire 
Delrin' Metal 
ResistancelCapacitance 
Networks With Solid State 
Components 
Silicon Rubber 
(Not Specified) 
Pont de Nemours & Company. 
Aging Concerns 
Leakage and Internal Contami- 
nation, Binding 
Internal (e.g. dirt) 
Contamination 
Dielectric Breakdown, Shorts 
Increased Resistance, 
Loosening, Shorts 
Dielectric Breakdown, Shorts 
Dielectric Breakdown, Shorts 
Shape Change 
Corrosion, Oxidation of Con- 
tacts, Contact Insulation. Loss 
of Contact Material 
Dielectric Breakdown, Shorts 
Loosening Resulting in Ohmic 
Heating and Burnout 
Wear, Corrosion, Binding 
Failure, Setpoint Drit? 
Rupture, Leakage, Plugging, 
Drift 
Binding, Mechanical Failure 
The most predominate stress mechanism is electrical relays appears to the thermal degradation (Toman et al. 1987). Thermal 
degradation impacts the non-metallic parts through increasing chemical reactions and/or through softening or melting of the 
material. Solenoids in a continuous energized state or in an enclosed cabinet or subjected to other elevated temperatures are 
more susceptible to thermal induced failures. High temperature relays are available and when required high temperature wire 
leads must also be used. 
Environmental conditions that contribute to relay degradations, include humidity, dust, dirt, oxidation and chemical contami- 
nates. These conditions can affect the operability of moving parts, heat dissipation, contact corrosion and insulation integrity. 
a Enclosed relays have a reduced probability of failure from environmental sources at the cost of increased thermal degradation. 
Moving parts within the relays are susceptible to normal mechanical wear. Thermal and environmental factors can accelerate 
the mechanical stresses and accelerate degradation. As intuitively obvious, high cycle relays are most susceptible to mechani- 
cal wear and fatigue. Relays, lead wires and connections exposed to frequent vibration or repeated movement lead wires could 
experience excessive wear and fatigue. 
Electrical stresses under normal design voltages and relay operability do not result in shortening the relay life (Tornan et a1 
1987). Under degraded conditions or voltage spikes can cause shorting of the coils and/or excessive contact wear. An induc- 
tive surge created by an interruption of power to a direct current coil can also cause shorting. 
15.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
The components of a successful program to manage aging degradation are broadly twofold: 1) inservice inspection, surveil- 
lance, and monitoring methods (incorporating non-destructive examination and residual life assessments, where appropriate, as 
well as parameter trending and record-keeping) to assess the magnitude and rate of aging degradation; and 2) control measures 
to mitigate the adverse impacts of component aging on plant safety and capacity factors. These methods for managing aging 
degradation are discussed below and summarized in Table 15.2. 
15.1.2.1 Inservice Inspection, Surveillance, and Monitoring 
Gleason (1992) examined a variety of inservice ISMM for aged and degraded relays. Both current nuclear industry ISM pract- 
ices and improved ISM methods were evaluated. Several of these methods were found to be effective in detecting aging in 
relays. 
For protective relays, 19 methods were evaluated and 1 1  were found to be effective in detecting aging. Of these 11 methods, 
the common nuclear plant ISM practices were visual inspection, timetcurrent characteristic, induction/overcurrent pickup, 
target and seal-in, and operating current. When these common practices were properly performed, all methods were effective 
at detecting aging except for the operating current method. Moreover, not all the current methods were equally sensitive for 
degraded relays from different manufacturers. The improved ISM method of infrared temperature measurement, done by 
pyrometer or scanner, was more sensitive to degraded conditions caused by dirt, overheating, and contact damage than the 
current practice and about as sensitive as the current practice when degradation was due to loose connections. For protective 
relays, infrared temperature measurement is recommended in addition to the current plant practices and should be performed 
with the cover off the relay and with the relay energized. 
For auxiliary relays, 16 ISM methods were evaluated and 14 were found to be effective in detecting aging. Of these 14 meth- 
ods, the common nuclear plant ISM practices were visual inspection, pick-up voltage, and drop out voltage. When these com- 
4 mon practices were properly performed, all three methods were effective at detecting aging. However, the current methods 
were not sensitive to many of the degraded conditions. The improved ISM methods of infrared temperature measurement, 
vibration testing, and acoustic testing were each more sensitive to degraded conditions than current practice. The improved 
ISM method of infrared temperature measurement, by pyrometer or scanner, was more sensitive to degraded conditions caused 
* by dirt, overheating, blocked armature, and loose connections than the current practice of pick-up voltage and drop out volt- 
age. Vibration testing, which gives a vibration signature analysis of the transient occurring during change of state of the con- 
trol relay, was more sensitive than the current practice to the degraded conditions of loose connections, contact damage, 
blocked annature, overheating, increased coil resistance, shorted coil turns, and dirt accumulation. For auxiliary relays, infra- 
red temperature measurement and vibration testing are recommended in addition to the current plant practices. 
Table 15.2 Managing aging degradation of relays 
For control relays, 16 ISM methods were evaluated and 11 were found to be effective in detecting aging. Of these 11 meth- 
ods, the common nuclear plant ISM practices were visual inspection, pick-up voltage, and drop out voltage. When these com- 
mon practices were properly performed, all three methods were effective at detecting aging. However, the current methods 
were not sensitive to most of the degraded conditions. The improved ISM methods of magnetic flux, infrared temperature 
measurement, vibration testing, and acoustic testing were sensitive to additional degraded conditions. Also, each was sensitive 
to some degraded condition for which current practice was insensitive. The improved ISM method of infrared temperature 
measurement, by pyrometer or scanner, was more sensitive to degraded conditions caused by dirt, overheating, short coil 
turns, and loose connections than was the current method of pick-up voltage and drop out voltage. Vibration testing was more w 
sensitive than the current practice to the degraded conditions of loose connections, contact damage, blocked armature, and 
overheating. For control relays, infrared temperature measurement and vibration testing are recommended in addition to the 
current plant practices. 
Component 
Relay Case 
Coil wire 
Coil Spool 
Coil coating 
Contact 
Carriers 
Contacts 
Coil lead 
Wires 
Cams 
Timing 
Circuits 
Timing 
Diaphragms 
Plunger or 
Armature 
'Trademark of 
Materials 
Phenolic, Lexan' 
Aluminum, Steel 
Polyamide-imide 
insulated wire 
Copper wire 
Zytel,' Nylon, Lexan' 
Polyester Tape, Fiber- 
glass Tape, Varnish 
Phenolic, Zytel.' Nylon. 
Delrin' 
Silver 
Teflon,' Silicon Rubber, 
Tebel'  
Copper Wire 
Delrin' Metal 
Resistance/Capacitance 
Networks with Solid 
State Components 
Silicon Rubber 
(Not Specified) 
E.1. DuPont de Nemours & 
Aging Mechanisms 
Embrittlement. Chem~cal Reactions. Vibration, 
Thermal Damage 
None Significant 
Radiation, Oxidation. Thermal Damage. 
Inductive Surges 
Corrosion, Thermal Cycling, Leakage 
Radiation, Oxidation. Thermal Damage, 
lnductive Surges 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal, Inductive 
Surges, Humidity 
Thermal Damage 
Oxidation, Contamination (e.g., dirt), Arcing 
and High Cycle Rate 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal Damage, 
Inductive Surges 
Vibration, Thermal Cycling 
Corrosion, Contamination 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal Damage, Power 
Surges 
Radiation, Oxidation, Thermal Damage, 
Contamination 
Contamination, High Cycle Fatigue, Wear 
Company. 
Managing Options 
Maintain or Improve Inspection 
Methods: 
Protective relays: visual inspec- 
tion, timelcurrent characteristic, 
induction/overcurrent pickup, 
target and seal-in, and infrared 
temperature measurement 
Auxiliary relays: visual inspec- 
tion, pick-up voltage, drop out 
voltage, infrared temperature 
measurement, and vibration 
testing 
Control relays: visual inspection, 
pick-up voltage, drop out volt- 
age, infrared temperature mens- 
urement, and vibration testing 
Electronic relays: visual inspec- 
tion, overcurrent sensing 
pick-up, instantaneous over- 
current, and vibration testing, 
limited to areas of low noise 
Timing relays: visual inspection, 
pick-up voltage, and timing tests, 
infrared temperature mensure- 
ment, inrush current, and vibra- 
tion testing 
References 
Glenson 
1992 
For electronic relays, 12 ISM methods were evaluated and 4 were found to be effective. Of these 4 methods, the common 
nuclear plant ISM practices were visual inspection, overcurrent sensing pick-up, and instantaneous overcurrent. When these 
common practices were properly performed, all three methods were effective at detecting aging. The improved ISM method 
of vibration testing, though limited to areas of low noise because of its low signal, was sensitive to all degraded conditions. 
For timing relays, 17 ISM methods were evaluated and 13 were found to be effective in detecting aging. Of these 13 methods, 
the common nuclear plant ISM practices were visual inspection, pick-up voltage, and timing tests. When these common prac- 
tices were properly performed, all three methods were effective at detecting aging. However, the current methods were not 
~1 sensitive to many of the degraded conditions. The improved ISM methods of infrared temperature measurement, inrush cur- 
rent, and vibration testing were each more sensitive to degraded conditions than current practices. The improved ISM method 
of inrush current, was more sensitive to degraded conditions caused by dirt accumulation, contact damage, and shorted coil 
turns than the current practice. Vibration testing was more sensitive than the current practice to the degraded conditions of 
b loose connections, contact damage, blocked armature, overheating, increased coil resistance, shorted coil turns, and dirt accu- 
mulation. For timing relays, infrared temperature measurement, inrush current, and vibration testing are recommended in 
addition to the current plant practices, while the pick-up voltage test is recommended for deletion. 
15.1.2.2 Mitigation 
Gleason (1992) suggested that the methods determined to be effective in detecting aging in relays were also capable of rnitiga- 
ting that aging. That is, detection of aging degradation would identify the need for an appropriate maintenance action; this 
action would then be performed to mitigate the observed degradation. These maintenance practices are summarized in 
Table 15.2. 
15.2 Circuit Breakers 
Circuit breakers (CBs) have two basic functions: switching and fault interruption. When switching, the CB is used to energize 
or deenergize loads and to transfer load groups from one power source to another. During switching, the currents being made 
and broken are within the normal rated current of the CB. When the CB is being used in its protective (i.e., fault interruption) 
mode, the CB interrupts large fault currents associated with short circuits in the connected, loadside equipment. Most CBs can 
be used as both switching and fault interrupting devices, the specific application determining which function is important. 
Only those CBs associated with the emergency buses are safety-related. Most safety-related CBs are in the low voltage and 
medium voltage classes, 480 Vac and 4160 Vac (or, in some plants, 13.6 kV), respectively. (The high voltage CBs associated 
with the main and startup transformers, which are of a totally different type and style from the safety-related CBs, are not con- 
sidered here.) Safety-related CBs may be divided into two generic types: molded-case CBs and CBs associated with metal- 
clad switchgear. Molded-case CBs are used to supply individual circuits and feeders for low voltage AC and DC distribution 
systems having voltages of 480 V and below for small loads. The breakers are enclosed in a phenolic molded housing that, 
generally, is sealed at the factory, and require little or no maintenance. The metal-clad switchgear CBs are predominantly 
associated with the 4160- (or 13.6 kV) and 480-V emergency loads buses. The metal-clad CB is much larger than the 
molded-case CB and is associated with a large plug-in bus system that is contained in a metal housing, hence the name 
"metal-clad." The bus system contains a number of cubicles, some reserved for instrumentation and transformers, and the 
remainder reserved for the CBs. The CBs can be easily removed from their cubicles for testing and maintenance. Circuit 
breakers associated with the DC system and with the AC vital buses may be molded-case or metal-clad, depending on the 
capacity and design of the system. 
..) Circuit breakers are complex electromechanical devices that must reliably perform the following bctions: 1) close the cur- 
rent path and carry the steady-state load current without overheating; 2) maintain sufficient contact pressure when closed to 
prevent a high-resistance path between contacts; 3) rapidly open the contacts under fault conditions so that current interruption 
does not result in excessive burning of the contacts; and 4) always provide adequate phaseto-phase and phaseto-ground insu- 
S lation. Circuit breakers have to be located in mild environments. If a CB is located in a steam or spray environment, the 
power path will flash over and, if subjected to the high temperature of an accident, a thennal cascade failure of its insulators 
could occur. However, even in mild environments, meeting the functional requirements noted above imposes stresses on CBs 
that can lead to aging-induced failures. 
15.2.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Tornan et al. (1987) did an extensive review of data on the designs, functions, and aging of CBs, and concluded that CB com- 
ponents are aged by numerous stressors, which may in time lead to their failure. Discussed below are the materials used in 
CB components and their aging degradation mechanisms. 
While CBs are usually located in mild environments, they are subjected to a variety of mechanical, electrical, thermal, and 
environmental stressors. These stressors include self-induced vibration and shock forces, electrical and magnetic forces, resis- 
tive heating, corrosion, and erosion. Therefore, all components must have sufficient mechanical and electrical strength; II 
current-carrying parts must have high conductivity with good arcing corrosion resistance of the contacts; and insulating mate- 
rials must have high dielectric strength and flame retarding properties.. As details about CB materials are often considered 
proprietary by manufacturers, the following discussion of typical materials or material types used in CB components is from 
information available from Brown Boveri (Bulletin 3.2.1-1B)' unless otherwise noted. 
The main contacts are made of a silver alloy having high electrical conductivity. Arcing contacts use a high refractory silver 
alloy for minimum deterioration during arcing while maintaining good electrical conductivity. Plating of arcing contacts is 
commonly used to increase the dielectric strength of the contact gap following a current-zero in the interruption process 
(Bogert 1962). 
Buses and current-carrying components are usually made of a hardened copper alloy, insulated with epoxy, with the main bus 
camed through the wall of the frame with porcelain supports embedded in polyester glass. Most parts of the operating mecha- 
nism are made of a high-quality brass or phosphor bronze and steel, with the charging springs in the stored energy mechanism 
made of high-quality spring steel (Tornan et al. 1987). 
Arc chutes, which contain the arc during the interruption process, are typically made of a high impact track-resistant polyester, 
but may also be made from a glazed ceramic material (Heinmiller et al. 1983). 
The primary disconnects are insulated with a polyester laminate or by porcelain housings mounted on polyester glass preforms 
bonded with an epoxy compound. Polyester glass supports the main bus and other continuous current components, serves to 
isolate the components from ground and, along with epoxy, provides an interphase bamer assembly to isolate the phases. 
Circuit breakers are subjected to a variety of mechanical, electrical, thermal, and environmental stressors that contribute to CB 
degradation; these are listed in Table 15.3. 
Table 15.3 Aging concerns and mechanisms for circuit breakers 
'Brown Boveri Bulletin 3.2.1-1B. I-T-E Type HK Metal-Clad Switchgear. p. 10-1 1 ,  Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), Stamford, Connecticut. 
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Component 
Mechanism 
Lubricants 
Contacts 
Insulation 
Materials for 
Power Path 
Materials 
Molybdenum Disul- 
tide and Petroleum- 
based Grease 
Silver Alloy On Cop- 
per base 
Polyester, Glass 
Fiber-Filled Epoxy 
Resin, And Phenolic 
References 
Toman et el. 
1987 
Aging Concerns 
Wear of Trip Mechanism 
Bearings 
Damage To Contact Support 
Insulation Causing Phase- 
To-Round Fault 
Contact Degradation 
Decreased Insulating Capa- 
bility Of Electrical insulating 
Components 
Aging Mechanisms 
Lubricant Evaporation 
Resistive Heating 
Fatigue, Wear 
Contact Material Vaporization 
15.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
The components of a successful program to manage aging degradation are broadly twofold: 1) inservice inspection, surveil- 
lance, and monitoring methods (incorporating non-destructive examination and residual life assessments, where appropriate, as 
well as parameter trending and record-keeping) to assess the magnitude and rate of aging degradation; and 2) control measures 
to mitigate the adverse impacts of component aging on plant safety and capacity factors. These methods for managing aging 
degradation are discussed below and summarized in Table 15.4. 
* 15.2.2.1 Inservice Inspection, Surveillance, and Monitoring 
Gleason (1992) examined a variety of inservice ISMM for aged and degraded molded-case and metal-clad circuit breakers. 
* 
Both current nuclear plant ISM practices and improved ISM methods were evaluated. Several of these methods were found to 
be effective in detecting aging in CBs. 
For molded-case CBs, the common nuclear plant ISM practices evaluated were visual inspection, instantaneous trip, pole resis- 
tance, insulation resistance, current hold-in (100 and 135% rated), and 300% overcurrent. When these common practices 
were properly performed, all methods, except for insulation resistance and mechanical actuation, were effective at detecting 
aging. Insulation resistance is useful for ensuring high-integrity connections and, thus, personnel safety after maintenance is 
performed. The instantaneous trip test is effective when performed below and above the instantaneous trip range. In addition, 
the improved ISM methods of infrared temperature measurement and vibration testing were found to be effective in detecting 
aging in molded-case CBs. Infrared temperature measurements, by pyrometer or scanner, detected ~ i g ~ c a n t  temperatures 
before damage to internals could occur. Vibration testing was the only method capable of detecting all the test degraded 
conditions. Infrared temperature measurement and vibration testing are recommended in addition to current plant practices. 
For metal-clad CBs, the common nuclear plant ISM practices evaluated were visual inspection, mechanical actuation, instan- 
taneous trip, pole resistance, insulation resistance, long time delay overcurrent, short time delay overcurrent, and lubrication 
inspection, which is a part of visual inspection. When these common practices were properly performed, all methods, except 
for insulation resistance, were effective at detecting aging. The improved ISM methods of infrared temperature measurement 
and vibration testing were found to be effective in detecting aging in metal-clad CBs. Infrared temperature measurements, by 
pyrorneter or scanner, could detect significant temperatures due to loose connections that, during the long time delay function 
of the trip device, could result in overheating of components. Vibration testing was the only method capable of detecting all 
the test degraded conditions and is also useful during trip tests. Infrared temperature measurement and vibration testing are 
recommended in addition to current plant practices. 
15.2.2.2 Mitigation 
Maintenance practices recommended by the manufacturers of the CBs are summarized by Toman et al. (1987). Gleason 
(1992) suggested that the methods determined to be effective in detecting aging in CBs were also capable of mitigating that 
aging. That is, detection of aging degradation would identify the need for an appropriate maintenance action; this action would 
then be performed to mitigate the observed degradation. These maintenance practices are summarized in Table 15.4. 
Table 15.4 Managing aging degradation of circuit breakers 
Component 
Mechmsm 
Lubr~cants 
Contacts 
Insulation 
Materials For 
Power Path 
'Gleason 1992; pp. 
%leason 1992; pp. 5-18 to 5-19. 
Toman et al. 1987; paragraph 3.8, p.139. 
'General Electric GET-2779G. 
'Westinghouse I.B. 33-790-1E. 
6General Electric GET-7303C. 
' ~ e s t i n ~ h o u s e  I.BV . 24-Y -7269 
'General Electric GET-1 802W. 
yoman 1982 
Materials 
Molybdenum 
Disulfide and 
Petroleum- 
Based Grease 
Silver ~ l l o y  
On Copper 
Base 
Polyester, 
Glass Fiber- 
Filled Epoxy 
Resin, And 
Phenolic 
5-16 to 5-18. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Lubricant 
Evaporation 
Resistive Heating 
Fatigue, Wear 
Contact Material 
Vaporization 
Inservice Inspection. Surveillance, 
and Monitoring 
Molded-case Cbs': 
- Current methods: visual inspec- 
tion, pole resistance, 100% rated 
current hold-in, 135% rated 
current hold-in, and 300% over- 
current, with insulation resistance 
to ensure good connections and 
instantaneous trip performed 
below and above the 
instantaneous trip range 
* Improved methods: infrared 
pyrometry or scanning, and 
vibration testing 
Metal-clad CBs2: 
• Current methods: visual inspec- 
tion (including lubrication 
inspection, mechanical actuation, 
instantaneous trip, pole resis- 
tance, insulation resistance, long 
time delay overcurrent, short 
time delay overcurrent, with 
insulation resistance to ensure 
good connections 
Improved methods: infrared 
pyrometry or scanning, and 
vibration testing. 
Mitigation 
The recommended ISM methods, being 
effective in detecting aging, are capable 
of mitigating aging.". Additional, 
specific mitigation methods include"' 
Molded-case, single phase, 
low-voltage CBs 
- sufficiently inexpensive for 
corrective action to be by 
replacemento'. 
Molded-case, multi-phase CBs with 
removable covers 
- small amount of light oil or grease 
at wear points' 
- file or sand pined contacts4. 
Metal-clad CBs periodically at user- 
defined intervals, along with tests 
and inspectionssd 
- thorough cleaning 
- check primary contacts for wear 
and lightly lubricate them 
- replace undervoltage trip attach- 
ments for reactor trip circuits for 
Westinghouse PWR based on 
number of operations for the 
device9 
- evaluate and adjust spring 
charging mechanisms? 
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16 Components of Instrumentation and Control Systems 
The components considered in this section are resistance temperature detectors and pressure sensors. Both types of instrumen- 
tation are widely used in nuclear power plants at locations often dictated by the system being measured. 
111 
16.1 Resistance Temperature Detectors 
Resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) are integral components of LWR safety systems. In order for the safety system to 
function properly, RTD indications must be accurate and timely. The two main types of RTDs are direct immersion, or wet- 
type, and thermowell-mounted, or well-type. A typical RTD consists of a sensing element, with extension wires, sealed and 
insulated within a metallic sheath. The sheath material is stainless steel or inconel, while the sensing element is a fully 
annealed platinum wire. A well-type RTD averages 30 to 60 cm (12 to 24 inches) in length, 1 to 2 cm (0.4 to 1 inches) in 
diameter, and weighs between 300 and 3000 grams (0.5 to 7 Ibs). A wet-type RTD is smaller, averaging 12 to 18 cm (4 to 
7 inches) in length, 0.6 'to 1 cm (0.25 to 0.4 inches) in diameter, and between 100 and 250 grams (0.2 to 0.5 Ibs). 
16.1.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Environmental, or normal, stressors act upon RTDs, such as heat, humidity, vibration, temperature cycling, and mechanical 
shock. Abnormal stressors result from handling, installation, maintenance, and design or manufacturing flaws. Table 16.1 
shows these stressors along with affected components and resultant aging mechanisms and aging concerns. 
Table 16.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms for resistance temperature detectors' 
Stressors 
Heat 
Humidity 
Vibration and 
Mechanical 
Shock 
Temperature 
Cycling 
IHashemian et al. 1990; pp. 24-35. 
Components 
Platinum Element 
Insulation Material 
Seal 
Insulation Material 
Platinum Element 
Spring 
Insulation Material 
Platinum Element 
Insulation Material 
Aging Mechanisms 
Chemical Contaminate 
Metallurgical Changes 
Strain Caused by Thermal 
Expansion 
Strain Caused by Thermal 
Expansion 
Insulation Breakdown 
Cold Working 
Loosening (thermowell only) 
Insulation Breakdown 
Strain Caused by Thermal 
Expansion 
Strain Caused by Thermal 
Expansion 
Aging Concerns 
Calibration Shift 
Gaplcrack Formation Response Time 
Degradation 
Moisture Allowed into the Sheath 
Calibration Error Noisy RTD Output 
Calibration Shift Response Time 
Lncrease 
Response Time Change 
Response Time Degradation 
Calibration Shift 
Response Time Change 
With normal aging, temperature effects are most significant. By the thermal expansion mechanism, RTD materials with differ- 
ent thermal expansion coefficients are strained with rising temperatures to form gaps and cracks. Long-term exposure to high 
temperatures can result in chemical contamination of the platinum sensing element. Temperatures above 420°C (788°F) cause 
calibration shifts due to metallurgical changes, such as grain growth. Insulation breakdown comes from vapor entering the 
sheath at high temperatures and leads to noisy RTD output and calibration error. 
Vibration-induced cold working of the platinum sensing element results in calibration shifts and causes the RTD to gradually A 
move out of the thermowell and increase response time. Also, vibration can alter response times by loosening the spring or by 
breaking down insulation when combined with high temperatures. 
Abnormal stressors lead to performance problems, such as 1) slow response times because of inadequate RTD insertion, 
2) failures due to rough handling or storage in humid environments, and 3) calibration inaccuracy from RTDs cut too short. 
16.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Table 16.2 displays the management options for handling the aging mechanisms and concerns previously described. There are 
four options: 1) periodic tests, 2) pre-installation screening, 3) recalibration for inactive or stored RTDs, and 4) scheduled 
replacements (Hashemian et al. 1990). 
Periodic tests should be done near the end of a fuel cycle prior to a refueling outage so that any problems can be resolved dur- 
ing an outage. Testing can be done more frequently if there are plant specific reasons or the RTDs are suspected of deficien- 
cies in design, fabrication, or installation. Testing should be performed on line using methods developed and validated for 
NPP use. The accuracy of RTDs is to be assessed by full calibration, while response times are to be determined by Loop 
Current Step Response (LCSR) tests. The LCSR test should be done at or near normal operating conditions and can be s u p  
plemented by self heating tests, which detect gross changes in RTD characteristics. 
Table 16.2 Managing aging degradation for resistance temperature detectors' 
Stressors 
Heat 
Humidity 
Vibration and 
Mechanical 
Shock 
Temperature 
Cycling 
'Hashemian et al. 1990; pp. 161-165, 180. 
Components 
Platinum Element 
Insulation Material 
Seal 
Insulation Material 
Platinum Element 
Spring 
Insulation Material 
Platinum Element 
Insulation Material 
Aging Mechanisms 
Chemical Contaminate 
Metallurgical Changes 
Strain Ccaused by 
Thermal Expansion 
Strain Caused by 
Thermal Expansion 
Insulation Breakdown 
Cold Working 
Loosening (themowell 
only) 
Insulation Breakdown 
Strain Caused by 
Thermal Expansion 
Strain Caused by 
Thermal Expansion 
Aging Management 
Perform full calibrations and loop current step response 
(LCSR) tests once per fuel cycle 
Screen RTDs prior to installation using a "bum-in" 
program for calibration and a laboratory response time 
test 
Recalibrate any RTD that has been inactive for over 
2 years 
Replace any RTDs which: 
(1) shift by more than 1 "C or consistent, drift in one 
direction during calibration tests 
(2) have unacceptably slow response times during 
response testing 
Pre-installation screening provides for each RTD to be calibrated using a "bum-in" program and response time tested in a lab- 
oratory (Hashemian et al. 1987). , Any RTD showing instability during calibration or having a long response time should not be 
used. 
Recalibration is necessary for any RTDs that have been stored for over 2 years. This procedure also holds true for any RTDs 
that have been inactive for over 2 years, such as those installed in a non-operating plant. 
Replacement schedules are based on performance problems identified by the periodic in-plant tests described above. Based on 
calibration tests, RTDs should be replaced which shift by more than 1°C (2 O F  ) or consistently drift in either direction, positive 
or negative. Based on response time tests, direct immersion RTDs having unacceptably slow response times must be replaced. 
However, well-type RTDs with slow response times can be cleaned and tried again before replacement becomes necessary. 
16.2 Pressure Transmitters 
Pressure transmitters provide important signals for the control and safety of NPPs. An average NPP uses 100 to 200 pressure 
and differential pressure transmitters to measure the process pressure, level, and flow in the primary and secondary systems of 
the plant. Pressure transmitters can be characterized by their class, type, and manufacturer. The two classes of transmitters 
are mechanical and electromechanical. Both classes convert the applied pressure to a displacement through an elastic sensing 
element, but the electromechanical class also uses a strain gauge or differential transformer to convert the displacement to an 
electrical signal. The three types of sensing elements for these classes are Bourdon tube, bellows, and diaphragm, while the 
four leading manufacturers are Barton, Foxboro. Rosemount, and Tobar. 
A typical pressure sensing system consists of 1) root valves at the process end of the sensing line as well as isolation and 
equalizing valves at the transmitter, 2) sensing lines which bring the pressure information from the process to the sensor, 
3) mechanical system which consists of the sensing element and the associated hardware. 4) signal conditioning components 
inside the transmitter, and 5) power supply, external signal conditioning equipment, and reactor trip circuitry. (Hashemian 
et al. 1993a). 
16.2.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Stressors acting upon the pressure transmitters are temperature, radiation, pressure, chemical, mechanical, and manufacturing 
flaws. Table 16.3 shows the aging concerns and mechanisms which result from these stressors to degrade transmitter compo- 
nents. The aging mechanisms are often synergistic in nature, requiring a combination of stressors to invoke degradation. This 
is reflected in the description of aging processes in the following paragraph and in Table 16.3 by the listing of enhancing 
stressors along with the aging mechanisms they accompany. 
Thermal fatigue creates drifting in damping resistors because of thermal cycling, radiation, and vibration. Diffusion, initiated 
by heat, radiation, and humidity, can cause changes in the values of electronic components. Radiation combined with heat can 
embrittle seals to allow moisture in-leakage or produce a viscosity increase in the fill fluid. Pressure enhanced by rnanufactur- 
ing flaws can cause a partial or total loss of fill fluid, while pressure enhanced by vibration can change the stiffness of the 
sensing element. Corrosion of the mechanical linkages can generate wear, friction, and sticking which is further aggravated by 
pressure fluctuations and surges. Work hardening, intensified by pressure cycling, can alter the diaphragm spring constant. 
Blockage of capillary tubes and other passageways can restrict the flow of till fluid. 
16.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
- 
Table 16.4 summarizes effective programs for the management of aging caused by the mechanisms previously described. The 
primary option for aging management is periodic testing, both calibration and response time, which determines if transmitter 
4 replacement is necessary. In administering these tests, the most important question to answer is whether the test should be 
performed on line or off line. Onliie testing requires sophisticated computer monitoring methods, but permits remote testing 
at normal operating conditions. Offlime testing, however, involves measurements taken during an outage. 
Table 16.3 Aging concerns and mechanisms for pressure transmitters'." 
Table 16.4 Managing aging degradation for pressure transmittersa 
Stressors 
Temperature (heat 
or cycling) 
Radiation 
Pressure (over 
pressurization or 
cycling) 
Chemical 
Mechanical 
Manufacturing 
Flaws 
'Hashemian et al. 1993a; Table 9-1, pp. 131-134. 
2Hashemian et el. 1989; pp. 17-23. 
Components 
Damping Resistors 
Electronics 
Fill Fluid 
Seals 
Fill Fluid 
Sensing Element 
Mechanical 
Linkages 
Diaphragm 
Capillary Tubes and 
Other Passageways 
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal Fatigue (enhanced by 
radiation and vibration) 
Diffusion (enhanced by radiation and 
humidity) 
Viscosity Increase (enhanced by 
heat) 
Thermal Aging 
Thermal Stress 
Fatigue 
Fouling 
DegradationILeaking (enhanced by 
manufacturing flaws) 
Deformation (enhanced by vibration) 
Corrosion/Oxidation (enhanced by 
pressure fluctuations and surges) 
Work Hardening (enhanced by 
pressure cycling) 
Blockage 
Stressors 
Temperature (heat or 
cycling) 
Radiation 
Pressure (over 
pressurization or 
cycling) 
Chemical 
Mechanical 
Manufacturing Flaws 
Aging Concerns 
Drifi 
Changes in Valves of Electronic 
Components 
Fill Fluid Degradation 
Moisture Allowed into Transmitter 
Electronics 
Partial or Total Loss of Fluid 
Changes in Stiffness 
Wear, Friction, and Sticking 
Changes in Spring Constant 
Restriction of the Flow of Fill Fluid 
'Hashemian et el. 1993a; pp. 239-254 and pp. 281-307. 
Components 
Damping resistors 
Electronics 
Fill Fluid 
Seals 
Fill Fluid 
Sensing Element 
Mechanical Linkages 
Diaphragm 
Capillary Tubes and 
Other Passageways 
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal Fatigue (enhanced by 
radiation and vibration) 
(enhanced by radiation and 
hum~dtty) 
Viscosity Increase (enhanced by 
hent) 
Thermal Aging 
Thermal Stress 
Fatigue 
Fouling 
(enhanced by 
manufacturing flaws) 
Deformation (enhanced by vibration) 
Corrosion/Oxidation (enhanced by 
pressure fluctuations and surges) 
Work Hardening (enhanced by 
pressure cycling) 
Blockage 
Aging Management 
Perform off-line calibrations tests once per fuel 
cycle 
Perform response time tests on  every channel 
once per fuel cycle 
Blow, or purge, sensing lines during every 
refueling outage or as indicated necessary by 
noise analysis 
Surveillance test signal conditioning equipment 
and reactor trip circuiting once a month 
Implement enhanced surveillance program and 
increased on-line monitoring for certain 
Rosemount transmitter 
For calibration tests, conventional offline methods must be used. New online techniques are under development, but will not 
be feasible for a few more years (Hashemian et al. 1993b). For response time tests, online methods should be used for most 
transmitters. Two acceptable online tests for response time are the Power Interrupt (PI) test and noise analysis. The PI test is 
limited to force-balance pressure transmitters and noise analysis is unacceptable for containment transmitters in PWRs. Offline 
techniques, such as ramp or step testing, can be used when online methods are impossible. 
Calibration and response time tests shbuld be performed once every fuel cycle. Response time tests must be done on every 
channel. Sensing lines should be blown, or purged, at every refueling outage or as indicated necessary by noise analysis. 
Signal conditioning equipment and reactor trip circuitry should be surveillance tested about once a month, as well. 
.r 
Oil loss has been a recurring problem for certain models of Rosemount pressure transmitters. If these models are used in a 
plant, an enhanced surveillance program should be implemented along with increased online monitoring (Hashemian et al. 
1 993a). 
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17 chemical and Volume Control System 
The chemical and volume control system (CVCS) performs the following functions: 
fills the RCS 
* 
provides a source of high pressure water for pressurizing the RCS when cold 
maintains the water level in the pressurizer when the RCS is hot 
reduces the concentration of corrosion and fission products in the reactor coolant 
adjusts the boric acid concentration of the reactor coolant for chemical shim control 
provides high pressure seal water for the reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals. 
Though the CVCS system at each PWR performs basically the same functions, plant to plant and vendor design differences do 
exist. Some plants use regenerative heat exchangers to cool both the letdown flow and the charging flow. Charging flow is 
provided by either positive displacement or centrifugal pumps, or a combination of each. 
A typical CVCS system is composed of the following subsystems: 
letdown cooling system 
boron thermal regeneration system 
volume control storage tank 
boric acid supply 
charging pumps 
RCP seal water injection. 
Most of the CVCS components are located outside the containment, so aging degradations which result in external leakage of 
the reactor coolant may also represent a small LOCA. Several CVCS components are also used in the HPIS. The effects of 
aging of the HPIS were analyzed by Meyer (1989). The failures for the components used by each system can affect both. For 
- example, charging pump failures would have affected both the ability to provide charging and HPI flow. The effect of aging 
on the CCWS has been studied by Higgins et al. (1988) and Lofaro et al. (1992). 
J 17.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
The CVCS components (pumps, valves, piping, heat exchangers, etc.) are subject to deposition, corrosion, and biofouling, the 
extent of which depends on the system type. 
Grove and Travis (1995) have performed the only study on aging of the CVCS. Based on this analysis, it was determined that 
the degradation of the positive displacement pumps and isolation and control valves accounted for the majority of the system 
failures. Pump packing degradation resulting in reactor coolant leakage, continues to be an industry wide problem with 
positive displacement pumps. 
Table 17.1 provides the aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for the CVCS. In this table, the pumps represent the 
charging pumps, centrifugal or positive displacement type. The valves could be motor operated, air operated, or check valves. 
The heat exchangers could be regenerative or non-regenerative. 
Table 17.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms for chemical and volume control systems I I 
17.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Component 
Pump lmpeller or Piston 
Pump Casing 
Pump Bearings 
Pump Seals and Gaskets 
Valve Body 
Valve Seat 
Valve Intemals 
Valve Seals, Gaskets 
Heat Exchanger Tubes 
Heat Exchanger Shell 
Grove and Travis (1995) have concluded that with the exceptions of high pressure injection, emergency boration, and contain- 
ment isolation, all of the CVCS functions are non-safety related. Sufficient redundancy is provided for key system components 
such that failure does not result in the loss of function. The majority of the system inspections and tests are performed in 
accordance with ASME Section XI (ASME 1992), Appendix J ,  and plant technical specifications. In response to frequent 
reactor coolant leakage occurrences due to packing failures, many plants have increased visual inspection of the pumps from 
quarterly to weekly. Furthermore Grove and Travis (1995) recommend a detailed review of the industry experience with 
respect to pump packing degradation, emphasizing packing material design, inspection and surveillance frequency. 
Table 17.2 indicates the management options to mitigate aging. 
Material 
Stainless Steel 
Cast Stainless 
Steel 
Cast Iron 
Rubber, 
Elastomer 
Stainless Steel 
Elastomer 
Stainless Steel 
PTFE, Graphite 
Stainless Steel 
Stainless Steel, 
Carbon Steel 
Aging Concerns 
Distortion, Binding 
Wall Thinning, Cracking, 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Wall Thinning 
Leakage 
Distortion 
Leakage 
Fouling, Blockage, Leakage 
Thinning 
Aging Mechanisms 
Erosion, Corrosion, 
Wear, Fatigue 
Corrosion, Erosion, 
Wear, Embrittlement 
Wear, Abrasion 
Creep, Hardening 
Corrosion, Erosion 
Wear 
Erosion, Corrosion 
Wear 
Corrosion, Debris, 
Erosion, Wear 
Corrosion, Erosion 
References 
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Table 17.2 Managing aging in chemical and volume control systems 
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Pump Impeller, Piston 
Pump Casing 
Pump Bearings 
Pump Seals and 
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Valve Body 
Valve Seat 
Valve Internals 
Valve Seals, Gaskets 
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Heat Exchanger Shell 
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Management Options 
Visual Inspection, 
Pressure, Vibration Tests 
Visual Inspection, 
Temperature Test 
Lube Oil Monitoring 
Visual Inspection 
Visual Inspection 
Visual Inspection, Position 
Test 
Visual Inspection, Flow 
Test 
Visual Inspection, 
Hydrostatic Testing 
Internal Visual Inspection 
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Materid 
Stainless Steel 
Cast Stainless 
Steel 
Cast Iron 
Rubber, 
Elastomer 
Stainless Steel 
Elastomer 
Stainless Steel 
PTFE, Graphite 
Stainless Steel 
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Carbon Steel 
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Aging Mechanisms 
Erosion, Corrosion, Wear, 
Fatigue 
Corrosion, Erosion, Wear, 
Embrittlement 
Wear, Abrasion 
Creep, Hardening 
Corrosion, Erosion 
Wear 
Erosion, Corrosion 
Wear 
Corrosion, Debris, Erosion, 
Wear 
Corrosion, Erosion 
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18 Heat Exchangers and Chillers 
& Heat exchangers and chillers constitute a portion of the heat transfer equipment within a nuclear reactor plant. The heat 
exchangers included in this section are of the non-power-cycle type used in safety related systems or to provide normal 
operating capability in nuclear power plants. The heat exchangers that are associated with the power conversion systems, such 
c as steam generators, main condensers, feedwater heaters, and turbine plant equipment coolers are not included as a part of this 
study. The Isolation Condenser System (ICS), as a part of the ECCS in some BWRs, has also been addressed in this study. 
The chillers used in essential safety heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC) plants of NPPs have been studied. The 
essential chillers provide chilled water to cool the control room and other rooms containing safety related equipment and 
personnel at nuclear power plants. Most of the nuclear power plants have at least two essential chillers that serve safety 
systems in the control rooms and various equipment rooms; one chiller serves as a backup and provides the safety redundancy 
required. 
18.1 Heat Exchangers 
Numerous heat exchangers are used in PWRs and BWRs, usually serving as interfaces between plant systems while trans- 
ferring heat toward the normal or ultimate heat sink to establish or maintain desired process or equipment temperatures. With 
the exception of containment or room coolers, which are fwed coil types with air on the outside of the tubes, the predominant 
heat exchanger type is the shell and tube. Such a design consists of two intertwined pressure vessels. The inlet header, outlet 
header, inside of the tubes and the inlet/outlet nozzles define the domain of the pressure vessel commonly referred to as the 
"tubeside" chamber (Figure 18.1; Singh and Soler 1984). The remaining space in the heat exchanger between the shell and the 
tubes is the other pressure vessel, known as the "shellside" chamber. Two fluids at different temperatures enter the two 
pressure chambers, exchange heat across the tube walls through a combined conduction-convection mechanism, and then exit 
through the outlet nozzles. Shell and tube heat exchangers are used for all water to water heat transfer applications. 
Isolation condensers are horizontal shell and tube heat exchangers in which steam is condensed in the tubeside chamber. The 
heat of the steam is removed by the demineralized water on the shellside which boils and is vented to the atmosphere. The 
ICS is part of the ECCS of some BWRs in the United States. The ICS is designed to provide emergency cooling to the reactor 
when the reactor vessel becomes isolated from the turbine and the main condenser by closure of the main steam isolation 
valves. The system removes residual and decay heat from the reactor, and depressurizes the reactor vessel in the event the 
main condenser is not available as a heat sink. The flow path of a typical ICS loop is shown in Figure 18.2 (Orton 1995). 
Upon manual or automatic initiation of the ICS, steam flows from the reactor vessel to the isolation condenser, is condensed in 
the tube bundles, and returns to the reactor via recirculation pumps. 
Finned coil type of heat exchangers are used for containment or room cooling. In these heat exchangers, the water flows 
through the tubes, whereas the air is forced across the tube bundle. The flow of air is by forced convection using fans. A 
typical pump room cooler is shown in Figure 18.3 (Blahnik and Goodman 1986). Warm air flows at the bottom left and passes 
through the cooling coils, where it is cooled. It continues through a plenum zone into a fan. The electric motor driven fan 
moves the cool air into a short duct and returns it to the room through the outlet. 
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18.1.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Booker et al. (1994) have investigated aging mechanisms acting on heat exchangers of both the shell-and-tube and the finned 
coil types. Their evaluations within the aging management guidelines (AMGs) identify the heat exchanger tubes1 
coils, tubesheets, shelllnozzleslinternals, waterboxlchannel headldivider plate, and support assembly bolts as components with 
sig
nifi
cant aging effects. Moyers (1992) has proposed 1) flow blockage, 2) external leakage, 3) interfluid leakage, and 
4) reduced heat transfer capability (due to fouling of the heat transfer surface) as significant degradation effects caused by 
aging. The aging concerns and mechanisms associated with heat exchangers are highlighted in Table 18.1. 
Table 18.1 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for heat exchangers 
* 
18.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Components 
TubesICoils 
Tubesheets 
ShelllNoulesllnternaIs 
WaterboxIChamel Head1 
Divider Plate 
Support Bolts 
Booker et al. (1994) have provided a comprehensive discussion on effective management of aging mechanisms. The various 
' aging mechanisms identified in the previous section will manifest and progress at different rates and are affected by many 
variables such as material composition, operating service conditions, environmental parameters, geometric configuration, etc. 
Materials 
Stainless Steel, Brass, Cu- 
Ni, Copper, Titanium 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel 
Forged Stainless Steel, 
Forged Carbon Steel 
Aging Concerns 
Leakage, Blockage 
Leakage, Blockage 
Leakage, Blockage 
Leakage, Blockage 
Loss of Preload 
Aging Mechanisms 
Fatigue, Corrosion, Wear, 
Fouling, Vibration 
Fatigue, Corrosion, Wear 
Fatigue, Corrosion, 
Erosion, Fouling 
Fatigue, Corrosion, 
Erosion, Fouling 
Corrosion, Stress 
Relaxation 
References 
Booker et al. 1994; 
Moyers 1992 
As such, program implementing procedures must be performed at a frequency commensurate with the rate of aging to ensure 
detection and mitigation of degradation. Moyers (1992) has addressed degradation monitoring of the heat exchanger failures 
represented by 1) flow blockage. 2) external leakage, 3) interfluid leakage, and 4) fouling of heat exchange surface. It is 
concluded that presently used methods for detection of flow blockage and leakage are adequate. The various methods for 
managing aging degradation are summarized in Table 18.2. 
Table 18.2 Managing aging degradation for heat exchangers 
18.2 Chillers 
The essential chillers provide chilled water to cool the control room and other rooms containing safety-related equipment and 
personnel at NPPs. The essential chilled water systems must be available at all times, have redundancy, and function during 
and after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), LOCA, or loss of offsite power (LOP). 
Components 
TubesICoils 
Tubesheets 
ShelllNozzles/ 
Internals 
Waterbox1 
Channel Head1 
Divider Plate 
Support Bolts 
About 90% of the chillers found in NPP Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSARs) were centrifugal chillers. Others were 
screw, rotary, and reciprocating chillers which were used primarily in older and smaller plants (Blahnik and Camp 1995). 
A cross-sectional schematic view of a centrifugal chiller is shown in Figure 18.4. It shows the major components and the 
direction of flow of condenser and cooler water and the refrigerant in various phases. The refrigerant used as heat transfer 
medium is usually CFC R-1 1 or CFC R-12. The major components of the chiller are a cooler, a condenser, a motor driven 
centrifugal compressor, and an economizer. The cooler is a heat exchanger vessel in which the flashing refrigerant picks up 
the heat from, and therefore chills, the water flowing through its tubes. The condenser is a heat exchanger vessel in which the 
heat is removed from compressed refrigerant and is camed out to the system. The motor-compressor maintains the necessary 
pressure difference in the system and moves the heat-carrying refrigerant from cooler to the condenser. The economizer is a 
vessel at intermediate pressure between the cooler and the condenser which returns "flash gas" to the compressor for greater 
cycle efficiency (Blahnik and Klein 1993). 
Materials 
Stainless Steel, Brass, 
Cu-Ni, Copper, 
Titanium 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel 
Carbon Steel, Stainless 
Steel 
Forged Stainless Steel, 
Forged Carbon Steel 
References 
Moyers 1992; Booker 
et al. 1994 
Booker et al. 1994 
Moyers 1992 
Booker et al. 1994 
Moyers 1992 
Aging Mechanisms 
Fatigue, Corrosion, 
Wear, Fouling, 
Vibration 
Fatigue. Corrosion, 
Wear 
Fatigue, Corrosion, 
Erosion, Fouling 
Fatigue, Corrosion, 
Erosion, Fouling 
Corrosion, Stress 
Relaxation 
Management Options 
Eddy current, acoustic 
emission, leak testing, flow 
measurement, vibration 
monitoring 
Visual inspection. leak 
testing 
Acoustic emission, 
radiographic/ultrasonic 
inspection, leak testing, flow 
measurement 
Visual inspection 
Volumetric Examination, 
torque monitoring 
Figure 18.4 centrifugal chiller schematic 
18.2.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
Blahnik and Camp (1995) found most of the failures in the cooler/condenser heat exchanger area and nearly all of the failures 
to be condenser related. Approximately 38% of the failures were attributed primarily to aging, 55% were partially aging 
related. In over 50% of the age related failures, corrosion was found to be involved. One of the sig
nifi
cant forms of corrosion 
is from the acid attack, which is described as follows. Excessive moisture in the refrigerant leads to the formation of hydro- 
chloric acid and hydrofluoric acid, as the free water reacts with the refrigerant. The acid attacks the crevices between the tube 
and the tube support plates. These crevices widen and the tubes ultimately fail as the tubes vibrate, especially due to the 
boiling refrigerant in the cooler. The acid reacts with the lubricating oil which degrades the bearings. It corrodes the com- 
pressor inlet guide vane assembly causing it to bind. The acid attack leads to shell scaling which clogs the space between the 
tube fins and the tubes and produces copper chloride deposits on the upper tubes. Other factors that cause aging related 
degradation are SCC, fatigue, erosion and wear. Excessive startistop cycling and underloading of chillers can promote rapid 
aging. Aging is also accelerated by corrosion and fouling of the cooler and condenser tubes. A summary of aging degradation 
concerns and mechanisms for chillers is provided in Table 18.3. 
w 18.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
The chiller aging study by Blahnik and Klein (1993) indicated that the primary cause of chiller failures and accelerated aging 
was a lack of proper service life monitoring. Accordingly, the main objective of the study by Blahnik and Camp (1995) was to 
t 
seek information in this area. Essential condition monitoring methods for chillers include operational data recording, 
monitoring and trending analysis; refrigerant and oil leak detection; refrigerant and oil analysis; condenser and cooler tube 
eddy current testing; and infrared thermal analysis. Computerized monitoring is the ultimate method that will continually 
monitor the chillers and their interfacing systems. 
Table 18.3 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for chillers 
, 
To minimize failures, the operators of the chillers need to carefully follow stringent procedures and monitoring schedules. 
Equipment performance must be recorded and trended on a daily basis. Since a small amount of contamination or a damaged 
or misaligned part can cause major problems, it is crucial that the equipment internals be kept very clean and the leakage of 
water, air and other contaminants into the sealed refrigerant containment system be prevented. Furthermore, the chillers need 
to be operated as close to the 100% capacity as practical to minimize aging degradation. Management options to mitigate the 
aging degradation identified earlier have been outlined in Table 18.4. 
Table 18.4 Managing aging degradation for chillers 
Components 
Cooler and Con- 
denser Tubes 
Cooler and Con- 
denser Shell, 
lnternals 
Compressor 
Bearings 
Compressor Guide 
Vanes 
Compressor 
Impellers 
Aging Concerns 
Leakage, Flow Blockage 
Shell Scaling. Clogging Between 
Tubes 
Bearing Failure, Leakage 
Binding 
Leakage 
Materials 
Copper, Cu901 
NilO, Titanium 
Carbon Steel 
Bronze, Aluminum 
Alloy 
Bronze, Aluminum 
Cast Aluminum 
Component 
Aging Mechanisms 
ID corrosion, 
ID pitting, OD corrosion, 
OD pining from acid attack, 
stress corrosion cracking, fouling, 
erosion, fatigue, vibration, wear 
Acid attack, vibration, fretting 
corrosion, wear 
Thermal distortion, wear, acid 
attack with lubricant 
Corrosion 
Fatigue, vibration, wear 
Cooler and 
Condenser Tubes 
References 
References 
Blahnik and 
Camp 1995 
I I I 
Materials 
Cooler and Con- 
denser Shell, 
lnternals 
Blahnik and Camp 
1995, Appendix D 
Copper, Cu901 NilO, 
Titanium 
Aging Mechanisms 
Carbon Steel 
Management Options 
ID Corrosion, ID pitting, OD 
corrosion, OD pitting from 
acid attack, stress corrosion 
cracking, fouling, erosion, 
fatigue, vibration, weer 
Compressor 
Bearings 
Eddy current test (3-5yrs); 
replace or  plug tubes if nec- 
essary; eliminate scaling by 
mechanical or chemical 
method; perform vibration 
analysis 
Acid Attack, Vibration, Fret- 
ting Corrosion, Wear 
Compressor Guide 
Vanes 
18.3 References 
Control impurities in refriger- 
ant; ensure proper refrigerant 
charge and temperature 
Bronze, Aluminum 
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Sample and analyze lubricant 
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refrigerant 
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19 Steam Turbine Drives for Safety Related 
Standby Pumps Compressed Air Systems 
Steam turbine drives are used within the AFWSs of PWRs, and within the HPCI and RCIC systems of BWRs. Turbine drives 
are redundant components to electric pump motors within those systems. The turbine-driven pump (TDP) would be relied 
k 
upon to provide coolant flow in the event of a loss of electrical power to the motordriven pumps (MDP) during activation of 
the AFW, HPCI or RCIC systems. 
The turbine drives are composed of the turbine, turbine overspeed trip system, governor and governor valve, steam admission 
and triplthrottle valves. Depending on the configuration of the system, either the steam admission or the triplthrottle valve is 
opened in response to a turbine-start signal. As the turbine spins up to the desired rotational velocity, the governor throttles 
the governor valve to maintain the turbine speed at the desired setpoint. A governor may be a mechanical type or an electronic 
type; in either case the governor controls a hydraulic actuator to control the governor valve. In the event of turbine overspeed, 
a spring-loaded trip pin extends from turbine shaft due to the influence of centrifugal force. If the rotational speed of the shaft 
is in excess of the trip setpoint, the trip pin will strike a tappet within the trip actuation system, resulting in the closure of the 
triplthrottle valve and the consequent isolation of the turbine from the steam supply. 
Most of the safety-related AFW, HPCI, or RCIC standby TDPs in use today have been manufactured by the Terry 
Corporation (currently DRESSER-RAND, Terry-Turbodyne) and employ governors manufactured by the Woodward 
Corporation. These systems have a long history of reliable service in the petrochemical and chemical industries as well as 
fossil-fueled power plants. However, in these applications the turbine drives are started slowly and operated continuously. 
This is not the case in AFW, HPCI and RCIC systems, in which the TDPs are required to go from cold-standby to full 
capacity in 60 to 120 seconds, and to operated over a wide range of inlet steam pressures. These requirements are a 
considerable challenge to the capabilities of TDPs, and the testing required to verify that these requirements are fulfilled has 
proven to have a considerable detrimental impact on TDP reliability. Operating experience has shown that most instances of 
turbine drive failures have not involved the turbines themselves, but originate instead with the governor and overspeed trip 
systems. 
19.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
The major aging concerns for turbinedriven AFW, HPCI, and RCIC pumps are identified in Cox (1991) and Boardman 
(1994), and are listed in Table 19.1. About 72% of the problems with TDPs are the result of failures of the speed control 
components (Cox 1991). These components are susceptible to the deleterious effects of frequent "quick-start" testing from a 
cold-standby condition. Wear to the turbine bearings is increased at start time due to inadequate lubrication; as a result, the 
lubricating oil is contaminated with metal particulates. Leaks in the steam isolation valves also introduce water contamination 
into the lubrication oil, leading to inadequate oil viscosity as well as corrosion due to increased humidity and temperature 
within the system. Because the governor often uses the turbine lubrication oil as its control oil supply, control valves and 
orifices within the governor may become clogged with particulate matter, resulting in sluggish governor operation. Often the 
.r response of the governor becomes so sluggish that it is unable to prevent a turbine overspeed during a quick start; the result is 
that high demand failure probabilities, around 6.Z-2, are often observed for TDPs. 
Table 19.1 Understanding aging of the auxiliary feedwater system 
19.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
The aging degradation and concerns for specific Turbine Drive components were summarized in the previous section. In this 
section, the options for better managing the aging for this system are discussed. Options for detecting and/or mitigating 
aging-related degradation are summarized in Table 19.2. 
Component 
Valve Seat 
Valve Lntemals 
Valve Packing 
Governor (Electronic) 
Governor (Mechanical) 
Trip Tappet Head (older 
ball tappets only) 
Trip Tappet Stem 
Valve Stem 
Emergency Trip Spring 
Turbine 
Bearings 
Governor Linkage 
A large fraction of Steam Turbine Drive failures have been found as a result of testing (52.8% between 1984 and 1990), 
followed by demand failures (21.5% during the same period). Due to the small amount of time that these components are 
actually operated on demand, the number of demand failures observed is significant. There is strong evidence that the number 
of demand failures per year has undergone a dramatic decrease in the period from 1985 to 1990; this is a consequence of 
improved and more frequent inspection and maintenance of these components, which results in a greater number of failures 
being detected as a result of testing. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
Corrosion, Debris 
Buildup 
Corrosion, Debris 
Buildup 
Chemical Reaction with 
Lubricating Oil 
Deformation 
Corrosion, Scale 
Buildup 
Creep 
Wear 
Dirt Accumulation 
There has been a great amount of variability within the industry in tenns of the content of the turbine drive inspection 
procedures. PWR plants typically perform monthly pump operability tests, while BWR plants typically perform such tests on a 
quarterly cycle. The types of tests vary widely, with some plants performing hot quick-start tests (in which the drive is w 
restarted after a slow-start test from cold standby), others perform cold quick-starts, and still others perform slow starts after 
the turbine speed has initially been brought to the slow speed stop. However, according to General Electric Service 
Information Letters from as early as 1994, only cold quick-start tests provide a valid indication of turbine operability for 
standby turbine driven pumps. 
Material 
Elastomer 
Stainless Steel 
P R E ,  Graphite 
Urethane 
Stainless or Carbon 
Steel 
Carbon Steel, 
Stainless Steel 
Spring Steel 
Tin-Based Babbitt 
Steel 
References 
Casada 1990 
Cox 1991, pp. 6-7 
Boardman 1994, p. 12 
Cox 199 1,  pp. 6-7 
Information Notice 
90-76 
Information Notice 
8 1-24 
Boardman 1994 
Aging Concerns 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Calibration Drift, 
Sluggish Response 
Loss of Material, 
Sluggish Response 
Swelling 
Binding 
Binding 
ElongationILoss of 
Tension 
spalling, Loss of 
Material 
Binding 
Table 19.2 Managing aging degradation of turbine drives for safety-related pumps 
Most turbine failures are the result of speed control failures, and the governor is particularly susceptible to the detrimental 
effects of testing (which induces heat and humidity into the system) and improper maintenance. This is due to the small size of 
control oil flow orifices and valves within the governor system. The governor control system shares its oil supply with the 
turbine lubrication system, and contamination of the latter can lead to clogging of the small orifices as well as higher than 
normal oil viscosities. The result is sluggish response of the governor, which can hinder the governor's ability to prevent a 
turbine overspeed and consequent trip. 
19.3 References 
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Management Options 
Wear Tracking 
Wear Tracking 
Wear Tracking 
Established Testing and 
Maintenance 
Procedures 
Established Testing and 
Monitoring Procedures 
Replace Older 
Components with 
Newer Design 
Established Testing and 
Maintenance 
Procedures 
Established Testing and 
Maintenance 
Procedures 
Established Testing and 
Calibration Procedures 
Lubrication Oil Quality 
Monitoring end 
Maintenance, 
Established Inspection 
Procedures 
Established inspection 
and maintenance . 
procedures 
Component 
Valve Seat 
Valve lnternals 
Valve Packing 
Governor (Electronic) 
Governor (mechanical) 
Trip Tappet Head (older 
ball tappets only) 
Trip Tappet Stem 
Valve Stem 
Emergency Trip Spring 
Turbine 
Bearings 
Governor Linkage 
Boardman, J. R. 1994. Operating Experience Feedback Report - Reliability of Safety-Related Steam Turbine-Driven Standby 
Pumps. NUREG-1275, Vol. 10, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Material 
Elastomer 
Stainless Steel 
PFTE, Graphite 
Urethane 
Stainless or Carbon 
Steel 
Carbon.Stee1, 
Stainless Steel 
Spring Steel 
Tin-Based Babbitt 
Steel 
Aging Mechanisms 
Wear 
Wear 
Wear 
Corrosion, Debris 
Buildup 
Corrosion, Debris 
Buildup 
Chemical Reaction with 
Lubricating Oil 
Deformation 
Corrosion, Scale 
Buildup 
Creep 
Wear 
Dirt accumulation 
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20 Bistables and Switches 
Bistables and switches are vital in the instrumentation and control logic of an NPP. In essentially every system of the plant, 
they provide control logic inputs, trip signals, and annunciation, both for safety systems and balance of plant systems. 
L 
The use of bistables compared to switches in NPPs has tended to favor bistables over switches for the past 15 years. Bistables 
are now used in systems traditionally occupied by switches. The design of the instrumentation in all PWRs originally made 
use of transmitters and bistables and most older BWRs have upgraded from switches to transmitters and analog trip systems in 
their RPS and ECCS. Operating data have shown that problems with bistables and switches have forced plant power 
reductions and have caused loss or degradation of instrument channels on safety systems, reactor trips, and safety system 
actuations. In a study of failures and causes conducted between 1976 and 1981 it was found that of the reported events, 68% 
resulted from failure of switches, radiation monitors, transmitters, sensors, and bistables (Lee et al. 1993) . 
20.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Most aging in switches results from the mechanical aging of the parts, particularly the snapping elements required to close the 
switch. These elements require precise calibration making them exceptionally vulnerable to mechanical setpoint drift which 
normally occurs between adjustable parts. In addition to mechanical aging, electrical components, mostly older capacitors and 
potentiometers are subject to aging. For bistables, aging of electrical parts is the most prominent type of aging. Table 20.1 
provides a summary of the types of aging that affects switches and bistables. 
Table 20.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms in switches and bistables 
Component 
Pressure Switches 
Level Switches 
Mechanical Tempera- 
ture Switches 
Electrical Temperature 
Switches 
Rotary Switches 
Bistables 
Parts of Concern 
Diaphragm, Bourdon Tube, and 
Bellows Sensing Element 
Snapping Element 
Internal Components and 
Sensing Elements 
Internal Components 
Electronic Components 
Contacts, Assembly, and Spring 
Capacitors, Potentiometers, 
Integrated Circuits, and 
Transistors 
Aging Concerns Aging Mechanisms Reference 
Lee et al. 1993 
Roberts et al. 1988, 
p. 33 
Lee et a1. 1993 
Failure to Operate or Lack 
of Calibration 
Corrosion, Vibration, Shock, 
Radiation, and Temperature 
Failure or Intermittent 
Actuation 
Corrosion, Mechanical Drift, 
Heat, and Dirt 
Loss of Function and Spuri- 
ous Signal 
Wear, Fatigue, and Electrical 
Switching Element Problems 
Loss of Calibration Due to 
Mechanical Setpoint Drift 
Wear, Vibration, and Fatigue 
Loss of Function 
Loss of Function 
Loss of Calibration, Spuri- 
ous Alarms, Loss of 
Function 
Degradation of Electronic 
Components 
Stress, Heat, Corrosion, 
Arcing, Radiation, Chemicals 
Insulation Breakdown, Burnout 
of Parts 
Mechanical aging of parts due to drift, corrosion, shock, radiation, and heat often cause a loss of calibration and failed or 
intermittent signals among pressure switches. Level switches are affected in this way as well, in addition to being prone to 
clogged and leaking sensing lines due to accumulation of residue, or crimped lines. Rotary switches, which are composed of 
many moving parts, are affected by stress, chemicals, and arcing in addition to the above listed mechanisms. Mechanical tem- 
perature switches are affected in the same way as pressure and rotary switches, but failure in electrical temperature switches 
usually results from degradation of electronic components. Bistables are also prone to the aging of electronic components. 
Older bistables and electronic temperature switches are often prone to burnout of capacitors, potentiometers, integrated cir- 
cuits, and transistors. This can cause loss of calibration or function or spurious alarms. Although newer bistables contain 
better parts such as tantalum and aluminum electrolytic capacitors, component burnout is still possible. 
20.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
4 
The primary means of inspecting and monitoring the performance of bistables and switches is the Technical Specifications sur- 
veillance testing of the instrumentation and controls associated with nuclear safety systems. Table 20.2 lists aging concerns 
and their management. The management of mechanical switches involves mostly routine checking such as channel, cali- 
bration, and function checks (Lee et al. 1993). Ln addition to these checks, rotary switches should be checked with torque 
measurements and contact resistance measurements (Roberts et al. 1988, p.45). Although switches are inexpensive and 
reliable, many NPPs have found that in safety applications switches require excessive monitoring and maintenance, and have 
decided to upgrade to transmitters and bistables which have proven to be more accurate and reliable than switches. 
For electric bistables, in addition to running Technical Specification surveillance testing, it is also recommended to follow the 
prescribed procedures whenever the failures are detected. Usually, corrective actions initially involve attempts to recalibrate 
the instrument, and then replace the circuit card if the recalibration is unsuccessful. The plant may then attempt to repair the 
card in its shop, or return it to the manufacturer. Preventive maintenance for the bistable racks, circuit cards, fans, and filters 
are incorporated into either the applicable surveillance testing procedures or the plant's preventative maintenance program. 
Table 20.2 Managing aging in switches and bistables 
20.3 References 
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References 
Lee et al. 1993 
Roberts et al. 
1988, p. 45 
Lee et al. 1993 
Component 
Pressure Switches 
Level Switches 
Mechanical Temperature 
Switches 
Electrical Temperature Switches 
Rotary Switches 
Bistables 
Roberts, G. C, V. P. Bacanskas, and G. J.  Toman. 1988. Aging and Service Wear of Mu2tistage Switches Used in Safety 
Systems of Nuckar Power P h s .  NUREGlCR-4992,ORNUSub/83-28915/5&Vl, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee. 
Agmg Mechanisms 
Corrosion, Vibration, Shock, Radiation, 
heat, dirt, and mechanical drift 
Wear, Fatigue. and Electrical Switching 
Element Problem 
Wear, Fatigue, and Vibration 
Degradation of Electrical Components 
Stress, Heat, Corrosion, Arcing, 
Radiation, and Chemicals 
Insulation Breakdown, and Burnout of 
Parts 
Management Options 
Technical Specification survei- 
llance testing, channel, calibra- 
tion and, and function checks. 
Upgrade switches in safety sys- 
terns to transmitters and electric 
bistables 
Visual Inspections, Operational 
Checks, Torque Measurements, 
and contact resistance 
measurements 
Technical Specification Survei- 
llance Testing 
21 Motors and Motor Control Centers 
This section covers electric motors and associated motor control centers. Nuclear power plants contain approximately 1100 
motors (Subudhi et al. 1987) some of which are needed for safe operation of the plant. Management of the aging impacts to 
these motors is necessary for continued long term operation of the plants. 
21.1 Motor Mechanisms 
NPPs use electric motors as vital system components for both the performance of normal system operation and as safeguards 
to limit the possibility of radioactive release in the event of abnormal events. The motors used range in power output from less 
than 314 hp to greater than 250 hp and are used in MOVs, pumps, fans, and other miscellaneous applications. 
21.1.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
The two most common causes for the failure of motors in NPPs is excessive heat and vibration. In addition to these stressors, 
motors also are affected by misalignment, material degradation, and lubricant degradation. Table 21.1 presents aging concerns 
and mechanisms as they affect different components of a motor. 
Table 21.1 Aging concerns and mechanisms in motors 
Excessive heat usually results from excessive current through the motor which results in self heating. The vibrational effects 
originate in abnonnalities of internal parts. Most failures in motors result from failures of either the stator or bearings due to 
overheating and deterioration of lubricants. However, operational stresses such as frequent starts and stops of motors and 
backseating of valves can cause stress to the entire motor. The systems that are the most affected by motor failures are the 
rl 
RHR, SWS, and the HPCI systems (Subudhi et al. 1985, pp. S-2 through S-3). 
21.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Component 
Stator 
Bearings 
Rotor 
Accessories 
There are many ways to increase the life of the motors in a power plant and detect problems before failures occur. Periodic 
tests should be preformed at scheduled intervals on the motors to verify operability and to detect degradation. In addition to 
this, motors equipped with monitors should be monitored regularly according to the manufacturer's suggested time periods. 
Material of Concern 
Insulating Materials 
Grease, Lube Oil, Steel, Brass, 
Bronze 
Insulating Materials 
Seals, Gaskets, Mica, Plastic, 
Graphite, Cable, Insulating 
Material 
References 
Subudhi et el. 1985, 
pp. S-2 through S-3 
Aging Concern 
Ground Insulation Burnout 
Bearing Failure 
Failure or Excessive Friction 
Aging Mechanisms 
Overheating, Vibration, 
and Materials 
Degradation 
Vibration and Deteriora- 
tion of Lubrication Due 
to Heat or Foreign 
Materials 
Heat, Vibration, and 
Misalignment 
Table 21.2 gives a list of both dielectric and rotational integrity tests that should be run during monitoring of the motors. In 
addition to monitoring the condition of the motors, it is also recommended to inspect motors periodically for such things as 
contaminants, fractures, cracks, and vibration. 
Table 21.2 Managing aging in motors 
21.2 Motor Control Centers 
Motor control centers (MCCs) control and protect the electrical motors throughout a reactor. The major components of an 
MCC are circuit breakers, relays, starters, transformers, terminal blocks and overloads. (See Section 15 for relays and circuit 
breakers used throughout the entire plant.) Motor control centers protect motors from power surges and starting motors after a 
shutdown. They also transform incoming current and voltage to levels compatible to the various motors they control. 
Component 
Stator 
Bearing 
Rotor 
Accessories 
21.2.1 Aging Concerns and Mechanisms 
Management Options 
No load current measurement, 
winding resistance measurement, 
DclAc leakage test, polarization index 
test, dissipation factor and capacitance 
test, impulse voltage test, winding 
temperatUre 
vibration test, chemical analysis of 
lubricants, bearing temperature 
measurements 
Aging Mechanism 
Overheating, Vibration, and Materials 
Degradation 
Vibration and Deterioration of Lubrica- 
tion Due to Heat or Foreign Materials 
H ~ ~ ,  vibration, and ~ i ~ ~ l i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
Common causes of MCC failure include excessive heat, stress, and cyclic fatigue. Other stressors are corrosion, residue 
buildup, and vibration. These stressors and their concerns are listed in Table 21.3. Systems most affected by MCC failures 
are those which are run at frequent, intermittent operation, because intermittence leads to the degradation of such parts as the 
starters, relays, and circuit breakers. A failure in an MCC often results in the loss of function in a downstream system. These 
failures have caused reactor scrams and an inability to restart the reactor, but these consequences can be mitigated by 
redundant design. 
Reference 
Subudhi et al. 1987, 
pp. 2-5 
Table 21.3 Aging concerns and mechanisms in motor control centers 
Component 
Circuit Breaker 
Relays 
Starter/Contactor 
Transformer Coils 
Terminal Block 
Overloads 
Material of Concern 
Phenolic, Vulcanized Rubber 
Neoprene 
Lubricants, Adhesives, 
Silicone, Polyester 
Varnish, Polyester Film, 
Polyamide-imide insulation 
Phenolic 
Lubricants, Vulcanized Fiber 
Aging Concern 
Failed or Sporadic Tripping 
Incorrect Responses 
Failure to Open or Close 
Short to Ground, Failed 
Circuit 
Poor Connection, Short to 
Ground 
Improper Open Circuit 
Aging Mechanism 
Cyclic Fatigue, Wear of 
Components, Residue 
Buildup 
Hent, Material 
Degradation, Stress, 
Misalignment 
Stress, Heat, Surface Deg- 
radation, Foreign Materials 
Overheating, Material Deg- 
radation, Excessive Current 
Stress, Humidity, Dust 
Cyclic Fatigue, Ambient 
Conditions 
Reference 
Shier and Subudhi 
1988, pp. 4-20 
through 4-24 
21.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Table 21.4 provides a list of management options which mitigate the effects of aging. Inspection and monitoring of MCCs is 
highly recommended. The molded case CBs constitute the highest percentage of failures noted in MCC components. Many 
plants employ diagnostic techniques, but identification of degradation before failure is limited. Typically only 40% of CB 
failures are detected before failure occurs. In addition to this periodic monitoring, the plant should review their maintenance 
program if the MCC components are exposed to temperatures above 40 "C (104°F) for extended periods of time or if the 
components are frequently subjected to high cycles (Toman et al. 1994, pp.1-6 and 1-7). 
b 
Table 21.4 Managing aging in motor control centers 
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Reference 
Toman et al. 1994, 
pp. 1-3 through 1-5 
Component 
Circuit Breaker 
Relays 
StarterlContactor 
Transfomer Coils 
Terminal Blocks 
Overloads 
Subudhi, M., E. Burns, and J. Taylor. 1985. Operaring Experience and Aging-Seismic Assessment of Electric Motors. 
NUREGICR-4156, BNLNUREG-51861, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, New York. 
Subudhi, M., W. Gunther, and J. Taylor. 1987. Iqroving Motor Reliability in Nuclear Power Plants, Volume I :  Perfarm- 
ance Evaluation and Maintenance Practices. NUREGKR-4939, BNWNUREG-52031, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
Upton, New York. 
A g i i  Mechanism 
Cyclic Fatigue, Wear of 
Components, Residue Buildup 
Heat, Material Degradation, 
Stress, Misalignment 
Stress, Heat, Surface 
Degradation, Foreign Materials 
Overheating, Material 
Degradation, Excessive Current 
Stress, Humidity, Dust 
Cyclic Fatigue, Ambient 
Conditions 
Toman, G., R. Gazdzinski, and E. O'Hearn . 1994. Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Planrs 
Motor Control Centers. SAND93-7069, Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc., Blue Bell, Pennsylvania. 
Management Options 
Visual Inspection, Operational Trip Test, 
Test for Freedom of Movement 
Visual Inspection of Coil, Inspection for 
Corrosion, Operational Tests 
Visual Inspection of Coils, Visual 
Inspection for Dirt and Wear 
Resistance Measurements, Inspection for 
Overheating and Cracking 
Visual Inspection for Overheating, Cracks 
and Improper Alignment 
Visual Inspection for Overheating, Cracks, 
Dirt and Freedom of Movement 
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